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 Within the field of Restoration and eighteenth-century studies, critics have 
investigated the relationship between literature and science for almost a century. Even 
among specialists, however, there has been insufficient enquiry into epistemological 
tensions between categories for what now might be called “pre-science” and what was 
then known as “natural philosophy.” Even less attention has been paid to the relation 
between natural philosophy and the category of speculation, in which speculation is 
understood scientifically and literarily. I explore how what I define as speculative writing 
about natural philosophy assisted in publicizing and spreading new epistemologies during 
the Restoration and early eighteenth century. In analyzing speculative writing, I 
investigate the cultural reception of natural philosophy, tracing responses to such 
changes. I argue that the speculative mode emphasizes a more integrated vision of 
knowledge formation at that time, a vision that is now divided by the categories of art and 
science. 
Emphasizing the contemporary reactions to these various models of knowledge, 
my methods require a deeply historical approach. To focus this approach, I consider 
writings in the Restoration that respond to the formation and practices of the early Royal 
Society: its institutional presence and public mission made it an especially attractive 
target of speculative writing that would challenge the Society’s official promotion of the 
experimental method and rejection of the speculative method. I take as evidence both 
literary and nonliterary documents, representative of a range of genres: these include 
dictionaries printed at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, Thomas Sprat’s The History of the Royal Society and Abraham Cowley’s 
opening ode, Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis and Margaret Cavendish’s Observations upon 
Experimental Philosophy and Blazing World, as well as Thomas Shadwell’s The Virtuoso 
and Aphra Behn’s The Emperor of the Moon. My argument considers the mixed and 
conflicting strands that informed the broader category of natural philosophy and 
recognizes the many ways in which the texts concerned with natural philosophy are by no 
means easily separated into so-called scientific or literary ones. I conclude the study by 
looking forward, linking the beginnings of the speculative mode in the Restoration period 
to a popular eighteenth-century text – Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels. I end with a 
call to understand the cultural moment of the Restoration better by joining together works 
of science and art as both valid and necessary avenues toward knowledge and literary 
history. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Everything must have a beginning, […] and that beginning must be linked to 
something that went before.1 
       Mary Shelley  
 
 
Within the field of Restoration and eighteenth-century studies, critics have 
investigated the relationship between literature and science for almost a century.2 Much 
of this work has included efforts to define “science” in that era, acknowledging that the 
word “science” has a different denotation in the Restoration and eighteenth century and 
that what precedes the modern term “science” is better labeled as “natural philosophy.” 
Even among specialists, however, there has been insufficient enquiry into tensions 
between categories for what now might be called “pre-science” and what was then known 
as “natural philosophy.” Depending on what kind of natural philosophy a philosopher 
practiced, speculation might be central to his practice or a method he sought to distance 
himself from. Either way, speculation was a crucial part of the discourse surrounding   
																																																								
1 In Shelley’s introduction to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein. 
2 When I use the term “literature” I use it to reference works that we now would consider literary – works 
of drama, poetry, and fictive prose. However, during the “long” eighteenth century, literature was more 
broadly defined. Throughout most of my project, I will use the terms “writing” or “speculative writing” to 
connote a response to natural philosophy that we would most likely refer to as a type of literature today. 
“Science” is another problematic term that is often employed by scholars who study what some refer to as 
the “Scientific Revolution.” The term “science” did not mean what we often think of when we hear the 
word “science.” “Science” usually meant general knowledge or study. I prefer to avoid the use of this term 
throughout my project; however, that is near to impossible because almost all scholars whom I reference 
employ that term. When I do use the word, I do so only to quote them. At times, for its ease of use, I 
reluctantly refer to “science,” but I always put it in quotation marks to indicate I am using that term loosely 
and anachronistically. See chapter two for a more in-depth investigation into the term “science.” 
	
	2 
natural philosophy. Despite its prominence – either in practice or as part of the discourse 
surrounding methodology – even less attention has been paid to what speculation means, 
both scientifically and literarily. Some of this tension arises because of the distinctions 
between speculative and experimental philosophy during the Restoration period. What I 
will eventually define and differentiate as speculative and experimental philosophy often 
gets labeled by scholars under a variety of terms: natural philosophy, science, 
empiricism, pre-science, and imagination – just to name a few. Understanding the 
nuances of these terms will prove essential to understanding how what would come to be 
known eventually as literature developed in certain directions because of its relation to 
this “pre-science.” As pre-science moved closer to what we today refer to as empiricism, 
speculation became aligned with the imaginative faculties, eventually becoming a prized 
component of the imagination. At the same time, speculative writing emphasized the 
need for the humanities at this particular moment in history, as a means through which to 
better understand science.4  
																																																								
4 In choosing the term “speculative writing,” which I describe as operating in the “speculative mode,” I 
have selected a term that had historical relevance. As I will establish in the introduction and in chapter two, 
the term “speculative” was related to a type of philosophy that relied on observation and conjecture to 
formulate truth. As a type of philosophy that relied more on observation and experimentation emerged, 
speculative thinking was positioned as inferior. My term, “speculative,” therefore, represents the debate 
between these two different kinds of knowledge production – speculation and experimentation. The 
“speculative mode” should not be confused with “speculative fiction,” a term coined in 1941 by Robert A. 
Heinlein. According to Merek Oziewicz, “the term ‘speculative fiction’ has three historically located 
meanings: a subgenre of science fiction that deals with human rather than technological problems, a genre 
distinct from and opposite to science fiction in its exclusive focus on possible futures, and a super category 
for all genres that deliberately depart from imitating “consensus reality” of everyday experience. In this 
latter sense, speculative fiction includes fantasy, science fiction, and horror, but also their derivatives, 
hybrids, and cognate genres like the gothic, dystopia, weird fiction, post-apocalyptic fiction, ghost stories, 
superhero tales, alternate history, steampunk, slipstream, magic realism, fractured fairy tales, and more” 
(n.p.). 
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 Speculative writing, as I define it, relies on practices formerly associated with 
older methodologies, namely those grounded in observation and conjecture. In other 
words, speculative writers rely on their observations of practices related to natural 
philosophy and then use those observations to hypothesize or speculate on what 
significance those practices might have for society and culture. As such, speculative 
writing that responds to the formation of the Royal Society as a public institution 
contributes to the Restoration discourse surrounding the developments in natural 
philosophy. These writings explore how shifts in epistemology impact us on a more 
personal level, within our daily lives and within our homes. Writings about natural 
philosophy assisted the public in mediating and discussing the anxieties that arose from 
such large shifts in knowledge.5 In this dissertation, focusing attention on general readers 
instead of practitioners exemplifies how the progression of “science” was slow moving, 
instead of sudden, and how its trajectory did not follow a straight, progressive line that 
consistently advanced toward more modern ideas of science. Our understanding of how 
this change occurred is limited if we consider the “scientific revolution” only in terms of 
those who practiced natural philosophy and not in light of those who were impacted by 
the changes natural philosophy brought.  
																																																								
5	When I refer to the public in my dissertation, I mean the reading public. David H. Richter argues that 
there is evidence for an increase in literacy during the eighteenth century. He notes that in 1700 around “50 
percent of men and 15 percent of women” could sign their name, but that those numbers jumped to 65 
percent and 40 percent by 1820 (214). According to Ian Watt, although the reading public at this time was 
larger than in previous eras, it was “far from the mass reading public of today” (35). There was an increase 
in printed titles between the years 1700 and 1800, rising from 1,800 to 6,000; however, Abigail Williams 
notes that books were expensive, “luxury items” (95); nevertheless, there were other ways that people could 
access print – newspapers, abridgements, secondhand shops, and circulating libraries. Williams also 
discusses how text was read out loud, both in the home and in public places (96). Despite a reading public 
that was small, Nicola Parsons contends that “print and reading were vital to the public sphere” at the start 
of the eighteenth century (7). 
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Al Coppola notes that there has been a “recent wave of revisionist histories of 
early modern science” that seeks to look beyond the practitioners’ and apologists’ views 
of natural philosophy to recover how society related to and understood natural philosophy 
(15). Joseph Drury traces the recent trends in the study of literature and science in his 
2017 article, “Literature and Science in Enlightenment Britain: New Directions.” His 
essay identifies four main areas of research in this field, although he notes that these 
research areas often overlap: poetry and performance, fiction, new ontologies, and 
politics and gender.6 Both Coppola and Drury acknowledge the connection between the 
discursive practices of natural philosophy and the techniques used in literary texts. 
Although scholars continue to explore how natural philosophy influenced literary texts, 
scholars are now beginning to investigate what practices literature and natural philosophy 
shared (Drury 2). More and more, scholars are breaking away from the tradition that 
natural philosophy came into practice and then was disseminated across society. Instead, 
many scholars see literary works as playing an “essential role” in natural philosophy’s 
creation, arguing that eighteenth-century literature actively participated in the societal 
networks that “establish and sustain that knowledge” (Drury 9).7 Coppola argues that this 
																																																								
6 Drury notes that such research explores: the “discursive strategies that 18th-century fiction shares with 
new science,” specifically the new practices of narration and description afforded by the “sciences” (4); the 
“renewal of interest” in neo-Epicureanism (6); the exploration of how “science” reflected or departed from 
the political rhetoric of moderation; and investigations into what opportunities women in the eighteenth-
century were afforded by “science” (8).  
7 For some of this recent scholarship see: Courtney Weiss Smith, Empiricist Devotions: Science, Religion, 
and Poetry in Early Eighteenth-Century England (2016); Karen Bloom Gervitz, Women, the Novel, and 
Natural Philosophy, 1660-1727 (2014); Sarah Tindal Kareem, Eighteenth-Century Fiction and the 
Reinvention of Wonder (2014); James J. Bono, “Making Knowledge: History, Literature, and the Poetics of 
Science” (2010); Jesse Molesworth, Chance and the Eighteenth-Century Novel: Realism, Probability, 
Magic (2010); John Shanahan, “Theatrical Space and Scientific Space in Thomas Shadwell’s Virtuoso” 
(2009); Catherine Gallagher, “The Rise of Fictionality” (2006); Clark Lawlor, “Poetry and Science” 
(2006); Barbara Bendict, Curiosity: A Cultural History of Early Modern Inquiry (2001);  Jan Golinski, 
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knowledge is expressed and circulated within “networks of persons, objects, and 
institutions that radiate out from the lab in all directions, linking specimens and scientists, 
politicians and playwrights, mechanics’ workshops and middle-class households” (16).  
My dissertation coordinates with the trends that Coppola and Drury note, as I seek 
to explore how writing about natural philosophy assisted in publicizing and spreading 
new epistemologies. In exploring these speculative writings, I am investigating the 
cultural reception of natural philosophy, analyzing responses to such changes. My 
methodology emphasizes the contemporary reactions to these various models of 
knowledge, which requires a deeply historical approach. Within this method, I take as 
evidence both literary and nonliterary documents, representative of a range of genres. I 
rely on this array of texts because each provides historical evidence: literary texts, 
dictionaries, and other nonfiction materials are each representative of the cultural 
moment. As such, close reading supports the method through which I analyze such varied 
texts. In putting these writings into conversation with one another, I can focus on how 
they relate to each other. Although there may not always be a clear cause and effect 
relationship between them, there is at least a dynamic of association. Because I rely 
highly on historical evidence, it is necessary to provide some background on Restoration 
politics and gender dynamics. The reason for this approach, above all, is to historicize, as 
specifically as possible, what was understood in the era as tensions between new 
organizations of knowledge and their cultural experiences. I am interested, therefore, in 
cultural politics and the power dynamics of competing knowledge.  
																																																																																																																																																																					
Science as Public Culture (1999); and Larry Stewart, The Rise of Public Science: Rhetoric, Technology, 
and Natural Philosophy in Newtonian Britain, 1660-1750 (1992). 
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My argument considers the mixed and conflicting strands that informed the 
broader category of natural philosophy and recognizes the many ways in which the texts 
concerned with natural philosophy are by no means easily separated into so-called 
scientific or literary ones, a complication that I will discuss further below. Analyzing 
several genres within what I call “speculative writing” – that which speaks back to the 
rhetoric of the Royal Society - I will establish that this writing not only critiques these 
new methods but also helps to shape them. Speculative writing also assists in knowledge 
production by entering the discourse surrounding natural philosophy. Consequently, I 
participate in what Coppola refers to as a “revisionist history” because my goal is to 
establish a discursive interchange between messages promoted by the Royal Society and 
how they were received and molded by writers outside of the Society. Writing in the 
Restoration and early eighteenth century that I define as speculative writing took on the 
topic of natural philosophy as one of its main subjects participated in a kind of 
speculative questioning of natural philosophy and its possible trajectories. I argue that 
what today is known as science fiction, and by that label assumed to be a genre, is what 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth century functioned as a mode that could appear in any 
genre – a mode that I call speculative.8 Exploring the speculative provides us with a 
																																																								
8 Scholars remain divided on whether science fiction is a genre or a mode, although many tend to refer to it 
as a genre. In fact, science fiction is often a member of the umbrella term “genre fiction.” David Seed 
asserts that calling science fiction a genre fails to “recognize the hybrid nature of many science fiction 
works” in which “different genres and subgenres [such as the fantastic voyage, the utopia, the tale of the 
future, and so on] intersect” (1). As will be discussed in chapters two and three, the Royal Society 
rhetorically positioned itself as opposed to “speculative philosophy.” The new philosophy, as practiced by 
the Society, advocated for experimental philosophy, which drew its conclusions inductively, by relying on 
observation and experimentation. See the next chapter for more analysis about what “speculation” meant at 
the time. 
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different foundation on which to understand the science fiction that follows and reorients 
emphases that will appear in later science fiction.  
In considering the role of the speculative mode, it is necessary to acknowledge its 
connection to the eventual development of the genre of science fiction. According to John 
Frow, “genres create effects of reality and truth, authority and plausibility, which are 
central to the different ways the world is understood” (2). One genre that attempts to 
understand the role of science in the modern world is science fiction. Many scholars of 
science fiction have searched and continue to search for precursors to science fiction, but 
those scholars often disagree about the origins of science fiction. David Seed contends 
that the range of origins of science fiction span from Lucian’s A True Story in the second 
century, to Thomas More’s Utopia (1516), to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), to as 
recent as the early twentieth century (2). The span of time in Seed’s history represents the 
difficulty in determining what counts as “science” and what counts as “fiction.”9 Brian 
Stableford considers that the application of the scientific method in the seventeenth 
century means that authors started writing science fiction about the latest discoveries and 
modern technologies during that period (15); accordingly, he proposes that Francis 
Godwin’s The Man in the Moone (1638) could be another potential forerunner.10 
Godwin’s narrative, however, mixes fantasy with musings about possible life on the 
moon. Stableford’s assessment, therefore, seems grounded in Godwin’s speculations 
																																																								
9 Seed contends that any text from antiquity should be seen as “ur-science fiction” and that works from the 
Renaissance through the early nineteenth century move closer to the methods we find today in science 
fiction, so they should be labeled “proto-science fiction.” In Seed’s view, science fiction emerged in the 
late nineteenth century (2). 
10 Stableford fails to acknowledge that the modern scientific method was not established in the seventeenth 
century.  
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instead of recognizing that Godwin’s text does not develop conclusions based on the 
writer’s observations about natural philosophy. Interestingly, the chronology in The 
Cambridge Companion to Science Fiction classifies nine titles prior to Frankenstein as 
members of the genre, beginning with More’s Utopia, followed by Francis Bacon’s New 
Atlantis (1627), and also includes Godwin’s The Man in the Moone (1638). German, 
French, and Norwegian writers penned the remaining narratives in the Cambridge 
chronology, and none of the titles listed during the Restoration or eighteenth century is by 
a British writer.11 This range of dates can be explained in part by whether scholars choose 
to focus on a particular historical and cultural understanding of science or on thematic 
connections across time periods. When scholars argue for the former, they suggest that 
science fiction “could only have arisen in a culture experiencing the Industrial 
Revolution,” as opposed to the latter, which speaks to “something more fundamental in 
the human make-up, some human desire to imagine worlds other than the one we actually 
inhabit” (Roberts 37-38).  
Regardless of what work scholars label as the first work of science fiction, the 
speculative mode is a type of writing that allows us to trace the beginnings of an 
imaginative response toward natural philosophy. The speculative mode is a valuable link 
in the long history of cultural responses to an epistemological shift that will develop into 
																																																								
11 Other critics’ views of the origins of science fiction have ranged substantially. Brian Aldiss, Billion Year 
Spree: The True History of Science Fiction (1973) asserts Frankenstein is the beginning of the genre; Mark 
Rose, Alien Encounters: Anatomy of Science Fiction (1981), marks Jules Verne and H.G. Wells as the 
originators of the genre; Paul Alkon, Science Fiction Before 1900: Imagination Discovers Technology 
(1994), marks Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels (1726) as 
precursors but Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as the original (1); Brian Stableford’s, “The Emergence of 
Science Fiction,” in Anatomy of Wonder (2004), argues that the first work of proto-science fiction is 
Gulliver’s Travels; and Adam Roberts, The History of Science Fiction (2005) cites Godwin, in addition to 
John Wilkins’s Discovery of a World in the Moon (1638) and Gulliver’s Travels.   
	
	9 
what we now call science fiction. However, if there is such a strong relationship between 
the speculative mode and science fiction, why not just refer to the speculative mode as 
science fiction or at least as a precursor/prototype? When considering speculative writing 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that take on natural philosophy as one of their 
main subjects, employing the term “speculative mode” as opposed to “science fiction” (or 
referring to them as precursors to science fiction) is necessary for several reasons. First, 
the words “science” and “science fiction” are both anachronistic when applied to 
Restoration and eighteenth-century texts, as demonstrated by the study of dictionary 
definitions of terms such as “science,” which is discussed in depth in chapter two.12  
There are also problems with both, especially when used in light of early contributors to 
the mode. For example, part of the concern with the word “fiction,” is that it implies 
narrative (especially prose) and excludes other genres. Moreover, the word “science” also 
poses a problem since that word has drastically changed meaning over time. 
“Speculative,” instead of “science” emphasizes the theoretical, as opposed to 
experimental knowledge. It sufficiently describes an inclination toward conjectural 
reasoning, a practice that both natural philosophers and writers were participating in 
because of natural philosophy. 
According to Helen Conrad-O’Briain, science fiction appears and reappears in 
response to scientific and technological shifts (33), and the speculative mode does the 
same. However, the speculative mode is more inclusive because it does not specify or 
imply the requirement of prose narrative. The speculative mode also deemphasizes 
																																																								
12 According to the OED, the term “science fiction” was not used until 1851. 
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science fiction’s requirement for technological plausibility. Typically, science fiction 
readers expect that predictions of technology be possible within the realms of science, so 
texts that are more far-fetched or fantastical would be excluded from science fiction. 
Because natural philosophers in the Royal Society themselves were speculating about 
technology with no hard proof to back up some of their theories, it seems appropriate that 
speculative writers would be doing the same; hence what today might be seen as so 
fantastical as to be outside the bounds of science fiction proper could be within the 
framework of possibilities within natural philosophy. Finally, the speculative mode, as I 
define it, neither requires nor dictates that imaginative literature operating within the 
mode focus mainly on the topic of natural philosophy, even though science fiction 
typically requires a sustained focus on science. Ultimately, recognizing the importance of 
the speculative mode emphasizes the essential position these literary writers occupy as 
part of a longer continuum that eventually gets labeled “science fiction.” The themes that 
speculative works in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were investigating have 
become more pertinent as time has progressed because they contribute to understanding 
cultural responses to discourses that shape our understanding of how the natural world 
works and how experimental philosophy shapes methods of inquiry. Without this 
category of the speculative mode, we ignore the work of the speculative in multiple 
genres. Understanding this mode leads to a richer and deeper understanding of how 
science fiction developed as a genre, while also providing insight into the ways in which 
speculative and experimental thinking were connected in the Restoration and eighteenth 
century. 
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I have chosen the term “speculative” because of its meaning at the time. 
Speculative philosophy was associated with ancient methods of knowledge formation, 
namely deductive reasoning, in which observations are used to suppose conclusions and 
theories. Therefore, when I refer to the “speculative” mode, I mean a type of writing that 
observes the practices of natural philosophy and then deduces where those practices 
might lead. Speculative writing, therefore, relies on conjecture and prediction and not on 
knowledge derived completely from the senses (as experimental philosophy does). As the 
Royal Society criticized speculation and sought to distance itself from it, writing about 
natural philosophy relied on speculation to ponder, criticize, and hypothesize about the 
various consequences “science” might have for society – both positive and negative. 
Additionally, the speculative mode draws attention to the various ways that speculative 
writing often used the tools of empiricism to consider truths that cannot be known 
empirically.13  
Speculative writing as I define it here is a vast territory, and studies of it could fill 
volumes. To focus my approach, I consider writings that respond to the formation and 
practices of the early Royal Society: its institutional presence and public mission made it 
an especially attractive target of speculative writing that would challenge the Society’s 
official promotion of the experimental and rejection of the speculative. R.S. Woolhouse 
																																																								
13 The term “empiricism” is another often employed by current scholars, despite the absence of the term 
from various discourses in the Restoration and early eighteenth century. We often refer to Francis Bacon as 
the “father of empiricism”; however, natural philosophers did not use that word to describe their methods. 
The Royal Society labeled their practices as “experimental philosophy,” and we often refer to those 
practices as empirical since they are based in methods that we today associate with empiricism (induction, 
observation, and experimentation). See chapter two for more information on the use of the term 
“empiricism.” See also chapters two and three for distinctions made between speculative and experimental 
philosophy.  
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contends that natural philosophy, although it was still emerging as a concept, was a 
“public, not private development,” and he argues that the institutionalization of the Royal 
Society is proof that natural philosophy was part of public life (67). The notion of a 
“public science” was derived from the experimental methods in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries. One of the purposes of its practitioners, according to Larry 
Stewart, was to make natural philosophy public (xxii). Consequently, the Philosophical 
Transactions and Thomas Sprat’s The History of the Royal Society were both avenues 
through which natural philosophers could spread knowledge outside the confines of the 
laboratory (xxiv).14 Although, as we will see, the Royal Society had multiple goals for the 
role it might serve in society, “the translation of private knowledge into public certainty 
had long been at the heart” of the Royal Society’s varied purposes (Woolhouse 101). 
The public nature of the Society’s mission opened its methods up to public 
scrutiny and critique. This critique could often be found across genres in what I delineate 
as the “speculative mode,” which was emerging in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and has thus far gone unnamed and perhaps underappreciated and 
																																																								
14 For recent scholarship on the Royal Society see: Elliot Rossiter, “Locke, Providence, and the Limits of 
Natural Philosophy” (2014); Peter Harrison, “Sentiments of Devotion and Experimental Philosophy in 
Seventeenth-Century England” (2014); Palmira Fontes Da Costa, The Singular and the Making of 
Knowledge at the Royal Society of London in the Eighteenth Century (2009); Marie Boas Hall, Henry 
Oldenburg: Shaping the Royal Society (2002); William Lynch, Solomon’s Child: Method in the Early 
Royal Society of London (2001). For recent scholarship on the Royal Society as public enterprise refer to 
John Shanahan, “The Dryden-Davenant Tempest, Wonder Production, and the State of Natural Philosophy 
in 1667” (2013) and “Theatrical Space and Scientific Space in Thomas Shadwell’s Virtuoso” (2009); Peter 
Dear, “Toitus in verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the Early Royal Society” (2014); Science in Print: Essays 
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unrecognized. Since it was an emerging mode, classifying which texts are speculative and 
which are not can be difficult. Nevertheless, the main goal in identifying emergent forms 
is larger than mere classification (Fowler 37), especially since the discourses used by 
natural philosophers and those used in “literary” texts were still being established (Aït-
Touati 5). In fact, “the meaning of the word ‘literature’ was much broader in this period,” 
leading critics to question whether eighteenth-century writers saw any difference between 
works of literature and science: all were ‘literature’ to them (Lawlor 40). The goal, then, 
is not just to identify which works might be classified as speculative, but instead to 
investigate their function in developing a speculative or imaginative response to natural 
philosophy.15 Because writing about natural philosophy by its practitioners did not yet 
have a “fixed form” and because natural philosophy was still in the process of deriving 
methods “distinct from the methods of literary writers,” we must remain cognizant of the 
fact that natural philosophy and speculative writing share similar motifs in the texts each 
produces (Aït-Touati 5). That could mean, for instance, that writings produced by the 
Royal Society for the purposes of promoting experimental philosophy could contain 
																																																								
15 When I use the word “imaginative” or “imagination,” I do so understanding the long history of 
philosophical and aesthetic treatises on the “imagination,” acknowledging that it is a complicated term. 
Occasionally, I do use the term to indicate a process the brain goes through when speculating, a process 
that is often understood in opposition to experimental philosophy. Dictionaries of the day, as will be 
discussed in chapter two, define the term “imagination” in a variety of ways and often list “fancy” as 
synonymous with the “imagination.” Some of those definitions include the imagination as an act of 
conceiving or surmising in the mind, while others define it with terms that denote a creative process – it 
feigns, invents, or devises. As Samuel Johnson describes the process of imagining, it is “to paint with the 
mind.” Sprat also employs the terms “fancy” and “imagination” to distinguish the speculative process from 
the experimental process; therefore, it is not a term I can avoid. As we will see, however, there are clusters 
of terms – such as “fancy,” “imagination,” and “magic” – that are frequently juxtaposed with the category 
of knowledge verified by the experimental method. I do not necessarily intend for such terms to be 
synonymous but am instead presenting them as a lexical field against which experimental philosophy is 
defining itself. Many of these terms as they are used in the Restoration lead to what will be known and 
appreciated as the “imagination.” 
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elements that seem more “literary” and more aligned with speculative modes of 
discourse. Although my study focuses on the speculative mode in relation to what we 
might deem today as “literature,” that does not mean that only texts we might consider to 
be literature were operating in the speculative mode. To underscore the dynamic between 
natural philosophy and speculative writing and to show the necessity of considering 
multiple genres, I examine works ranging from proto-novels, to poetry, to drama, to 
periodicals.  
Because speculative writing can be found across genres, classifying this type of 
writing as contributing to a mode and not a genre is an important distinction. Genre as a 
term is multi-faceted and complex.16 Genre or kind is distinguished by formal or 
structural classifications (Frow 67). Genre, thus, is distinct because of its noticeable 
formal features (Sitter 94). The mode, as opposed to genre, involves more of an “elusive 
generic idea,” making it so that it can seem unclear exactly how the mode relates to or is 
connected to genre. Alastair Fowler notes that when discussing genre, we can always put 
it in the form of a noun (a novel, an epic), but modes tend to be adjectives (106). As Frow 
notes, “rather than standing alone, modes are usually qualifications or modifications of 
particular genres (pastoral elegy or satirical sitcom)” (65). It is useful, therefore, to think 
of a mode as a type of writing that does not have to adhere to certain formal structures 
																																																								
16 In “An Introduction to Genre Theory” Daniel Chandler notes that the “word genre comes from the 
French (and originally Latin) word for 'kind' or 'class'. The term is widely used in rhetoric, literary theory, 
media theory, and more recently linguistics, to refer to a distinctive type of 'text'” (1). Within literature, the 
most basic genres include poetry, prose, and drama. Chandler acknowledges that terms related to genre are 
abstract so “one theorist’s genre may be another’s sub-genre” and what one sees as a mode “may be treated 
as a genre by another” (1). According to Jill Marie Bradbury, “genre itself was a critical problem during the 
late seventeenth and eighteenth century, when there was no consistent principle for distinguishing among 
forms of prose literature” (29). 
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and instead focuses on the writer’s purpose, while also signifying “a broader specification 
of tone” (Frow 65). In that regard, a mode modifies a genre, and the term “mode” 
signifies certain themes or ways of speaking, but mode does not require specific formal 
structures. In other words, modes are completely detached from having to adhere to 
certain types of arrangements that are expected in genre (65). For example, if I refer to 
Margaret Cavendish’s The Blazing World as a speculative prose narrative, I mean that 
The Blazing World by kind is a prose narrative, but by mode it is speculative. The 
“speculative mode,” therefore, signifies a certain tone and/or a certain theme that 
Cavendish includes and does not refer to generic or formal elements. Furthermore, mode 
does not imply sustained focus, in that a mode may be found in some or all of the work 
(Frow 107). That is why a work such as Gulliver’s Travels can participate in the 
speculative mode even though only a small portion of it (several chapters in Book III) 
focuses on natural philosophy. Additionally, modes traverse genre, in that a certain type 
of mode can be found in a novel, a play, or a poem. The variable nature of the 
“speculative mode,” in particular, does not confine itself to specific forms, especially in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Modes, like genre, can also transcend literary 
periods; however, modes can change or become outdated “when the values they enshrine, 
or the emotions they evoke, grow alien” (Frow 111). In the case of the speculative mode, 
as science and technology continue to advance into the present age, this particular mode 
becomes more and more relevant. 
Based on the distinctions above, the word “mode” indicates a common focus on 
natural philosophy, and it draws attention to the writer’s purpose and tone – in the cases I 
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explore, a critical purpose and often a ridiculing or disparaging tone. In defining the 
speculative mode, I also include its treatment of certain themes. Its variable forms arise in 
part from the speculative mode’s concern with emerging or imagined, thus changing, 
epistemologies. In exploring the speculative mode in the chapters that follow, it is 
important that I clarify that such writing is not merely about natural philosophy, meaning 
that subject matter is not the only criterion that must be met in order to classify a work as 
speculative. The purpose and tone are just as important as the subject matter since the 
purpose of investigating natural philosophy is to consider the ways in which natural 
philosophy could affect society. In that way, the speculative mode is often attempting to 
forecast or predict consequences of emerging epistemologies. In terms of tone, the 
speculative mode focuses on natural philosophy and its technologies so as to provide a 
social, political, and/or cultural critique. The ever-fluctuating mode, therefore, seems 
suited to address the substantial cultural questions and anxieties that accompany such 
technological advancements. Thus, the speculative mode speaks to themes of cultural 
change, managing and dealing with particular anxieties about technological advancement. 
As such, the speculative mode is a type of writing that critically considers the place of 
natural philosophy in society in order to ask “what if?” questions. These “what if?” 
questions are often tied to certain apprehensions associated with new technologies and 
epistemologies. Such questions frequently tackle themes such as skepticism regarding the 
advancements of natural philosophy, fears and uncertainties about natural philosophy and 
its practitioners, and natural philosophy’s potential to harm society. Speculative writing 
may also focus on the fantastical, while simultaneously staying true to the plausibility of 
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a scientific age, “thereby providing an artistically satisfying vehicle for rational 
speculation” (Alkon Science 3).   
Without the category of the speculative, we might disregard the very real ways 
that this category exposes the relation of speculative philosophy to experimental 
philosophy; this connection to the speculative was often either overlooked or denigrated 
by the Royal Society. Additionally, the speculative mode emphasizes a more integrated 
vision of knowledge formation at that time, a vision that is now divided by the categories 
of art and science. Mark Greenberg contends that the Restoration and eighteenth century 
emerge as “the pivotal period for what deepens into an ongoing antipathy between the 
two socially constructed institutions” of literature and science (116). Greenberg goes on 
to argue that works written during this period give us insight into the “fierce struggle 
between science, or natural philosophy, and literature as competing […] social 
institutions” (116-17). What Greenberg fails to acknowledge, however, is that science 
and natural philosophy were not the same categories in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, and the meaning of literature at the time was broader because it could include 
natural philosophy as its subject matter. Although the speculative mode does highlight 
the beginning of a struggle between speculative and experimental knowledge, the 
speculative mode also gives us access to the ways in which natural philosophy stimulated 
writers to consider the consequences, both positive and negative, that natural philosophy 
might have for society. Literary writers found in natural philosophy “not only a rich 
source of inspiration but a whole range of new strategies of writing and techniques with 
which they could develop their own way of thinking about fiction or story telling” (Aït-
	
	18 
Touati 6). By investigating the speculative mode, we can examine the various ways in 
which natural philosophy and literature “joined in a larger project […] of defining ‘truth’ 
in terms of verisimilitude of probability” (Bender 252). In other words, speculative 
literature participated in natural philosophy by questioning how realistic and how 
probable empirical truths could be. In the Restoration and early eighteenth century, the 
speculative mode brings conjecture and hypothesis in its response to natural philosophy 
to transform the reader’s understanding of what might be known and seen. The 
speculative mode also humanizes experimental philosophy because it removes it from the 
laboratory, reminding us that natural philosophers are royal subjects and family members. 
Speculative writing envisions how natural philosophy operates within society and 
custom, so as to “spatially represent and enhance” new discoveries (Greenberg 117). Put 
differently, speculative writers frame natural philosophy in a new way, sharing in the new 
knowledge while also making it their own.  
  In addition to speculative writers participating in natural philosophy through their 
conjecture, I argue that the speculative mode was also contributing to the development of 
natural philosophy. Andrew Cunningham notes that when scholars try to construct a 
history of science, they construct that origin narrative by pointing to practitioners such as 
Copernicus, Kepler, and Newton. This kind of narrative leads to agreement among 
scholars as to “what does and what does not ‘count as’ past science and who does and 
who does not qualify as a past scientist” (365-66). Such consensus about the origins of 
science often excludes speculative thinking and writing, never considering that perhaps 
the kinds of observations and speculations found within imaginative writing might also 
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classify as “scientific.” The main feature common to the speculative mode is that it 
intends to be fictive rather than factual, perhaps one of the reasons for why it is often 
overlooked as part of the discourse surrounding natural philosophy. Broadening our 
conceptions of the history of science means that we must look to the ways in which 
people of the time understood and described their own activities, and those descriptions 
should trump our own assumptions of what we think it meant to practice science 
(Cunningham 278). The framework I will employ allows us to investigate seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century works that have received little scholarly attention, looking first at 
the “scientific” society written about in speculative prose, as a means through which to 
explore the implications of a culture led by “scientists,” and then at the fictive individual 
practitioner in drama as representative of disorder and chaos within the domestic space. 
The Royal Society did not publicly acknowledge the importance of the 
speculative to knowledge formation, and in fact, sought to denigrate the speculative as a 
valid path to truth. The speculative, as represented in the Society’s rhetoric, was inferior 
because it placed value not on the senses and what can be observed, but on conjecture 
and theory. As experimental philosophy positioned itself as superior to speculative 
philosophy, writers in the speculative mode exemplify the fact that “the extraordinary and 
the unreal are not necessarily a retreat from the world around us. Rather they are vehicles 
to express [relevant] fears and possible solutions” (Conrad-O’Briain 28). Writers of the 
Restoration and eighteenth century who were composing in the speculative mode 
encouraged readers to reconsider the world around them in light of emerging 
epistemological and technological shifts. Accordingly, exploring the speculative mode 
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allows us to trace how we came to be where we are in “our attitudes toward science” 
(Conrad-O’Briain 28-9). 
In exploring the speculative mode, it is essential to first establish the many ways 
in which terms associated with natural philosophy were understood, both by non-
practitioners and by the Society, itself. As such, the organization of my project reflects 
the need to establish a sense of the differences between experimental and speculative 
philosophy – differences I establish in the next two chapters. What follows these 
delineations are chapters that explore how speculative writing enters into this discourse, 
which I undertake by first looking at literature that responds to the society as an 
institutional unit and then by investigating representations of its individual practitioners.  
As I have indicated, the speculative is a cultural response to natural philosophy, 
so understanding how some of the ways that public may have understand natural 
philosophy proves useful to analyzing the varied responses represented in speculative 
writing. Because much of the public would not have had expertise in natural philosophy, 
dictionaries became a valuable tool through which to communicate terminology related to 
natural philosophy. In chapter two, I investigate the role of dictionaries printed at the end 
of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century in order to 
demonstrate how knowledge about natural philosophy was disseminated into the culture 
at large. Definitions of words such as “natural philosophy,” “speculation,” and 
“imagination” illustrate how frequently they were conflated with one another, exposing 
the complex and contradictory ways that natural philosophy was understood. These 
dictionaries illuminate a divide between speculative philosophy and experimental 
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philosophy – a divide that nevertheless could define the category of natural philosophy. 
Speculative philosophy, as defined at the time, focuses on contemplation of the natural 
world and/or the divine by methods that rely both on observation and theory. 
Experimental philosophy, on the other hand, attempted to abandon any truth that was not 
derived from observation and experiment; however, speculative questioning and 
speculative philosophy continued to coexist even as experimental philosophy was 
rhetorically positioned as superior. Not only did these dictionaries ascribe speculation to 
natural philosophy, but as I will demonstrate, Fellows within the Royal Society continued 
to rely on speculation as part of their method. Uncovering what the general reader’s 
conceptions of natural philosophy might have been allows me to demonstrate the Janus-
faced nature of the emerging “new science”: the dictionaries will reveal that newer 
philosophical methods were still immersed in older methodologies. Because these 
dictionaries assisted readers with comprehending complex ideas about natural 
philosophy, acknowledging the ways in which dictionaries combined older and newer 
methods provides us with a more nuanced understanding of the rate at which these ideas 
were disseminated into the larger culture.   
In addition to the dictionaries explored in the second chapter, which contributed 
to the understanding and popularization of natural philosophy, Sprat’s The History of the 
Royal Society became another way for the reading public to engage with emerging 
epistemologies. Chapter three focuses specifically on the formation of the Royal Society 
in 1660 and its incorporation in 1662 because of the public nature of this corporate 
approach to natural philosophy. As their rhetoric demonstrates, the Society legitimized its 
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methods, at least partly, by advocating for approaches that could be practiced as part of a 
community and public demonstrations of experiments were a crucial component of this 
cooperative approach.  
The Royal Society, I argue, was extremely concerned with its public image, 
prompting the Society to commission its written history a mere seven years after its 
formation. The Royal Society as an institution came to stand for the new experimental 
philosophy, exemplified by Thomas Sprat’s History and Abraham Cowley’s opening ode 
to the Society. Analyzing Sprat’s and Cowley’s rhetoric showcases how the Society 
separated itself from speculative philosophy. In exploring these two works of 
propaganda, it becomes clear that the Royal Society desired a strong public statement in 
favor of their own methods and in opposition to speculative methods. In denigrating 
speculative methods of philosophy, the Society was able to promote what it saw as a 
more valid avenue to truth – philosophy grounded in observation and experimentation; 
however, its call to demote and dismantle speculative thinking draws more attention not 
only to how much the Society relies on it themselves, but also to how vital speculative 
thinking is to the public’s understanding of natural philosophy. Sprat’s History and 
Cowley’s ode, therefore, become an additional vantage point through which we can 
ascertain how the public may have conceived of natural philosophy, important 
groundwork to understanding why speculative writers were so critical of these 
developments. 
After laying the foundation for what messages the general public received about 
natural philosophy through sources such as dictionaries and Sprat’s History, I analyze 
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examples of speculative writing that react to the Society’s rhetoric. One of the Society’s 
main messages centered on the Society as a healing institution of moderate men who 
come together in multitude so as to rectify defaults in one another. Chapter four opens 
with Francis Bacon’s speculative society of philosophers in New Atlantis (1627) so that I 
can draw comparisons between the envisioned society and the actualized one. New 
Atlantis also sets the stage for an exploration of Margaret Cavendish’s Blazing World 
(1666).  Cavendish’s speculative society seems to be a direct attack upon the Royal 
Society’s vision and clearly warns the reader about a civilization that grounds all its truth 
on experimental philosophy. Cavendish’s speculative narrative argues for an 
epistemology that embraces both the speculative and the experimental, since knowing 
anything for certain is impossible. Her prose narrative, therefore, represents combined 
methods as necessary to creating the most comprehensive truth.  
Despite Sprat’s insistence on a fair and objective approach, based only on 
observation and experimentation, natural philosophers often became objects of ridicule, 
and their antics became cautionary tales in speculative writing about the Royal Society 
and its practitioners. In chapter four, I explore how the speculations about societies run 
by natural philosophers revealed the dangers of disorder to society, at large. In chapter 
five, I shift the focus from the general to the specific, looking at the individuals who 
contribute to the society. The individual practitioner is considered in both poetry and 
prose, but the main focus is on speculative Restoration theatre because of its ability to 
highlight the individual as a character to be viewed and judged in a public forum.  
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Even though experiments were performed within the Royal Society, Fellows were 
practicing individually in their own homes, as well. When exploring the speculative mode 
that focuses on the individual philosopher, natural philosophy becomes much more 
localized. We are reminded that the collective cannot happen without the individual, but 
this reminder also serves as a source of anxiety if the collective is composed of 
disordered individuals. When readers and spectators are also reminded that these 
disordered individuals are husbands and fathers, then the speculative anxieties over 
natural philosophy become more personal. I explore how Thomas Shadwell’s The 
Virtuoso (1676) and Aphra Behn’s The Emperor of the Moon (1687) participate in a kind 
of questioning regarding the role that natural philosophers might have in the home. This 
questioning reveals apprehensions toward the natural philosopher as connected to larger 
concerns regarding national identity. The speculative writing in this chapter also explores 
the dangers of the immoderate natural philosopher’s compromised masculinity and his 
disordered household, which underscores lingering anxiety about the stability of the 
nation due to political unrest.   
 Chapter six closes this study by looking forward, linking the beginnings of the 
speculative mode in the Restoration period to a popular eighteenth-century text – 
Gulliver’s Travels (1726). Jonathan Swift’s Book III is often cited by science fiction 
scholars as representative of the beginnings of the science fiction genre. In exploring the 
varied responses to Jonathan Swift’s Book III, I ponder why speculative texts are often 
misunderstood as lacking cohesion or as absent of serious themes, and I draw some 
conclusions regarding why speculative writing has received little scholarly attention. I 
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end with a call to understand the cultural moment better by joining together works of 
science and art as both valid and necessary avenues toward knowledge. Although we live 
in a world where the line between science and art is clearly drawn, and although we 
understand that division well, it is harder for us to make sense of texts that combine 
science with art. Speculative writing enters into that in-between space and serves as a 
bridge between literature and science. It is within the in-between, I argue, where we 
realize how similar both pursuits are and where we can understand how both pursuits are 
necessary and equally vital components of knowledge formation.  
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CHAPTER II 
“INTERPRETING ALL SUCH HARD WORDS”: DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS AS  
 
INSTRUCTION AND POPULARIZATION OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY FOR  
 
GENERAL READERS 
 
 
Scholars who study the history of science, whether they are historians, 
rhetoricians, or literary scholars, are often faced with the problem of terminology 
regarding science and natural philosophy. During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, 
for instance, the term “science” was understood differently from the way the term is 
currently used.1 Just prior to the Restoration, John Rider’s 1640 dictionary defined 
science as “art and knowledge.” Henry Cockerham’s 1651 definition was a bit simpler in 
that he defined science merely as “knowledge.” In addition to knowledge, Thomas 
Blount’s dictionary, which was published in 1661 right before the incorporation of the 
Royal Society, broadens the meaning of the word “science.” Marking it as more than a 
type of knowledge, Blount delineates the term as also meaning “cunning, skill,” and  
“learning.”2 Clearly, our modern understanding of the word “science” does not correlate 
with meanings of the time in that we understand science to mean more than just 
  
																																																								
1 Gaukroger notes that our modern understandings of the word “science” and “scientist” are derived from 
the nineteenth century. These modern understandings are very different from the Latin term scientia, which 
“denotes a form of wisdom that derives from the systematic organization of material, at least in the 
Aristotelian tradition” (2). 
2 So as to not belabor the point, there are several other dictionaries that define the term science in similar 
ways. See dictionaries published by J.B. in 1680, John Kersey (1702 and 1715), Edward Phillips (1706), 
and Edward Cocker (1724). 
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knowledge or skill. However, scholars who study the history of science often do not 
adequately differentiate between modern denotations of the term and its original context. 
It is problematic to use these terms interchangeably because doing so ignores the context 
of what these words signify. Even with the term “natural philosophy,” there is 
extraordinary disagreement about what that category means, so it seems bizarre and 
inaccurate to interchange “science” and “natural philosophy.” Aside from including 
elements that would not be accepted as part of modern notions of science (such as 
magic), the complex definitions of natural philosophy discussed below illuminate how 
important the category is because it means so many things.  
Investigating the usage of these terms sheds light on the eventual disciplinary 
boundaries established in the wake of the categorical work being done at the time in 
attempting to differentiate the value of meaning derived from “science” versus meaning 
derived through more speculative inquiries (which eventually get associated with the 
imagination and art). Today, of course, university systems contain separate departments 
for the study of humanities and sciences. Culturally, we are in a time where science 
marks off a separation for defining and organizing knowledge. These distinctions become 
clearer when we look to the Oxford English Dictionary and notice the differentiation that 
happens over time. The OED marks certain definitions of “science” as archaic, rare, and 
obsolete – namely those that focus on science as a broad kind of knowledge, skill, or type 
of study.3 These definitions delineate science as mastering any branch of learning. Most 
of these definitions range from the twelfth century through the beginnings of the 
																																																								
3 “science,” OED. 
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eighteenth century. Starting with entries dated from the late eighteenth century to present 
day, the OED designates science as rooted in “trustworthy methods” such as the 
“scientific method.” Within the many and evolving definitions of science, the OED 
distinguishes the difference between early and later usage, showing a clear separation 
from other types of learning when it defines science as “scientific disciplines 
distinguished from other departments of learning.” In light of these and other definitions I 
investigate later in this chapter, there is a preponderance of evidence that “science” is not 
the term typically used to describe activities associated with natural philosophy, unless 
referring to natural philosophy as just one type of knowledge among many.   
Perusing recent publications about seventeenth and eighteenth century natural 
philosophy (both historical and literary) yields title upon title that employs the word 
“science,” and often within the body of the argument, there is no mention of why the 
word “science” or “new science” is the chosen term or why “science” is standing in for 
the terms associated with what we might call “pre-science.” In fact, in 1980 Simon 
Schaffer drew attention to terminological issues when he argued that there is a “problem 
of definition” when it comes to understanding how to define natural philosophy (71). 
Eight years later, Andrew Cunningham also took issue with the way scholars at the time 
were often interchanging the word “science” with other terms such as “natural 
philosophy.” Cunningham maintains that it is important for scholars to discuss “science” 
in the same way that most people at the time would have understood the term and the 
activities associated with it. What scholars often describe as “scientific” would have 
either been called philosophy or natural philosophy in the late seventeenth and early 
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eighteenth centuries. “More particularly,” Cunningham notes, natural philosophers of the 
time “might have described their enterprise as ‘anatomy’, ‘chemistry’, or whatever – as a 
branch or sub-discipline of Philosophy or ‘Natural Philosophy.’ This is what they called 
it” (379). Cunningham poses the following question: might people in the past also have 
described their engagement with natural philosophy as being “science?” He definitively 
answers that question in the negative, arguing that no one, until at least 1750 and maybe 
as late as 1800 would have used the terms “science” and “natural philosophy” 
synonymously (380).4 It is problematic, therefore, to discuss natural philosophy as 
“simply renamed as Science: as if the two terms are simply alternatives for an earlier and 
later practice of the same activity.” Despite the differences in meaning between “science” 
and “natural philosophy,” scholars, according to Cunningham “have tended to slip 
happily back and forth between the two terms” (381). I include both Schaffer’s and 
Cunningham’s decades-old arguments to establish the long history of defining “natural 
philosophy” and the issues that arise when we replace terms of the past with our own.5  
 Schaffer and Cunningham draw attention to a history of terminological difficulty, 
which has continued into recent scholarship. A decade after Cunningham’s 
admonishment of scholars who use the terms interchangeably, James R. Jacob defines 
natural philosophy as what we now call “science” (xiv). In 2000, Roy Porter employs the 
																																																								
4 Cunningham remarks that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they had the word “scientia,” but it 
referred to speculative subdisciplines of Philosophy or Natural Philosophy […] it did not refer to the same 
set or ‘family’ of disciplines and activities that our modern word ‘science’ does. Indeed, into the late 
eighteenth century and beyond, all sorts of studies that we would exclude from science were described 
quite validly as ‘sciences’; such were logic, grammar, theology and ethics” (380). 
5 Because scholars so often refer to natural philosophy as “science” or as “scientific,” it is nearly impossible 
to exclude these terms from my own work. However, when I use such terms, it is always in relation to 
another scholar’s use of that word, and I indicate that by placing those words in quotation marks.  
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term “new science” as interchangeable with “natural philosophy,” going so far as to argue 
that what we call “new science” was previously known as natural philosophy (131). In 
his endnotes to this description, he defines natural philosophy as “the contemporary term 
for what would later be modified into ‘science’” (524). Evidently, despite calls to discuss 
natural philosophy in the terminology of the day, scholars still prefer discussing natural 
philosophy as a type of “science,” a fact Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster both 
highlight again in 2005 in The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century. They detail 
the ways that scholars often use the term “natural philosophy” as tantamount to 
“science,” and they make it clear that doing so poses problems (2). Despite multiple 
scholarly attempts to encourage correct terminological usage, scholars consistently rely 
on the word “science” to discuss natural philosophy. In 2007 Edward Grant attempted to 
provide justification for such a practice in his book that recounts the history of natural 
philosophy. He discusses how natural philosophy, prior to the seventeenth century, was 
once an independent practice, something that was “isolated from mathematics” and other 
“exact sciences.” However, in Grant’s view, natural philosophy during this time became 
highly mathematical, and this resulted in natural philosophy becoming “synonymous with 
the term science, which came into use in the nineteenth century” (xii). Grant seems to 
take no issue with anachronistically assigning a nineteenth-century term to the 
seventeenth century, despite the fact that practitioners of natural philosophy would not 
have used that term to describe their activities. As recently as 2012 Gregory Lynall posits 
that “in the eighteenth century ‘science’ was often used to refer to ‘philosophy,’ including 
natural philosophy” (4).  
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In examining literary and history scholars who study “science,” one of three 
trends emerge when considering the terminology they use. Some of them, as discussed 
above, disregard the differences in meaning between “science” and “natural philosophy.” 
Others acknowledge what natural philosophy was and then briefly define it, but then they 
replace the term with either “science” or “new science,” often without any justification or 
explanation for why they are doing so. Finally, some scholars do not acknowledge a 
difference at all and find no qualms with replacing “natural philosophy” with “science.” 
These scholars do not establish the fact that “science” meant something completely 
different from what it means today. It remains unclear as to why many scholars have 
chosen not to represent the terminology of the day or why they often, without reason, 
choose one term over another. Perhaps certain assumptions exist among scholars that 
other scholars working in the history of science will implicitly know and, therefore, 
understand the differences between science and natural philosophy. Nevertheless, that 
assumption in itself is problematic, for so many scholars define natural philosophy in 
divergent ways, often in ways that depart from understandings of the term during the 
Restoration and early eighteenth century. Perhaps other scholars do not distinguish 
between the terms because the words are confused even in the period, but I see this 
confusion as indicative of the slow nature of the shift between old and new 
epistemologies. This confusion also highlights how dependent experimental philosophy 
was on older, speculative methodologies. The only way we can be as precise as possible 
about these early conceptions is to use the term “natural philosophy” instead of “science.”   
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This chapter attempts to examine the roots of terminology associated with natural 
philosophy by exploring what these terms might have meant for a general reader of the 
time. In this chapter I focus on dictionaries printed from 1640 to 1755, highlighting these 
references as one of the ways that difficult concepts were communicated to non-
practitioners.6 The dictionary definitions are important because they capture a more 
nuanced understanding of how the philosophical revolution occurred, showcasing that the 
revolution was not linear. The dictionaries also shed light on how the public did not have 
a clear or consistent idea of what natural philosophy was since it was often still immersed 
in older methodologies. The explanations found in these dictionaries do not define natural 
philosophy as “science,” and many of them do not even refer to natural philosophy as 
such, instead favoring the term “physics.” While modern scholars refer to practitioners as 
“natural philosophers,” the term that dictionaries often use is “naturalists.” Moreover, the 
word “empiricism” is absent from these dictionaries altogether, yet it is a term frequently 
employed in scholarship today when referring to the rise of “science.”7 Understanding the 
way dictionaries of the day grappled with such terms showcases how the philosophical 
revolution occurred slowly and did not result in immediate shifts or agreed upon ideas, 
although many of the aforementioned scholars use terminology that would lead us to 
believe it was. These dictionary definitions also shed light on the “speculative,” 
																																																								
6 The dictionaries I will investigate are the ones available on Early English Books Online and Eighteenth 
Century Collections Online, admittedly, only a sampling of what would have been available to a reader at 
the time.  
7 Because of a long and established history in scholarship on this topic, avoiding the term “science” will be 
nearly impossible in this and following chapters, despite my rejection of the term. Even when scholars 
themselves consider the term anachronistic, they often rely on it throughout their work. Although I prefer 
the term “experimental philosophy” because it adequately describes how the Royal Society envisioned their 
own work, as we will see in the next chapter, I also frequently rely on the term “natural philosophy” in this 
chapter to represent this phase of “pre-science.” 
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sometimes marking the beginnings of a tendency to place speculative philosophy in 
opposition to experimental philosophy. The Royal Society sees experimental philosophy 
as their term, and the dictionary definitions capture the difference between the 
speculative and the experimental. When the term “speculative” is viewed in tandem with 
the definitions of “fancy” and the “imagination,” an important link is exposed between 
the speculative and the imaginative, as speculative philosophy relies on deductive 
reasoning, supposition, and conjecture, none of which are observable through the senses.  
 
Defining Natural Philosophy 
 Before turning to historical definitions, I discuss how recent scholars have 
characterized natural philosophy in order to establish the differences between the way 
natural philosophy is represented in scholarship and the way it may have been understood 
within culture at the time. R.S. Woolhouse’s work on empiricism defines natural 
philosophy as a “body of knowledge based firmly on the experienced facts of experiment 
and observation” rather than on logic and categories (67). It is important to keep in mind 
Woolhouse’s reliance on experiment and observation as key aspects of natural 
philosophy, especially when later contrasting this idea with seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century notions. Steven Shapin designates natural philosophy as inquiries into nature and 
its “causal structure” (5-6). Similarly, Peter Dear marks it as the main discipline that 
concerned itself with the knowledge of nature. He extends this definition by asserting 
natural philosophy’s prominence among medicinal and mathematical sciences since its 
chief objective was to offer a “philosophical explanation of all aspects of the natural 
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world, from plants to planets” (3).8 Likewise, Anstey and Schuster expand the definition 
of natural philosophy to provide ideas of what types of inquiry natural philosophy 
maintained. They refer to natural philosophy as the “Science of Nature” but designate it 
more specifically as concerned with “the cosmological structuring and functioning of 
matter and the proper method for acquiring or justifying knowledge of nature” (1).  
Lynette Hunter and Sarah Hutton also make natural philosophy a term that encompasses 
various disciplines: astronomy, chemistry, physics, and biology (2). Likewise, Stephen 
Gaukroger designates natural philosophy as an umbrella term, noting that it is a practice 
that includes the aforementioned physics, chemistry, and biology; however, he adds 
alchemy and physiology to the mix and excludes disciplines that we might label as 
“science” – those of medicine and mathematics (1). Consequently, these scholars assign 
various meanings to natural philosophy, some including or excluding a wide range of 
practices from medicine to botany and from astronomy to the scientific method; again, 
these divergent conceptions of natural philosophy among recent scholars are important to 
consider when attempting to differentiate between scholarly and contemporary 
designations. John Gascoigne’s definition makes the issue of terminology even more 
problematic. Admittedly, his essay, published as part of The Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth-Century Philosophy, is meant to represent natural philosophy in broad 
strokes; however, the multiplicities of foci that Gascoigne ascribes to the study of natural 
philosophy shed light on how difficult it can be to pinpoint an exact definition of natural 
																																																								
8 Many of the early modern definitions define philosophers generally as someone who studies wisdom or 
has a love of wisdom (see J.B., Blount, Phillips, Rider, Bailey, Glossographia, and Kersey). Several of 
them divide philosophy into different types of knowledge, one of which is knowledge about the natural 
world (see Blount, Phillips, Bailey, Chambers, Glossographia, and Kersey). 
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philosophy. He argues that by the end of the seventeenth century, natural philosophy 
became a separate discipline that departed from “qualitative” and “speculative” methods 
(854-55).9 Some of the main developments that transformed natural philosophy were its 
emphasis on the empirical and the experimental (855). At the same time it was 
transformed, it was also still very much reliant on its “long scholastic heritage” of 
searching for the causes of “natural phenomena” and the causes of motion. Furthermore, 
“early eighteenth-century definitions of natural philosophy […] still reflected the 
traditional view that the task of natural philosophy was to arrive at an understanding of 
the basic causes of change” (856).  
 From whence do the aforementioned scholars arrive at their definitions and why 
are they so different? Often the scholar does not provide this answer. Although not every 
scholar provides the sources that inform these definitions, their variety can be partially 
explained by the many inconsistent definitions of natural philosophy in earlier texts; 
however, some of these modern definitions also impose modern notions of science on 
natural philosophy. Perhaps some scholars reflect their own research interests in the 
definition they choose. As Cunningham notes, some scholars seem to refer to the actual 
activities associated with science; other scholars are concerned with what we might call 
scientific research.10 Some studies are more focused on epistemological shifts, while 
others attempt to analyze reactions to those shifts. Still other studies use “science” or 
“natural philosophy” to focus on more than one of the above concerns. Despite the 
																																																								
9 Gascoigne notes that these separate disciplines were no longer united under a “common philosophical 
endeavor” (855). The separate disciplines that eventually emerged were disciplines such as biology, natural 
history, chemistry, astronomy, physics, and mathematics. 
10 Cunningham draws a distinction between those scholars who research the activities that go into “making 
science,” while other scholars focus more on the production of research.  
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slipperiness of these terms, “we rarely specify which meaning we intend at a given time, 
relying on our readers or listeners to recognize which one we mean” (Cunningham “The 
Identity” 260). 
The multiple designations of what natural philosophy can mean should prompt 
scholars to consider which historical texts they should rely on for an understanding of the 
category and why those texts best serve their research questions. In studying speculative 
writing as a type of response to natural philosophy, it is important to consider a general 
reader’s perception about what natural philosophy was, since a general reader might not 
have access to or understand the ways in which various natural philosophers conceived of 
their own work.11 Looking to what general readers understood helps us to better 
appreciate the interactions between the public and new epistemologies while also 
highlighting how each influenced the other. As David Layton asserts, “the mathematical 
expression of scientific theories, the development of concepts remote from common 
sense, the growth of a technical vocabulary, and the increasingly vast range of scientific 
knowledge all tended to remove science from within the grasp of a member of the general 
reading public” (221).12 One such way that the public could attempt to grasp the new 
philosophical movements was to refer to a dictionary. “Scientific” progress did result in 
communication problems, which “influenced the need for, and development of, general 
dictionaries” (226). Additionally, as “scientific discourse” began to develop and 
																																																								
11 When I refer to “imaginative, literary accounts,” I am using that phrase to designate works that scholars 
today would refer to as “literature,” understanding that these works would not have been classified as such 
during the time. See notes in the introduction regarding my use of “imagination,” as well as dictionary 
definitions in this chapter regarding the distinctions between “fancy” and the “imagination.” 
12 Layton discusses the role of dictionaries in defining “science” from the mid-seventeenth century through 
the end eighteenth century. 
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philosophers sought to write about “scientific” matters, this often “required glossaries or 
interposed explanations of technical or 'philosophic' words” (222). According to Layton, 
dictionaries that included philosophical definitions served two purposes for the reading 
public. First, for those who did not have access to a university education, dictionaries 
played a vital part in disseminating “scientific” knowledge (234). Moreover, and more 
importantly to my argument, because these dictionaries attempted to interpret and explain 
difficult philosophical concepts and words, they directly and importantly contributed to 
“the popularization of scientific knowledge” (222). Carey McIntosh speaks to the 
pedagogical aims of dictionaries and encyclopedias of the day, noting that the audience 
for both is a popular one and that the goal of the genre is to instruct or inform (8).13  
We should not disregard the significant information that dictionaries and 
encyclopedias can provide when considering the public’s understanding of natural 
philosophy since the point of these dictionaries was to instruct general readers regarding 
unfamiliar terminology. Although we cannot assume that dictionaries contained “correct” 
information or that they represented the practitioners’ understanding, they provide 
valuable insight into how “scientific” ideas were disseminated by the compliers of these 
works. Both dictionaries and encyclopedias “aim to supply a comparatively unknowing 
readership with as much advanced and scholarly information as it is looking for” 
(McIntosh 8). McIntosh establishes that these dictionaries would not offer a reader a 
specialist’s or practitioner’s view of natural philosophy, but that kind of specialized 
knowledge would also not be what many readers would be looking for. Of course, many 
																																																								
13 McIntosh notes that encyclopedias are now viewed as a different genre, but that in the Renaissance and 
eighteenth century, there were no clear distinctions between the two.  
 38 
of the lexicographers that I will discuss were not natural philosophers themselves, 
although their dictionaries define words in the lexical field of natural philosophy. 
Furthermore, dictionaries were often works of compilation, and it was not always typical 
for them to compile from primary sources (Layton 226). Edward Phillips, whose 
dictionary appeared shortly after the turn of the century, was not an “expert” on the 
philosophical movements; therefore, his definitions provide an interesting mixture of “old 
learning” with a little bit of the new (Layton 223). Despite Layton’s attention to Phillips’s 
inconsistencies, it was not uncommon to find lexicographers contradicting statements in 
different parts of the same dictionary. With the publication of John Harris’s Lexicon 
Technicum: or, an Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, the first general scientific 
dictionary was realized (Layton 226). Harris’s Lexicon is viewed by Layton as an “up to 
date and a sound compilation of contemporary scientific knowledge” (227). With John 
Kersey’s 1706 dictionary Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum, which was a revision of 
Phillips’s, the number of definitions concerning natural philosophy increased and some of 
Phillips’s definitions were corrected, but Kersey was able to draw from Harris’s Lexicon 
(Layton 223). In the following year Glossographia Anglicana Nova was printed, and “it 
was characterized by a special interest in science.” It also “was an advance on previous 
works including scientific terms, in that it made an attempt to familiarize contemporary 
scientific knowledge in a cheap and handy form” (Layton 224). Likewise, lexicographers 
such as Chambers and Bailey included “scientific” content within their text, with 
Chambers’s Cyclopaedia attempting to meet “the difficulties raised by the vocabulary of 
science,” and “the increasingly vast range of scientific knowledge” (Layton 228). 
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As discussed above, the term that is often used by scholars to discuss “science” in 
the Restoration and eighteenth century is “natural philosophy,” a term that also appears in 
contemporary dictionaries. Most of these dictionaries, however, do not define the term as 
explicitly or assuredly as scholars use the term today and, instead, often conflate natural 
philosophy with physics. In Riders Dictionarie (1640), for instance, the term “natural 
philosophy” was not included; however, listed under the word “Nature” was “Physica,” 
which signified “a searching out of natural things, or reasoning of the nature of 
anything.” I include this definition because of the tendency in these dictionaries to 
connect natural philosophy with variants of the word “physica.” J.B.’s 1641 printing of 
An English Expositour appears to be one of the first to mention and attempt to define 
natural philosophy, not as a stand-alone term but also as part of the larger term 
“philosophy.”14 In general, philosophy is described as the “study of Wisdom, a deep 
Knowledge in the nature of things,” and J.B. delineates natural philosophy as “teaching 
the nature of all things, and containing, besides Arithmetick, Musick, Geometry, and 
Astronomy.” Although J.B’s dictionary does define natural philosophy, there are others 
prior to his that only define the term based on who practices it. Again, Rider’s dictionary 
remains the outlier in light of his chosen terminology in that he marks the practitioner of 
the study of natural things as a “physiologia” or “he that searcheth out natural things, or 
disputeth of natural causes.” After J.B., dictionaries printed in 1658 and later define the 
																																																								
14 J.B. is noted in this edition as a “doctor of physic.” In the 1707 edition, available on Early English Books 
Online, he is identified as John Bullokar. J.B.’s first edition of An English expositor was printed in 1616, 
but the word “philosophy” does not appear in that printing. His definition of “physica” remained at least 
until the 1775 printing, as viewed on Eighteenth Century Collections Online. When I say this is a “first,” I 
acknowledge the limitations of my research, in that I am limited to dictionaries available only on EBBO 
and ECCO. 
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work of natural philosophy as that performed by “naturalists,” not necessarily “natural 
philosophers” as scholars often prefer. Edward Phillips’s The New World of Words 
(1658) lists a naturalist as “one that understandeth natural causes.” Blount’s 1661 
Glossographia includes that a naturalist is “one skilled in the Reason, the causes of 
natural things,” and J.B.’s English Expositour (1680) and Kersey’s A New English 
Dictionary (1702) defines the naturalist as simply “a natural philosopher” and “one 
skilled in natural Philosophy,” respectively.15 Taken together, one can already see that 
when attempting to define the practice of natural philosophy, the notions of what it 
exactly is in the latter half of the seventeenth century are not homogeneous. Nevertheless, 
it is clearly tied to practice that investigates the natural world and its causes. We can 
conclude from these definitions (and/or omissions) how difficult this concept might have 
been to define in the early and developing days of natural philosophy. Indeed, some 
dictionaries do not even attempt to define what natural philosophy is and instead resort 
only to pointing out that naturalists perform natural philosophy.  
As established previously, I included Rider’s definitions, which intertwine the 
terms “nature” with terms like “physica” because these terms are often interchangeable in 
the first part of the eighteenth century. Peter Dear is one of the few scholars to clarify the 
connection between physics in the seventeenth and eighteenth century and its relationship 
to natural philosophy. Natural philosophy, he explains, was originally tied to Aristotle’s 
																																																								
15 This trend of identifying one who performs natural philosophy as a Naturalist continues for decades, 
despite Shapin’s assertion that relevant practitioners of natural philosophy should be designated as natural 
philosophers (6). Naturalists are described in the following ways – Phillips (1706) and Kersey (1715): “one 
who understands natural Causes, or is skill’d in Natural Philosophy”; Blount (1707), Bailey (1730), and 
Defoe (1735): “one skill’d in Natural Philosophy”; Coles (1713): “a natural Philosopher, skilled in the 
causes of natural things”; Cocker (1724): “one who studies the Causes of Natural Things”; Johnson (1755): 
“A student in pysicks, or natural philosophy.” 
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writings, and Aristotle had used the Greek word physis when speaking about the natural 
world. “Consequently, the medieval Latin word physica or ‘physics,’ was routinely used 
as a synonym for ‘natural philosophy’” (3). Dear also provides his readers with a glossary 
of terms, in which he defines natural philosophy as a practice also known as physics and 
physics as a “practical synonym” for natural philosophy (195). Scholars, however, 
infrequently employ the term “physics” and almost exclusively (if they do not use the 
word “science”) speak of this era’s “scientific” practice as natural philosophy. Gaukroger 
explains one possible justification for not using the term physics: because its meaning 
signifies something so different from what physics today means, he prefers to use the 
term “natural philosophy” (1).  
Regardless of the reasons for why one term might be more appropriate for 
scholars today, it is important to remember the deep connection that contemporary 
dictionary writers and readers made between Aristotelian physics and the developing 
practice of natural philosophy, for it reminds us that change is never instantaneous. In this 
case, the study and understanding of nature seems tied, at least in popular conceptions, to 
earlier understandings of nature and what is studied in the natural world. Such earlier 
understandings involve speculative practices (sometimes designated as contemplation), 
which I define and discuss later in this chapter. Other earlier understandings can be found 
in definitions that align natural philosophy with causes since looking for causes came 
from Aristotelian ideas that sought to understand the “why” behind how nature operates. 
Such a process of accretion is not surprising, but it is easy for modern readers to forget 
about this layering or integration of new with previous systems. In order to better capture 
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the consistent similarities across lexicographers and times, I have organized this material 
in Table 1, which appears below, to visually represent natural philosophy’s connection to 
physics.16 Some dictionaries do not even list a separate definition for natural philosophy 
but instruct their readers to see the entry for physics. Others who do define natural 
philosophy offer explicit connections between the two terms, as though one thing is 
actually the other. It is not until Samuel Johnson’s dictionary in 1755 that readers get a 
clear differentiation between natural philosophy and the work of physics.  
Johnson’s dictionary notes that originally “physick” had signified natural philosophy, but  
 
that the word had come to mean medicine, which is still different from today’s definition. 
 
 
	
	
	
																																																								
16 My research included exploring dictionaries published from 1640 to 1730, with the inclusion of Johnson 
because his dictionary is so well known and is a touchstone for dictionaries of the day. These dictionaries 
were found through Early English Books Online and Eighteenth Century Collections Online. The chart only 
includes, however, those dictionaries that defined either the term “natural philosophy” or the term 
“physica.” Additionally, for dictionaries that had later editions printed under the same name, I did not 
include those duplicates if the definitions from the first edition remained unchanged.  
17 The following dictionaries do not contain entries for either physics or natural philosophy: Glossographia, 
or, A Dictionary Interpreting All Such Hard Words – Thomas Blount, 1661 and An Alphabetical Dictionary 
– John Wilkins, 1668. However, Blount’s dictionary does define a naturalist as a natural philosopher (or 
one who understands the causes of natural things.) Additionally, John Kersey’s A New English Dictionary 
(1702) does not define “Physics” or “Natural Philosophy.” However, in addition to describing “Natural 
Magick” as natural philosophy, the term “Physiologhy” is identified as “Natural Philosophy, treating of the 
nature of things, by their causes, effects, &c.” 
18 J.B.’s dictionary does not contain a separate entry for “natural philosophy.” Instead, the term is defined 
under “Philosophy,” as one of the three types of philosophy.  
Table 1. Definitions of Physics and Natural Philosophy 
Dictionary Name, Author, 
and Publication Date17 
Physics Natural Philosophy 
An English Expositour – 
J.B., 168018 
No entry Teaching the nature of all 
things, and containing, 
besides Arithmetick, 
Musick, Geometry, and 
Astronomy 
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Table 1. Definitions of Physics and Natural Philosophy 
Dictionary Name, Author, 
and Publication Date 
Physics Natural Philosophy 
The New World of Words - 
Edward Phillips, 1706 
Listed as “Physica” – 
“Physicks or Natural 
Philosophy; or Books 
treating of that Subject” 
“see Physica” 
 
 
Glossographia Anglicana 
Nova – 1707 
Listed as “Physicks” – “is the 
speculative knowledge of all 
Natural Bodies, and of their 
proper Natures, 
Constitutions, Powers and 
Operations” 
“(the same with Physicks) 
is that Science which 
contemplates the Powers of 
Nature, the Properties of 
Natural Bodies, and their 
mutual action one upon 
another” 
Lexicon Technicum - John 
Harris, 1708 
Listed as “Physicks” – “or 
Natural Philosophy, is the 
Speculative Knowledge of all 
Natural Bodies and of their 
Proper Natures, 
Constitutions, Powers, and 
Operations” 
“Is the same with what is 
usually call’d Physicks. 
That Science which 
contemplates the Powers of 
Nature, the Properties of 
Natural Bodies, and their 
mutual Action one upon 
another.”  
 
An English Dictionary - 
Elisha Coles, 1713 
Listed as “Physicks” – 
“natural Philosophy” 
 
No Entry 
Dictionarium Anglo-
Britannicum - John 
Kersey, 1715 
 
Listed as “Physica” – 
“Physicks, or Natural 
Philosophy” 
Listed as “Physicka or 
Natural Philosophy” – “a 
Science which shews the 
Nature of Things, with their 
various Causes, Effects, 
Properties, and Operations” 
Cocker’s English 
Dictionary – Edward 
Cocker, 1724 
Listed as “Physicks” – 
“natural philosophy” 
No entry 
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Table 1. Definitions of Physics and Natural Philosophy 
Dictionary Name, Author, 
and Publication Date 
Physics Natural Philosophy 
Cyclopædia – Ephraim 
Chambers, 1728 
 
Listed as “Physicks” – “by 
the Latins call’d PHYSICA 
[…] by us frequently 
PHYSIOLOGY, or Natural 
Philosophy; is the Doctrine 
of Natural Bodies, their 
Phenomena, Causes, and 
Effects; their various 
Affections, Motions, 
Operations.”  
Natural Philosophy – that 
Science which considers 
the Powers of Nature, the 
Properties of Natural 
Bodies, and their mutual 
Action on one another; 
otherwise call’d Physics 
 
Dictionarium Britannicum 
-  Nathan Bailey, 1730 
 
Listed as “Physicks” – 
“natural Philosophy or 
Physiology; is the Doctrine 
of natural Bodies, their 
Phænomena, Causes and 
Effects; their various 
Affections, Motions, 
Operations, &c. or is in 
general the Science of all 
material Beings, or 
whatsoever concerns the 
System of this visible 
World.”  
“Is that Science which 
considers the Powers of 
Nature, the Properties of 
natural Bodies, and their 
mutual Action on one 
another, called also 
Physicks” 
 
A Dictionary of the 
English Language – 
Samuel Johnson, 175519 
“Originally signifying natural 
philosophy, has been 
transferred in many modern 
languages to medicine” 
 
No entry20 
 
																																																								
19 This dictionary also lists an entry for “speculatively,” signifying it as “contemplatively; with meditation 
2. Ideally theoretically; not practically.” 
20 The term “natural philosophy” does appear in Johnson’s dictionary as part of other definitions. For 
instance, his definition of “mechanick” includes, “Constructed by the laws of mechanicks.” Johnson relies 
on a passage from Newton in drawing this delineation, and the passage he quotes discusses the “main 
business of natural philosophy” as being to “argue from phenomena without feigning hypotheses.” He also 
mentions it in a quotation he uses to define the word “moral” as meaning, “known or admitted in the 
general business of life.” In this case he relies on a passage from Tillotson: “Mathematical things are 
capable of the strictest demonstration; conclusions in natural philosophy are capable of proof by an 
induction of experiments.” In defining the word “physicotheology,” Johnson says it is “divinity enforced or 
illustrated by natural philosophy.” Johnson also defines a “naturalist,” as a “Student in physicks, or natural 
philosophy.    
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 For readers seeking an understanding of the term “natural philosophy” in these 
dictionaries the definitions may not have provided them with a complex understanding. 
Most definitions do make it very clear that natural philosophy concerned itself with 
increasing knowledge about nature. Furthermore, the entries signify that knowing more 
about nature means understanding the causes and effects of natural occurrences, as well 
as the motions and operations within the natural world. Sometimes, however, what is not 
defined can reveal just as much as what is clearly delineated. Unlike recent scholars, who 
tend to define specifically which categories natural philosophy investigated, none of the 
aforementioned definitions classifies realms of inquiry. The lexicographers also do not 
specify whether natural philosophy excluded alchemy, astrology, or other occult or 
metaphysical practices or beliefs. In fact, several dictionaries ascribe methods that today 
we would not deem “scientific” to natural philosophy and its practices. Kersey’s A New 
English Dictionary (1702) and Chamber’s Cyclopedia (1728) equate natural philosophy 
with “Natural Magick.” On the one hand, “Natural magick” is defined by Kersey as 
“natural Philosophy, a lawful, and useful Science.”23 On the other hand, Chambers 
ascribes some focus on the supernatural in his explanation of physics when he reports that 
“Mr. Locke would likewise have GOD, Angels, and Spirits, come under Physicks, which 
are more usually referr’d to Metaphysics.”24 Chambers has been characterized by 
McIntosh as an “up-to-date and science-minded scholar,” but even he included in his 
																																																								
23 Interestingly, the actual definition of “magic” is listed as a black art that deals with familiar spirits, and a 
magician is denoted as a conjurer or sorcerer.  
24 In his Essay concerning Human Understanding Locke lauded the philosophical discourse of natural 
philosophers. Gascoigne argues that natural philosophy’s “methods and successes were regarded as 
establishing goals which other branches of philosophy could emulate” (856). Chambers’s definition, which 
alludes to Locke’s desire to incorporate natural philosophy into metaphysics, exemplifies the tendency to 
integrate natural philosophy with other methods of knowledge. 
 46 
definitions of “natural philosophy” “‘wondrous curiosities and supernatural cures’ in his 
dictionary-like Cyclopaedia” (4).  
Both Kersey’s and Chambers’s definitions link traditional epistemologies with 
emerging ones, as discussed above in the connections between Aristotelian physics and 
natural philosophy. These traditional epistemologies, nevertheless, could include both 
Aristotelian methods and what many considered the occult or magic. In fact, some 
theories that today we know as modern “science” could fall under the category of the 
occult during this time.  Within Kersey’s dictionary there contain what McIntosh refers to 
as “startling irrationalities” in which the emerging “science” is aligned with outdated 
modes of knowledge formation (4). When positioning natural magic as a form of natural 
philosophy, the concerns of natural philosophy become aligned with “occult qualities” 
(Grant 291). Grant contends that “Isaac Newton’s universal theory of gravitation was 
regarded as an occult phenomenon” (291-92); however, natural magic included practices 
such as astrology, which position natural magic as a type of knowledge that was 
concerned with more than attaining knowledge for occult causes and effects (292). 
Additionally, instrumentation, such as the microscope and telescope, combined with 
experimentation were often used together so as to explain occult causes (291).  
Although definitions of natural philosophy that contain occult explanations do appear in 
some of the dictionaries, later dictionaries distanced themselves from superstition and 
magic: the “general trend” was a move in dictionaries published in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century toward definitions that resemble more what today we would regard as 
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“science” (McIntosh 4).25 Nevertheless, we cannot deny that these types of definitions 
were in circulation within the general public or that a public audience would not be under 
the impression that natural philosophy perhaps allowed for superstitious explanations of 
natural occurrences.  
These dictionaries represent the thinking of the time. Such a supposition is not 
problematic because of the way some definitions got recycled by later editions or by 
author compilers. Each new dictionary “drew heavily” on dictionaries published prior to 
theirs, and older and what may seem to be outdated dictionaries “tended to stay in print” 
(McIntosh 3-4). Because the dictionary was intended for a varied and current readership 
and because it would be a financial risk for a publisher to print words and definitions no 
longer in use, booksellers would not have printed a dictionary “that seemed completely 
out of touch with current usage” (McIntosh 4). When lexicographers like Johnson (1755) 
copied Bailey (1721), who copied Kersey (1708), those compilations must have meant 
that the writers “judged that the old definition was current enough” (McIntosh 4). These 
general dictionaries from the first half of the eighteenth century, therefore, did impact and 
circulate “scientific” knowledge to the public. Dictionaries such as the Glossographia 
Anglicana Nova intended to explain “hard words” and instruct the reader, while works by 
lexicographers such as Bailey intended to “entertain the curious.” Surely, these 
“dictionaries must have opened the doors to scientific knowledge for many and been an 
important agent in popularization” (Layton 226). 
																																																								
25 When McIntosh refers to “later dictionaries,” he includes those from the mid to late eighteenth century, 
including Johnson (1755), John Ash’s The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1775), 
and Thomas Sheridan’s A General Dictionary of the English Language (1780). 
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Empiricism and Experimental Philosophy 
 One subset of natural philosophy that was publicly promoted by the Royal Society 
and was, therefore, becoming popular with general readers was experimental philosophy, 
which employed methods that we today recognize as empirical. Often when one refers to 
the “scientific revolution,” one of the epistemological shifts discussed or referred to is a 
move from deductive to inductive reasoning. Inductive reason uses observations, 
experience, and (sometimes) experimentation to draw conclusions about the natural 
world. Typically, we refer to this shift as the rise of empiricism. Although it is 
anachronistic to use the term “empiricism,” the term represents a principle of knowledge 
that is gained through the use of the senses. The term “empiricism,” like others discussed 
here, is contentious and often invokes modern conceptions of empiricism to explain a 
concept that was not yet developed or fully employed during the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries. Using the word “empiricism” presents us with a problem 
different from using the term “natural philosophy” to distinguish the complex nature of a 
series of overlapping practices in the Restoration and early eighteenth century: practices 
of “empiricism” represent just one of the defining features of “pre-science.” Likewise, 
using the term “empiricism” in place of “experimental philosophy” disregards the term 
used by the Royal Society to describe its own work. Although we may now see such 
activity as empirical, we are better served by relying on the Society’s conceptions of 
experimental philosophy. When we define natural or experimental philosophy as 
inherently empirical we disregard the emerging and mixed methods of the time. It could 
also be argued that empiricism is one of the methods that survive the mixed methods 
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associated with natural philosophy, and is therefore, a method that scholars today identify 
as a crucial attribute of the philosophical revolution.  
As noted above, however, it is vital to consider historical denotations of terms that 
we, as scholars, use so casually when discussing the “science” of the day. Notably, the 
term “empiricism” as a way to describe practices within “natural philosophy” was not 
defined in any of the early modern dictionaries included in my research. It is not until 
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary was published that the word “empiric” appears in a 
dictionary, defined as “a trier; an experimenter; such persons as have no true education 
in, or knowledge of physical practice, but venture upon hearsay and observation only.” 
This definition, in itself, is complicated but, in some ways, relates to our current 
understandings of the methodologies associated with empiricism, namely practices that 
center on experimentation and/or observation; but, Johnson’s definition is pejorative in 
that the “empiric” also relies on hearsay and has no formal training or knowledge. 
Notably, Johnson is also not specifically designating the empiric as someone who also 
practices natural philosophy, a significant omission because he does, when defining other 
terms, refer to natural philosophy as a type of example in his definitions. For instance, 
when Johnson defines “scientifick,” two of the four examples that he uses of the term in 
context refer to natural philosophy as scientific, meaning that it produces “demonstrative 
knowledge” or “certainty.”26 Turning to the Oxford English Dictionary provides some 
																																																								
26 He cites Brown’s Vulgar Errours. Brown states, “Natural philosophy proceeding from settled principles, 
therein is expected a satisfaction from scientifical progressions, and such as beget a sure or rational belief.” 
He also cites Locke. Locke’s use of the term “scientific” undercuts natural philosophy’s ability to create 
certainty when he argues, “The systems of natural philosophy that have obtained, are to be read more to 
know the hypotheses, than with hopes to gain a comprehensive, scientifical, and satisfactory knowledge of 
the works of nature.” 
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insight as to why the word “empiricism” might have been excluded in these early modern 
dictionaries. The OED lists the first printed use of the term “empiricism” in 1658. 
Originally, an empiric referred to the person who practiced a type of medicine that was 
based in experience and observation instead of on deduction from theoretical principles.27 
Empiricism as a philosophical term, meaning a “doctrine or theory that emphasizes or 
privileges the role of experience in knowledge, esp. claiming that sense experience or 
direct observation rather than abstract reasoning is the foundation of all knowledge of 
reality,” did not appear in print until 1796.28 However, the OED does record the term as 
meaning a way to draw conclusions based on observation and experiment and lists the 
first textual reference as occurring in 1724.29 The OED also notes that the word was 
employed “sometimes with somewhat negative connotations,” especially in its early 
usage. 
 Although many recent scholars use “empiricism” to describe the activities of 
natural philosophers, I use “experimental” and “experimental philosophy” because 
Thomas Sprat uses these terms to designate the methods advocated publicly by the Royal 
Society. Because Sprat’s History also marks a clear divide between the speculative and 
the experimental, using the term “experimental philosophy” allows me to designate the 
																																																								
27 The OED lists the first occurrence of the term under this meaning in George Starkey’s Natures 
explication and Helmont’s vindication. Interestingly, it also appeared in a postscript against empiricism in 
the Royal Society’s Philosophical Transactions in 1744. 
28 In Friedrich A. Nitsch’s A general and introductory view of Professor Kant’s principles concerning man, 
the world, and the deity.  
29 Peter Shaw’s Juice of a Grape. Shaw states in the preface, “In effect, the Distinction between a Medicine 
and a Meal, is a mere Empiricism (iii). In this case, Shaw does not appear to use the term scientifically, but 
instead as a general conclusion or observation. The first definition that the OED lists that also seems to 
have a direct connection to empiricism as science is listed as occurring in 1846 in John Stuart Mill’s second 
edition of A System of Logic, Rationcinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of 
Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (III, xii). 
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perceived differences between the two approaches. Despite the historical context and the 
consistent absence of the term “empiricism” during the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, scholars often use the term to describe the activity of natural 
philosophers of the time because experimental philosophy relied on observation, 
experimentation, and induction, all practices we today associate with empirical 
methods.30  
The collective experience, at least for early modern natural philosophy, was a key 
component of what the Royal Society referred to as experimental philosophy and what 
scholars often label as part of the Society’s “empirical” methodology. John Henry locates 
the origins of English empiricism in the “tendency for natural philosophers to come 
together in informal collaborating groups” (182). In that case, “collective” refers to 
natural philosophers meeting together to observe and experiment or to witness 
																																																								
30 See Stephen Pumfrey who argues that natural philosophy was becoming prominent because “its more 
empiricist proponents claimed to be replacing the false ‘opinions’ of the ancients with the authority of 
certain deductions based on first-hand observations and experiments on nature” (48). Barbara Shapiro 
recounts how scientific thought at the time became “reoriented” when empiricism became a chief 
component of “scientific endeavor.” She argues that it was the “empirically grounded sciences,” which 
sought to examine nature and that were unlike mathematics in a search for certainty (9). Woolhouse 
designates the empiricist as someone who relies on the senses, experience, and observation in order to 
formulate knowledge. The empiricist is committed to the philosophical ideal that experience is the 
“touchstone of truth and meaning, and that we cannot know, or even sensibly speak of, things which go 
beyond our experience” (Woolhouse 2). Shapin and Dear offer similar discussions of the aim of 
empiricism. The “root idea” behind the concept of empiricism, according to Shapin, is that knowledge is 
derived from “direct sense experience,” meaning that one should look to what nature testifies rather than 
what humans do, in addition to preferring things over words (69). Dear classifies empiricism as a 
“philosophical stance,” and notes that knowledge is derived from the senses and the experiences that the 
senses provide (194). Although empiricism is clearly aligned with epistemology, empiricism can also be a 
methodology, Woolhouse argues. Woolhouse describes Francis Bacon as someone who was “purely a 
methodologist” when it came to empiricism. He explains that Bacon “enthusiastically advocates and 
describes certain empirical procedure by which knowledge should be sought; but he does not reflect on the 
relationship between knowledge and ideas on the one hand, and experience on the other” (Woolhouse 2-3). 
Scholars usually position Bacon as a proponent of empiricism, and the argument is often made that English 
science developed and progressed because of its “emphasis on Baconian fact gathering and empiricism” 
(Henry 202). 
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experimentation. But the collective could also refer to the repeatability of an experiment 
in which the same results were observed each time. Shapin and Schaffer refer to this type 
of collective experiment when they discuss Boyle’s determination of what constitutes 
“matters of fact.” Firstly, the members of “an intellectual collective” had to come to 
mutual understanding and assurance in the fact that “empirical experience was  
warranted” (25). Shapin and Shaffer note: 
 
 
Matters of fact were the outcome of the process of having an empirical 
experience, warranting it to oneself, and assuring others that grounds for their 
belief were adequate […] An experience, even of a rigidly controlled 
experimental performance, that one man alone witnessed was not adequate to 
make a matter of fact. If that experience could be extended to many, and in 
principle to all men, then the result could be constituted as a matter of fact. (25) 
 
 
The empirical, therefore, does not result in “scientific knowledge” unless many can 
experience and observe the same outcome or result. That might mean either a collective 
experience in which an experiment is repeatedly performed in front of a group so that the 
results can be observed and verified by others, or the repeatability of the experiment 
performed by others separately could make it fact. Natural philosophers could feel 
confident in matters of fact because those matters were not of their own making; “they 
were, in the empiricist language-game, discovered rather than invented” (Shapin and 
Schaffer 67). What we see with Boyle’s designation of how matters of fact become 
established is an acknowledgement of how the empirical is tied to “experimental 
performance.” Experimentation becomes a type of sensory experience and a kind of 
observation that can result in knowledge. In recent scholarship empiricism and 
experimental science are often used interchangeably, in the sense that empirical “science” 
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means a reliance on experimentation. “Experimental philosophy” is a term that was used 
by Boyle and other members of the early Royal Society to designate a type of natural 
philosophy that centered on gathering knowledge from both observation and 
experimentation (Dear 194). Experimental philosophy relied on methods that we 
associate with empiricism, upholding the importance of the senses and denigrating the 
“use of mere reason in generating hypotheses” (Anstey 215). Henry notes that English 
natural philosophy set itself apart from what was happening in other European countries 
because it was “fundamentally empirical.” He acknowledges that English naturalists were 
not the only ones performing experiments, but that “only English natural philosophers 
can be said to have been experimentalists,” something he clearly designates as empirical 
(182). Although scholars notice this shift into experimental and therefore empirical 
philosophy, the dictionaries tell a different story. If the experimental philosophers within 
the Royal Society were “fundamentally empirical,” then the dictionaries written for 
general audiences highlight that the hegemony of the empirical was very slow to dislodge 
earlier approaches to the natural world as understood by the public.  
 The dictionaries of the time show a mixture of old and new; however, the new, in 
the form of experimentation, began making appearances in these dictionaries, although 
not necessarily tied to definitions of natural philosophy. Some of the earlier dictionaries 
define what it means to experiment without connecting the activity to practices associated 
with natural philosophy, while other dictionaries perhaps imply an association with 
natural philosophy because they define experiments as one way to discover truth about 
nature. According to recent scholars, experimentation, as a key component of empirical 
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natural philosophy, resulted in a break away from antiquated knowledge formation. 
Dictionaries of the day seem to capture this connection between empiricism and 
experimentation, in that the definitions of experimentation align with what scholars today 
label “empiricism.” Several dictionaries minimally define the word “experiment” as a 
trial, an essay, or a proof.31 However, other dictionaries make a clear connection to 
experience, observation, or the senses. Phillips’s The New World of English Words 
(1658) describes experimentation as a practice that results in certainty that can be verified 
by the senses, so much so that it produces an effect that is “physically evident.” The level 
of certainty is so high that the only way an experiment can deceive is with a supernatural 
intervention, or through a “miracle.” The supernatural, it seems, remains a large part of 
the worldview and can override even the most tangible and observable evidence. Phillips 
places much faith in the ability of experimentation to produce truth, a kind of truth that 
becomes apparent through observation. Furthermore, J.B. defines “experiment” as merely 
“an experience” in An English Expositor (1680). Although his definition appears simple, 
his use of the word “experience” denotes discovery and proof through “trial” and 
“observation.”32 In Glossographia Anglicana Nova (1707), an experiment is described as 
a type of proof or trial “wherein the Senses are judges of the truth of it.” Similar to 
Phillips’s definition, this entry underscores how experimentation leads to truth, but only 
because the senses become the authority, able to judge and perceive a level of certainty 
unable to be reached without empiricism.  
																																																								
31 See Blount’s Glossographia (1661); J.B.’s An English Expositor (1680); Kersey’s Dictionarium Anglo-
Britannicum (1715); Cocker’s English Dictionary (1724). 
32 “experience,” OED. 
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Several of the later definitions turn attention to the connection between 
experimentation and discovery. Bailey’s Dictionarium Britannicum (1730) designates the 
purpose of experimentation: it is done “in order to discover something of the laws and 
natures” of “natural bodies.” Likewise, Johnson’s Dictionary asserts that an experiment is 
performed “in order to discover an uncertain or unknown effect.” Each of these 
definitions expounds upon the designations that connect experiment to truth or certainty. 
Discovery implies that there is some certain truth that can be observed about the natural 
world. Furthermore, Johnson’s use of the words “uncertain” and “unknown” as the 
inverse of experimentation highlights the epistemological stakes at play with empirical 
methodology and experimental practices. Consequently, what one can arrive at through 
experimental natural philosophy is that which is certain and that which can be known. 
Finally, Chambers’s Cyclopædia (1728) draws a line in the sand between the ancients and 
the moderns. Although he does not define the word “experiment” on its own, he includes 
it as part of his definition of “philosophy.” He clearly positions the term as part of natural 
philosophy because he labels the practice as “experimental physics,” describing it as a 
way to enquire into the “Reasons and Natures of Things.” He also characterizes the 
practice as something that has been “cultivated since the Time of my Lord Bacon.” The 
key part of the definition comes, however, when he connects experimentation specifically 
to the Royal Society, claiming that the Society’s experiments have been of “infinite 
Service in Physicks, and ’tis to these, in great measure, that the Advantage of the modern 
Philosophy above the ancient is due.” Consequently, in Chambers’s definition, 
experimentation becomes a means through which natural philosophy has advanced but 
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also marks natural philosophy, specifically the type practiced by the Royal Society, as a 
superior way to formulate knowledge about the natural world.33  
 
Speculative Philosophy 
 Another path to knowledge about the natural world – and the one associated with 
outdated methods – was speculative philosophy, a term that was becoming contentious 
and pejorative. Speculative philosophy was associated with the ancient way of learning 
and was criticized for formulating knowledge based only on contemplation (Anstey 216). 
However, epistemological shifts do not happen radically, in that natural philosophy 
during the Restoration and early eighteenth century did not always cast-off speculation 
and hypothesis. Speculative philosophy was synonymous with the ancient ways of 
learning in schools and it was associated with a kind of contemplation that depended 
upon supposition. Speculative philosophy, therefore, is another example of older systems 
combining with newer epistemologies. One of the main differences between speculative 
philosophy and experimental philosophy is that conclusions drawn from contemplations 
and speculations were often untestable (Anstey 221). Conversely, experimental natural 
philosophy positioned itself as participating in something new because of the way in 
which it relied on sensory data to formulate conclusions (Anstey 222).  Said another way, 
speculative natural philosophy seeks to understand and explain the natural world without  
																																																								
33 Although “nature” can mean many objects of study, there does not appear to be much contention or 
disagreement among modern scholars as to what “nature” as an object of study meant. Gascoigne notes the 
study of nature under Aristotelian philosophy included all organic and inorganic natural things (form, 
matter, cause, and motion) (854). Natural philosophy in the Restoration and eighteenth century focused on 
the “basic causes of natural phenomena” and the “basic causes of change” and motion (856). 
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“systematic observation and experiment,” while experimental philosophy seeks, collects, 
and orders observations in order to use those observations as a way to explain the natural 
world (Anstey 215). 
 Bacon formulated the division between speculative and experimental philosophy; 
however, he used the terms “speculative” and “operative,” with the speculative being 
purely theoretical, while operative knowledge was applicable to practical situations.34 
According to Woolhouse, Bacon continued to be focused on both types of learning: “the 
knowledge of formal causes, to which his method is designed to lead, is pure and 
‘speculative’; while his stress on the practical usefulness of science, and his frequent 
discussions of the mechanical arts, shows a deep interest in the ‘operative’ and 
technological” (25). In Part I of Novum Organum (1620), Bacon speaks against any kind 
of futile speculation and promotes experimentation as the avenue toward knowledge.35 
Despite this assertion, the two types of knowledge are still “intimately connected” for 
Bacon because speculating about causes should and can lead to an operative practical 
philosophy (Woolhouse 25-6).  
 In addition to his claim that speculation and experimentation coexist in Bacon’s 
work, Anstey argues that scholars today rarely acknowledge both the divisions and 
blurred lines between experimental and speculative natural philosophy in spite of the fact 
that writers from the 1650s to the beginning of the eighteenth century acknowledged 
																																																								
34 In De dignitata et augmentis scientiarum or The Dignity and Advancement of Science (1623). 
35 In aphorism 10, Bacon notes that men “indulge” in “speculations” that cannot capture the “subtlety of 
nature,” and he says that the only hope for science lies in “true Induction” (aphorism 14). In aphorism 19, 
he notes that “investigating and discovering truth” arises when one relies on the senses and “particulars” to 
arrive at “highest generality last of all.” The other way of understanding nature (ancient philosophy) only 
“just touches on experience and particulars cursorily” (aphorism 22), but “all truer interpretation of nature” 
is accomplished from “apt and appropriate experiments” (aphorism 50).  
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differences in these two categories. What was being called “physics” in the 1650s started 
being divided into speculative or experimental physics. Moreover, in the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, many English writers were discussing this separation (Anstey 215-
16). For example, in 1665, Joseph Glanvill’s Scepsis Scientifica denies any focus on 
speculation within the Royal Society.36 Glanvill’s assertion implicitly criticizes 
speculative philosophy and advocates for the methods of experimentation and 
observation found in the Royal Society. By the end of the seventeenth century, writers 
such as John Dunton attempt to differentiate between the two philosophies in The Young 
Students Library (1692): Philosophy, according to Dunton ‘may be again Subdivided into 
Speculative and Experimental’ (qtd in Anstey 215). Anstey argues that, except for 
Hobbes, experimental natural philosophy was preferred “by almost all natural 
philosophers in early modern England” (215).37 Although such sweeping generalizations 
can be troublesome, Anstey’s claim highlights, at minimum, the rhetoric surrounding 
knowledge formation at the time and attempts to shed light on why speculative 
philosophy was deemed inferior.  
Anstey contends that the Royal Society took on the term “experimental  
 
philosophy” as one of its main categories.38 Using such a term allowed the Society to  
 
promote the type of natural philosophy that they were practicing (220). In aligning  
 
																																																								
36 Glanvill was a Fellow and apologist for the Royal Society. He says that the Royal Society is not focused 
on “little Projects of serving a Sect, or propagating an Opinion; of spinning out a subtile Notion into a fine 
thread, or forming a plausible System of new Speculation” (5).  
37 Anstey also notes that Cavendish’s chapter on ancient learning in Observations upon Experimental 
Philosophy vocally opposes favoring only experimental philosophy.  
38 Anstey references correspondence by Henry Oldenburg in which he wrote that the Society “aimes at the 
improvement of all usefull Sciences and Arts, not by meer speculations, but by exact and faithfull 
Observations and Experiments.” Oldenburg to Norwood, 10 February 1667/8. 
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themselves with experimental philosophy, they demonstrated a desire to distance  
 
themselves from the ancients. In fact, Anstey refers to their differentiation between 
 
speculative and experimental philosophy as having a “strong polemical agenda.” He  
 
argues: 
 
 
It was the new natural philosophers, and in particular those aligned with the newly 
formed Royal Society and its precursor groups, who first used the distinction. 
They did this not simply to emphasize the fact that they were experimentalists or 
saw an indispensable need for experimentation, but also to distance themselves 
from the old speculative way of proceeding in physics or physiology (as natural 
philosophy was often called). (221) 
 
 
Essentially, therefore, marking a difference between speculative and experimental natural 
philosophy criticizes the former and recommends the latter (216). Accordingly, 
“speculative” becomes a derogatory term within the contexts of some discourses on 
natural philosophy (220). Within the dictionaries of the time and rhetoric associated with 
the Royal Society, speculative philosophy is often aligned with drawing hypotheses. 
Today we tend to think of hypotheses as part and parcel of the modern scientific method; 
however, at this time, hypotheses were aligned with the speculative philosopher.39 The 
speculative natural philosopher was “one who indulged in hypotheses without recourse to 
observation and experiment at all, or only as an afterthought” (Anstey 223). These 
delineations shed light on the status of hypotheses during this period. For early modern 
natural philosophers, according to Anstey, a hypothesis would refer to what we think of 
																																																								
39 Peter Dear discusses the Society’s view of hypotheses in “Toitus in verba: Rhetoric and Authority in the 
Early Royal Society.” According to Dear, hypotheses were problematic because they “could not be 
grounded in the bedrock of the new authority.”  Hypotheses, he notes “remained a matter of choice, at best 
of heuristic, and could play no active part in the furtherance of the experimental philosophy that was the 
basis of the Royal Society’s cooperative scheme. Outside the limits of the Society’s activities, however, the 
individual natural philosopher could quite properly utilize hypotheses” (70). 
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as a “generalization, or even a theory,” and the word was used synonymously with terms 
such as conjecture and speculation (223-4). Hypotheses, consequently, were seen as 
“castles in the air, mere speculations, fancies, phantasms, chimeras, and so on” (Anstey 
225).40 When seen in this light, what is really being denigrated about the way in which 
speculative philosophy arrives at knowledge and truth? Speculation, on some level, relies 
explicitly on what will come to be called the imagination as a means through which to 
contemplate. Although one might argue that conjecture or supposition is at the root of at 
least the first stages that lead toward experimental philosophy, it becomes clear that 
asserting its reliance exclusively on empirical truths was a way for experimental 
philosophy to distance itself from the trappings, deceptions, and potential errors that were 
often associated with the imagination.  
 Before discussing the definitions of some of these words in popular dictionaries, it 
is important to recognize that even with such divisive rhetoric, natural philosophy was 
not practiced in solely one way. In fact, experimental philosophy was not necessarily 
equivalent to natural philosophy because there were natural philosophers at this time 
practicing in a speculative manner. At stake, of course, is a “cluster of epistemological 
issues that underlie the terms ‘experimental’ and ‘speculative’” (Anstey 220). When these 
terms are really explored, however, we see that the methodologies of natural philosophers 
ranged widely, and some who claimed to be experimental philosophers ultimately 
																																																								
40 This distinction Anstey makes to speculation as “fancies” or “phantasms” becomes important in my later 
exploration into dictionary definitions on the imagination. The speculative seems inherently tied to the 
imagination. Anstey references the physician Thomas Syndenham’s Tractaus de podagra et hydrope 
(1683): “Had I begun with my hypotheses, I should have shown the same want of wisdom that a builder 
would show who began with the roof and tiles, and ended with the basement and foundation. But it is only 
those who build castles in the air [Aere Castella] that may begin at either end indifferently” (165-66). 
 61 
“incorporated elements normally attributed to speculative philosophy” (Anstey 220). As 
we will see from some of the dictionary entries, there were no clear-cut ideas about what 
some of these terms meant. Terms such as “hypothesis,” “experiment,” and “probability” 
were being discussed and debated. The unclear meaning of some of these terms and the 
way in which they are sometimes used interchangeably emphasize that natural 
philosophy confronted ideas that were fluctuating. As such, the methodologies that 
various natural philosophers employed were not fully developed yet, and instead were 
often provisional, uncertain, and at times, inconsistent (Anstey 221).  
 
Hypothesis, Speculation, and the Imagination 
 As with some of the terms discussed previously, it is necessary that we are 
reminded of and appreciate the popular conceptions and understandings of these ideas. 
Since hypothesizing is often connected to speculation and both were tied to the 
imagination, it is useful to explore the way the public was informed on what it meant to 
hypothesize. Every dictionary that contains the word “hypothesis” defines it as a 
supposition.41 “Supposition” denotes assumption or inference – basically the opposite of 
what experimental philosophy promoted itself as doing. The OED records supposition as 
a type of assumption that, despite being used as a basis for an argument, does not call 
attention to whether that assumption is true or false. Suppositions contain indeterminate 
beliefs and are sometimes inaccurate. Furthermore, in spite of its possible mistakenness, a 
supposition is often assumed to be probable or true or to be “at least admitted as possibly 
																																																								
41 The New World of Words (1658, 1706); An Alphabetical Dictionary (1668); Dictionarium Anglo 
Britannicum (1715); Cocker’s English Dictionary (1724); Dictionary of the English Language (1755). 
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true.”42 Phillips’s The New World of Words (1658) speaks to this kind of uncertainty in 
part of his definition for the word “hypothesis” when he describes it as a type of 
argument that is laid out and “taken for granted for Argument’s sake.” The 1706 update 
to the term says that the inference is taken for granted so as to solve problems and answer 
questions, especially in natural philosophy. Kersey’s 1715 definition reiterates Phillips’s, 
exemplifying how the general reader might believe that natural philosophy and naturalists 
were still engaged in speculative philosophy. Further proof can be found in the fact that 
no definition of natural philosophy in the dictionaries I refer to includes any words 
related to experimentation, but several of them do define hypothesis and speculation as 
practices that define natural philosophy. The term “hypothesis” can be and was 
interpreted and discussed in a negative way, especially by practitioners in the Royal 
Society who sought to promote a different kind of knowledge acquisition. Supposition, 
however, leaves open the possibilities and multiplicities of truth and knowledge because 
it allows for conclusions not based solely in observation and experiment and allows for a 
type of thinking that could involve the imagination. Moreover, as defined by these 
various dictionaries, a general reader might have understood natural philosophy as a 
practice that still involved drawing conclusions based on unknowns. As we will see, the 
term “hypothesis” also has a clear connection to speculation, a type of activity that some 
writers were engaging in as they responded to natural philosophy. 
 Since dictionaries from the first decade of the eighteenth century still attribute  
 
speculative modes to natural philosophy, one has to consider that methodologies often 
 
																																																								
42 “supposition,” OED. 
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were mixed, but also that older notions of what constituted natural philosophy continued 
  
to linger. Both Glossographia Anglicana Nova (1707) and Harris’s Lexicon Technicum  
 
(1708) define physicks as the “speculative knowledge of all Natural Bodies.” Each also  
 
assigns natural philosophy as a type of “science” that “contemplates” the powers of 
 
nature. The word “contemplation” appears in most of the definitions of speculation. 
 
Speculation and the speculative will prove relevant to my later arguments about how 
 
other texts entered discourse about natural philosophy, so it is necessary to chart the 
 
various ways in which these terms were defined. These definitions can elucidate some of 
 
 the epistemological ideas to which many practitioners of the early Royal Society were 
 
opposed, as is evident in the rhetoric of Sprat’s History, which will be discussed in the  
 
next chapter. 
 
 
Table 2. Definitions of Speculation 
Dictionary Name, 
Author, and 
Publication Date43 
 
To Speculate 
 
Speculation 
 
Speculative 
Glossographia, or, A 
Dictionary 
Interpreting All Such 
Hard Words – 
Thomas Blount, 
1661 
To watch in an high 
Tower, or other like 
place, to see far, to 
espy, search out, to 
consider diligently, 
to behold and gaze 
upon 
A spying, a 
watching in an open 
place, a discovery, a 
considering, or 
observing 
 
No entry 
A New English 
Dictionary – John 
Kersey, 1702 
No entry Contemplation  Belonging thereto 
	 	
																																																								
43 The following dictionaries contain no entry for speculate or any derivative of that word:  An Alphabetical 
Dictionary – John Wilkins, 1668; An English Expositour – J.B., 1680; Lexicon Technicum - John Harris, 
1708; An English Dictionary - Elisha Coles, 1713; Cyclopædia – Ephraim Chambers, 1728. 
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Table 2.  Definitions of Speculation 
Dictionary Name, 
Author, and 
Publication Date 
 
To Speculate 
 
Speculation 
 
Speculative 
The New World of 
Words - Edward 
Phillips, 1706 
To contemplate, 
observe, or view; to 
consider seriously, 
to meditate upon 
 
The Theory, or 
study of an Art or 
Science without 
regard to the 
Practice. 
Studious in the 
observation of 
things Divine or 
Natural: Speculative 
is also more 
especially opposed 
to Practical 
Glossographia 
Anglicana Nova –
1707 
No entry Contemplation 
 
No entry 
Dictionarium Anglo-
Britannicum - John 
Kersey, 1715 
 
to observe, or view; 
to consider 
seriously 
 
the Art of 
Speculating, 
contemplating, &c. 
an Espial, a Notion: 
Also the Theory, or 
study of an Art, or 
Science without 
regard to the 
Practice 
belonging to 
Speculation, apt to 
speculate 
 
Cocker’s English 
Dictionary – Edward 
Cocker, 1724 
No entry Observing and 
inquiring 
No entry 
Dictionarium 
Britannicum -  
Nathan Bailey, 
173044 
to contemplate, 
observe, or view; 
also to consider 
seriously upon, to 
mediate upon.  
 
Contemplation, &c. 
also an Espial, a 
Notion; also the 
Theory or Study of 
an Art or Science, 
without Regard had 
to the Practice of it 
of, or pertaining to 
Speculation; 
studious in the 
Observation of 
Things divine or 
natural; speculative 
is also opposed to 
practical 
	 	
																																																								
44 This dictionary also lists an entry for “speculativeness,” signifying it as a “Propenseness to Speculation, 
Studiousness in Observation. Speculativeness is the Opposite of Practicalness.” 
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Table 2.  Definitions of Speculation 
Dictionary Name, 
Author, and 
Publication Date 
 
To Speculate 
 
Speculation 
 
Speculative 
A Dictionary of the 
English Language – 
Samuel Johnson, 
175546 
To meditate; to 
contemplate; to take 
a view of any thing 
with the mind’ to 
consider 
attentively; to look 
through with the 
mind 
 
1. Examination by 
the eye; view 2. 
Examiner; spy. 3. 
Mental view; 
intellectual 
examination; 
contemplation 4. A 
train of thoughts 
formed by 
meditation 5. 
Mental scheme not 
reduced to practice 
 
[from Given to 
speculation; 
contemplative 2. 
Notional; ideal; not 
practical 
 
 
 In surveying the chart above, we can see that one of the definitions of speculation 
that appears in many of the entries is contemplation. To contemplate something requires 
thought and attention, and this term also implies sustained study, to think and ponder over 
something again and again. Several of the definitions of speculation draw attention to the 
seriousness of this type of activity. Philosophers who speculate are “diligent,” “serious,” 
“studious,” and “attentive.” There is also some connection to relying on the senses, in 
that almost every definition aligns speculation with watching, viewing, and observing. 
Furthermore, some of the above entries speak to what the speculative philosopher 
examines or probes into – the “Natural.” Like natural philosophy or experimental 
philosophy, speculative philosophy investigates the causes of the natural world and does 
so through observation and study. However, the departure of the speculative from the 
																																																								
46 This dictionary also lists an entry for “speculatively,” signifying it as “contemplatively; with meditation 
2. Ideally theoretically; not practically.” 
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experimental is addressed in many entries above as well. The speculative, unlike 
experimental methods, is not concerned with the practical. In fact, the entries that 
highlight the absence of practicality identify speculation as opposed to the practical. The 
speculative, therefore, is more concerned with theory and less focused on implementing 
those theories into practice. The early Royal Society, along with apologists such as Sprat, 
went to great lengths to convince readers of the usefulness of empirical/experimental 
natural philosophy. That, of course, does not mean that early natural philosophers 
completely abandoned speculation or that all of their concerns addressed the practical. 
The other clear point of divergence between definitions of natural philosophy and of 
experiment is that the speculative is often described as studying not just the natural world 
but also the divine. Contemplation of the divine moves natural philosophy outside of 
what can be empirically known. Despite the fact that many early members of the Royal 
Society claimed that part of the usefulness of experimental philosophy was that many 
discoveries reinforced and pointed to the existence of a higher power, experiment and 
empiricism rely on what can be directly experienced and observed within the limits of the 
human body and developing technologies.  
 Speculation, as signifying meditation and contemplation, can allow for the 
importance of the imagination. Within Table 2, Johnson describes the action of 
speculating as taking a view of “any thing with the mind.” As early as 1706, Phillips’s 
The New World of Words delineates the imagination as applying something to the mind, 
even if that “thing” is “impressed upon the brain through thought.” To imagine, 
according to Phillips, is to both fancy and to conceive or suppose. The definitions in 
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Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum (1715) and A Compleat English Dictionary (1735) 
reinforce this connection, aligning not only speculation, but also hypothesizing with the 
imagination – each describing it partly as “to suppose.” Supposition, as discussed above, 
was one of the predominant definitions of hypothesis. The imagination, of course, is also 
a contested term, which many scholars have defined in divergent ways; Table 3 lists the 
many ways in which the imagination was defined at the time. Even though the term 
“imagination” can have many different meanings, relying, once again, on dictionary 
definitions for general readers provides us with insight into how the imagination was  
understood at the time and also provides some interesting and explicit connections to how  
 
the imaginative relates to the speculative.  
 
 
Table 3. Definitions Related to the Imagination 
Dictionary Name, 
Author, and 
Publication Date47 
 
Fancy 
 
Phantasy 
 
Imagination/Imaginary 
/To Imagine 
The English 
Dictionarie - Henry 
Cockerham, 1642 
No entry No entry Imaginary – that 
which is conceived in 
the mind 
 
A French-English 
Dictionary - Randle 
Cotgrave, 1650 
Not listed, but 
referenced in 
definition for 
Imagination 
No entry Imagination - fancie, 
conceit, thought, a 
surmise, or surmising 
An English 
Dictionary - Elisha 
Coles, 1676 
Not listed, but 
referenced in 
definition for 
Imagination 
No entry Imagination - 
feigning, also the 
phansie 
An English 
Expositour - J.B., 
1676 
No entry No entry Imaginary – that 
which is conceived in 
the mind 
	
																																																								
47 There are no definitions for the above terms in Rider’s Dictionarie (1640), Phillips’s The New World of 
Words first edition in 1658, or Blount’s Glossographia in 1661. 
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Table 3. Definitions Related to the Imagination 
Dictionary Name, 
Author, and 
Publication Date 
 
Fancy 
 
Phantasy 
 
Imagination/Imaginary 
/To Imagine 
The New World of 
Words - Edward 
Phillips, 1706 
Fancy - see 
Imagination 
 
Phillips also marks 
Fantasy as a 
synonym of Fancy 
and defines it as - 
Imagination, 
Humour, Crotchet, 
Maggot, Whim 
An inward Sense or 
Imagination, 
whereby any thing 
is represented to 
the Mind, or 
imprinted on it 
 
Imagination - an apply 
of the Mind to the 
Image of some Bodily 
Thing impressed in the 
Brain by 
Apprehension, 
Invention, Fancy, 
Conceit, Thought. 
 
To Imagine - to 
conceive or fancy, to 
think or suppose; to 
invent, devise, or 
contrive 
Glossographia 
Anglicana Nova –
1707 
No entry An inward Sense or 
Imagination, 
whereby things are 
represented to the 
Mind, or imprinted 
on it 
Imagination – is an 
application of the 
Mind to the Phantasm 
or Image of some 
corporeal thing 
expressed in the brain  
Lexicon Technicum 
-  John Harris, 1708 
See Phantasy, or 
Imagination 
An Internal Sense 
or Imagination, 
whereby any 
Corporeal thing is 
represented to the 
Mind, or impressed 
on the Brain by its 
proper Image 
Imagination – is an 
Application of the 
Mind to the Phantasm 
or Image of some 
Corporeal Thing 
impressed in the 
Brain.  
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Table 3. Definitions Related to the Imagination 
Dictionary Name, 
Author, and 
Publication Date 
 
Fancy 
 
Phantasy 
 
Imagination/Imaginary 
/To Imagine 
A New English 
Dictionary - John 
Kersey, 1720 
No definition for 
fancy, but “fantasy” 
is defined as 
“fancy” 
Phantasy – or 
Fancy, the 
Imagination; the 
Second of the 
Powers, or 
Faculties of the 
sensitive or rational 
Soul, by which the 
Species of Objects 
receiv’d by the 
common Sense, are 
retain’d, recall’d, 
further examin’d, 
and either 
compounded or 
divided 
Others define the 
Phantasy to be that 
internal Sense or 
Power, whereby 
the Idea’s of absent 
Things are form’d, 
and presented to 
the Mind, as if they 
were present  
Imaginary - that has 
no being at all, but in 
one’s fancy; An 
Imagination, thought 
or fancy. The 
Imaginative faculty 
 
To Imagine – devise, 
fancy, think, or 
suppose 
  
Cyclopædia - 
Ephraim Chambers, 
1728 
See Phantasy, or 
Imagination 
No entry Imagination – a Power 
or Faculty of the Soul, 
by which it conceives, 
and forms Ideas of 
Things, by means of 
certain Traces and 
Impressions that had 
been before made in 
the Fibres of the 
Brain, by Sensation.  
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Table 3. Definitions Related to the Imagination 
Dictionary Name, 
Author, and 
Publication Date 
 
Fancy 
 
Phantasy 
 
Imagination/Imaginary 
/To Imagine 
Dictionarium 
Britannicum - 
Nathan Bailey, 
1730 
The imagination The Fancy or 
Imagination; the 
second of the 
Powers or Faculties 
of the sensitive or 
rational Soul, by 
which the Species 
of Objects, 
received in by the 
common Sense, are 
retained, recalled, 
further examined, 
and either 
compounded or 
divided 
Imagination – is an 
application of the 
Mind to the Phantasm 
or Image of some 
corporeal Thing 
impressed in the 
Brain: or, it is a power 
or faculty of the Soul, 
by which it conceives 
and forms Ideas of 
Things, by means of 
certain Traces and 
Impressions that had 
been made on the 
Brain by Sensation 
 
To imagine – to 
conceive or fancy, to 
think or suppose 
A Dictionary of the 
English Language -  
Samuel Johnson, 
175548 
[contracted from 
phantasy] 
Imagination; the 
power by which the 
mind forms to itself 
images and 
representations of 
things, persons, or 
scenes of being; an 
opinion bred rather 
by the imagination 
than the reason 
 Imagination – Fancy; 
the power of forming 
ideal pictures; the 
power of representing 
things absent to one’s 
self or others 
 
To imagine – to fancy; 
to paint in the mind 
 
	
	
 The concept of the imagination and its function is as, or perhaps more, contested 
as each of the terms related to natural philosophy. When exploring the above chart for 
patterns, one commonality is the interconnectedness or synonymous relationship between 
																																																								
48 Johnson also defines “To Fancy” as “To imagine; to believe without being able to prove.” 
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the words “fancy” and “imagination.” This will prove important to understanding Sprat’s 
rhetoric in his History of the Royal Society, in which he sets up fancy as part and parcel 
of the trappings of speculative philosophy. The dictionary definitions also capture this 
relationship between fancy and speculation. Many of the definitions share one common 
defining characteristic of the imagination: it is an action the brain engages in when 
imagining, and one of those actions listed is supposition. Hypothesis, a method associated 
with speculative philosophy, relies on supposition according to various dictionary 
definitions. Supposition implies an idea or thought that is based on assumptions and 
beliefs, not necessarily grounded in observable truth. In fact, the OED lists both the 
words “fancy” and “deception” as ways to define supposition.50  
 The meanings found in some of the definitions may help us to better understand 
the way the imagination was conceived in general representations. Many of the 
definitions are grounded in the imagination as a thought or idea, but when we explore the 
other descriptors, the imagination is not always represented in the most positive light. 
“Deception” clearly has negative connotations, as do the words “feign” and “contrive,” 
two of the other frequent characteristics of what the imagination was considered to have 
been doing at the time. To feign means to “fashion factiously or deceptively,” to 
“contrive (a deception),” “to imagine” and believe “erroneously” and to “indulge in 
fiction.”51 Contriving has similar negative connotations, as it is a term that signifies 
making things up and is itself a word used to define what it means to feign. Inventing, 
another term used to describe what it means to imagine, is also defined in the OED by 
																																																								
50 “supposition,” OED. 
51 “feign,” OED. 
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contriving and feigning, but it also defines the term as what one does when they compose 
a “work of imagination or literary art.”52 Samuel Johnson describes the action of 
imagination as “painting with the mind.” Some of the other terms used to define 
imagination are as a “conceit,” a “maggot,” or a “whim.” None of these terms imply 
anything negative, but they do allude more to the fantastical. Johnson defines “maggot” 
and “whim” as an “odd fancy.” Chambers goes so far as to align strength of imagination 
as a symptom of mental decline. In Cyclopæida Chambers notes that the imaginative 
faculty is “very strong, representing many, extravagant and monstrous things” in those 
who are “melancholic” or “mad.” He does also align the imaginative faculty with artistic 
expression: “In Poets and Painters, that same Faculty is to be the Predominant one; to 
enable ’em to feign, and pursue and execute their Fictions and Fables with more Strength, 
Consistency, etc.” Whether an innocent whimsy, an artistic expression, or something 
more approaching deceit, imagination is not treated in many of these definitions as a 
respectable faculty.  
 One of the most telling descriptions of the imagination comes in the way the 
imagination is presented as a second power of the faculties. Johnson explains it best when 
he says that fancy is the imagination, or the “power by which the mind forms to itself 
images and representations of things, persons, or scenes of being; an opinion bred rather 
by the imagination than the reason” (emphasis added). It is reason that is able to 
distinguish what is good from what is evil and what is truth from what is falsehood 
(Johnson’s Dictionary). The speculative and the imaginative, therefore, both exist within 
																																																								
52 “invent” OED. 
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the mind, but their focus on what is fictive and what is hypothetical detract from natural 
philosophy’s focus on what can be known and observed with certainty. When Kersey 
says that the imaginary has “no being at all, but in one’s fancy,” he gets at the heart of the 
ever-growing separation between the speculative and the experimental. That which is 
only conceived of in the mind cannot be proven in an empirical way. Kersey is correct in 
saying that imaginative thoughts and fictions have no physical presence, but they do have 
a power in shaping the public’s reaction to and discourse with experimental philosophy. 
It is in the imagination that one contemplates the wonder of new discoveries and new 
technologies. The imaginative faculty is also a crucial component of experimental 
philosophy, for all ideas and theories must initially be conceived in the mind, before the 
first experiment can be performed.53  
 
Conclusion 
 James Engell argues that our conceptions of the imagination today originated in 
the late seventeenth century and continued into the eighteenth century in his book The 
Creative Imagination. He claims that much effort was focused on defining the idea of the 
imagination during this time. Engell argues that our understanding of “genius, poetic 
power, and originality, of sympathy, individuality, knowledge, and even ethics grew and 
took lifeblood from the idea of imagination” (3). The imagination, as envisioned by such 
philosophers as Thomas Hobbes in the Restoration, makes and intercedes on behalf of the 
																																																								
53 As referenced in Table 3, of the eleven dictionaries that define the imagination, eight of them define the 
imagination as something that originates within the mind. The only three that do not make that distinction 
are Coles, Colgrave, and Kersey. 
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human experience; therefore, the imagination is not a passive faculty because it “actively 
forms our conception of the world and, compounded and regulated to form an end or 
design governing its function, it becomes the process of artistic creation” (Engell 13-15). 
Despite these positive conceptions of the imagination, Engell establishes that the 
imagination was also associated with emotions, passions, and desires (15). In the 1660s, 
according to Beverly C. Southgate, these characteristics associated with the imagination 
and the role the imagination was thought to play made the concept contentious (285). As 
William Rossky writes, early modern thinkers understood the imagination as an 
uncontrolled and immoral faculty. This faculty was inferior because it was “forever 
distorting and lying, irrational, unstable, flitting and insubstantial, haphazardly making 
and marring, dangerously tied to emotions, feigning idly and purposelessly” (73). The 
Royal Society, at least in in Sprat’s rhetoric, associates these types of deficiencies with 
the speculative. As will be established in chapter three, some of the rhetoric associated 
with the Royal Society goes to great distances to set up experimental philosophy as bereft 
of emotion and desire. 
 When considering the views of the imagination discussed in the next chapter, it is 
pertinent to consider the ways in which the imagination was seen as erroneous and 
misleading. Southgate establishes the way the word “imagination” was employed during 
the Restoration. She argues that the imagination was associated with Platonic traditions 
that deemed the imaginative faculty something that must be “controlled and kept 
subservient to our more reliable faculties” (286). Although the imagination has value, its 
negative qualities outweighed its unpredictable nature. Not only was the imagination seen 
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as resistant to reason’s restraints, but it was also positioned as “disturbingly, even 
dangerously anarchic and irrational” (Southgate 286). In thinking about the Royal 
Society’s belief that careful observation and a moderate approach to knowledge were 
both desirable and necessary, it is no wonder that the Society’s rhetoric positioned the 
imagination as an avenue that led away from truth and into uncertainty. In delving further 
into the separation between the speculative (the ancient philosophy) and the experimental 
(seen as new), it is clear that the imagination “becomes associated with the vices of the 
old: it is what the true and real and safe philosophy has got away from” (Southgate 287). 
Thus, the term “imagination” became “a kind of shorthand – a sign to indicate what 
cannot readily be understood” in terms of the emerging natural philosophy. The 
imagination, consequently, “refers to something non-material, non-physical, non-
mechanical; it relates to forces of the sort that we might describe as ‘mental’ or 
‘psychological’” (Southgate 281). Imagination, as envisioned by writers such as Sprat, 
stood for everything experimental philosophy was not, or at minimum, what it argued 
that it was not (Southgate 287).  
In addition to trying to interpret the ways in which popular audiences conceived 
of natural philosophy, I also point to the connection between hypothesis, speculation, and 
imagination to draw attention to the ways reason was positioned as superior to these 
concepts. Is there value in the imagination, or are observation and experimentation the 
only reliable and practical sources of knowledge? Speculative writing serves as a bridge, 
connecting observation and experimentation with conjecture. This combination 
emphasizes the need for both speculation and experimentation, because it is in both that 
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one has access to a more complete path for ascertaining knowledge and understanding the 
possible consequences of the pursuit of certain kinds of natural philosophy. Speculation 
also becomes an important tool through which people could contemplate and, in some 
ways, participate in experimental philosophy and the discoveries and changes that it 
brought. Speculation and imagination, thus, disseminate, receive, and reconsider 
“scientific” ideas in ways that the rhetoric coming out of the Royal Society does not 
recognize. Speculative thought, no matter how much the Society attempted to distance 
itself from it, cannot be separated from experimental philosophy because it is crucial to 
the Society’s methods and its desire to capture the public’s imagination.  
 All of the definitions explored in this chapter suggest that public knowledge of 
natural philosophy may have differed from what Fellows in the Royal Society were 
actually practicing. But these definitions also capture the shifting epistemology of the day 
and the ways in which old and new methodologies and domains of knowledge collided, 
coexisted, and conflicted. Considering how terms such as “physics,” “natural 
philosophy,” “experiment,” and “speculation” were defined is a necessary task, even 
when it may seem like representations in dictionaries remain remote from actual practice. 
Viewing natural philosophy as a practice that was “intimately bound up with the practical 
role it played in the society” can help us determine how to define natural philosophy 
(Grant 264). One of the ways we can start to understand the role it played is to look at 
contemporary and popular representations of natural philosophy. Those representations 
might illuminate what function natural philosophy served and what it meant to 
contemporary audiences. Although scholars most often rely on the natural philosopher’s 
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writings and methods to define his practice, how the public interpreted the products of 
natural philosophy are just as much a “part of the identity of natural philosophy” as what 
we might deem more legitimate work (Grant 264).  
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CHAPTER III 
“MEN OF HOT, EARNEST, AND HASTY MINDS” VERSUS “THE SOLID 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF SCIENCE ITSELF”: THE ROYAL SOCIETY’S PUBLIC  
 
ATTEMPT TO EXALT EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
For so there will be always many sincere witnesses standing by, whom self-love 
will not persuade to report falsly, nor heat of invention carry to swallow a deceit 
too soon; as having themselves no hand in the making of the Experiment, but 
onely in the Inspection.  
Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society of London1 
 
 
 The excerpt above, taken from part two of Sprat’s The History of the Royal 
Society (1667), alludes to the collective experience that was seen as so significant to the 
Royal Society’s philosophy. This quotation, taken from Section VIII, “A defence of the 
largeness of their number,” attempts to explain why there are so many members in the 
Society and why the members represent many different types of studies. These many  
members, in addition to being Fellows themselves, become the necessary witnesses to the 
Society’s experimental philosophy. Witnesses are just as important as – or even more  
important than – the one doing the experiment, for it is the witnesses who can validate the 
truths demonstrated. The solitary philosopher, according to Sprat, might be tempted to 
falsify his report, so it is the public nature of the Society’s philosophy that legitimizes its 
position. The Royal Society envisioned a type of natural philosophy available to the   
																																																								
1 Pg. 73. In History of the Royal Society, edited by Jackson I. Cope and Harold Whitmore Jones, 1959. All 
quotations taken from this edition. Cope and Jones note that it was entered into the Stationers’ Hall as 
entitled: The History of the Instauration, designe and Progress of the Royal Society of London for the 
Advancement of experimental philosophy (ix).  
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public, so not only did they publish their own history in 1667, but they also made 
demonstrations of experiments available to the public and began publishing records of 
their experiments in 1665 in their Philosophical Transactions. As established in the 
previous chapter, the public was likewise introduced to and educated about natural 
philosophy through other means, including dictionaries, which attempted to disseminate 
and explain the terminology related to natural philosophy. Those dictionary definitions 
exemplify a natural philosophy that was in flux, in that it looked forward to experimental 
philosophy and that which today we would refer to as “empiricism,” while also keeping 
ties to speculative philosophy and older epistemologies such as superstition and magic.2 
In addition to dictionaries that contributed to the understanding and popularization of 
natural philosophy, Sprat’s History became another way for the reading public to engage 
with emerging epistemologies.3 Sprat’s History is often cited when describing the 
relationship between the use of plain-style rhetoric and experimental philosophy, but not 
much attention has been paid to Sprat’s dichotomous presentation of the speculative and 
experimental philosopher.4 The distinction between the speculative and the experimental 
																																																								
2 As noted in chapter two, the term “empiricism” was not a word that appeared in the dictionaries of the day 
when describing natural, speculative, or experimental philosophy. Empiricism, however, has become a 
popular term among scholars when discussing experimental philosophy, as practiced by the Royal Society. 
This experimental philosophy relied on observation, experiment, and inductive reasoning, methods that we 
today associate with “empiricism.” When I use the term “empiricism” I do so acknowledging its common 
usage among scholars and understanding that it is a term that has come to signify experimental philosophy.  
3 Cope and Jones recount the multiple printings that Sprat’s History went through: the second edition was 
issued in 1702, the third in 1722, and the fourth in 1734. Hall says that Sprat’s History “had considerable 
influence at home and abroad – it was translated into French in 1669” and went through multiple English 
editions in the eighteenth century (52). 
4 For more on Sprat’s discourse on rhetoric see Denise Tillery “The Plain Style in the Seventeenth Century: 
Gender and the History of Scientific Discourse” (2016); Tina Skouen “Science versus Rhetoric? Sprat’s 
History of the Royal Society Reconsidered” (2011); R.J. Stark Rhetoric, Science, & Magic in Seventeenth-
Century England (2009); James McGuire “The Rhetoric of Sprat’s Defense of the Royal Society” (2005); 
Joel Reed “Restoration and Repression: The Language Projects of the Royal Society” (1989); Werner 
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that we find in the dictionary definitions appears as more lengthy explanations in this 
official statement representing the Royal Society’s views. These distinctions that 
concerned these writers of official statements extended far beyond subdividing natural 
philosophy. Experimental philosophy, as opposed to speculative philosophy, would be 
championed as necessary to cultural and political stability.     
The public rhetoric associated with the early Royal Society during the 
Restoration, therefore, becomes another point of crucial public communication to study 
when examining what natural philosophy might have meant to a general reader. Because 
the remaining chapters of this dissertation investigate speculative writing that responds to 
the formation and practices of the Royal Society, understanding how the Society 
rhetorically presented itself to the public is an important step. Sprat wrote his History at 
the bequest of the Society in order to trace its history, publicize its methods, and defend 
its philosophy to the world.5 It is divided into three parts: the first part, which recounts 
the state of ancient philosophy; the second part, which captures the Society’s 
establishment and initial years; and the third part, which defends and recommends 
experimental philosophy.6 Prefacing Sprat’s History is a poem by Abraham Cowley, 
																																																																																																																																																																					
Hüllen “Style and Utopia: Sprat’s Demand for a Plain Style Reconsidered” (1987); B. Vickers “The Royal 
Society and English Prose Style: A Reassessment” (1986); and W.S. Howell Eighteenth-Century British 
Logic and Rhetoric (1971). 
5 According to Cope and Jones’s introduction to Sprat’s History, “As early as May 24, 1663, Sir Robert 
Moray mentions young Thomas Sprat’s project.” At the time he was a “young churchman of twenty-eight, 
whose name had been proposed for membership in the Society by John Wilkins as recently as April 1, 
1663, and whose election had not taken place until April 29” (xiii). Sprat opens the History with a 
pronouncement that “I shall here present to the World, an Account of the First Institution of the Royal 
Society; and of the Progress, which they have already made: in hope, that this Learned and Inquisitive Age, 
will either think their Indeavors, worthy of its Assistance; or else will be thereby provok’d, to attempt some 
greater Enterprise (if any such can be found out)” (1).  
6 As discussed in the previous chapter, “ancient philosophy” typically refers to a natural philosophy based 
in Aristotelian philosophy. However, Sprat’s History details the many ancient philosophies that served as 
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entitled “To the Royal Society,” a pindaric ode singing the praises of Francis Bacon and 
acclaiming the Royal Society’s victorious emancipation of ancient philosophy from 
stagnation and deluded truth. As in the case of Sprat, the Royal Society had requested 
Cowley’s services, and his poem establishes the laudatory tone of Sprat’s work.7 Sprat’s 
History and Cowley’s poem represent the way the Royal Society attempted to influence 
the public’s perception of its endeavors. After briefly discussing how the Royal Society 
was formed, I analyze Sprat’s and Cowley’s rhetoric to elucidate how the Society 
separated itself from ancient philosophy. These two pieces of propaganda show that the 
Royal Society desired a strong public statement in favor of its own methods and in 
opposition to speculative methods of philosophy. In denigrating speculative methods of 
philosophy, the Society was able to promote what it saw as a more valid avenue to truth – 
philosophy grounded in observation and experimentation; however, its call to demote and 
dismantle speculative thinking draws more attention not only to how much the Society 
relies on it themselves, but also to how vital speculative thinking is to the public’s 
understanding of natural philosophy. Sprat’s History and Cowley’s ode, therefore, 
become an additional method through which we can ascertain how the public may have 
conceived of natural philosophy, important groundwork for understanding why 
speculative prose and drama reacted to these developments with such skepticism.  
																																																																																																																																																																					
precursors to what he terms the “modern.” In part one, he lists the philosophy of the east (naming them 
“ancients”). These eastern philosophies include those associated with the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, and the 
Egyptians. Sprat then discusses the philosophy of ancient Greece and Rome, the “Primitive Church,” 
philosophy under the Church of Rome, and the philosophy of the “Schole-men.” (5-28). Sprat labels all of 
these “ancient philosophies” as “hindrances,” before moving into his focus on the philosophy of “the 
Moderns,” as that which is practiced by the Royal Society (28). 
7 Jarvis notes that Sprat actually preferred to open with prose by Francis Bacon, but the Society selected 
Cowley’s ode (65). 
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Forming the Society 
 In order to better understand Sprat’s and Cowley’s views, it is useful to first 
establish a brief history of how the Society came to be and the context in which it arose. 
In addition to the public nature of the Society, it is worthwhile to study the Society 
because “it can be taken as a symbol of particular conceptions of natural philosophy in 
this period (Dear “Toitus” 55). The prototype for the Royal Society was an informal 
group of men who met together in London in approximately 1645 in order to further 
experimental science (Purver xi); however, the actual Royal Society was founded in 
London in 1660, and it received the Royal charter in 1662.8 The 1660s, in fact, can be 
seen as one of the most productive decades in the history of “science” (Vickers ix). The 
Society’s foundation was innovative because it signified a new type of establishment; it 
was a public body “devoted to the corporate pursuit of scientific research,” which was 
something unprecedented (Hunter Establishing 1).9 The formation of the Royal Society 
was an “important episode in intellectual history,” for it “embodied a new philosophy and 
a new scientific attitude” (Purver xi). As a Society, the Fellows saw themselves as 
standing for something unique, and they felt as though their work was important, in that 
they would be making significant and “far-reaching contributions to science” (Purver 21-
																																																								
8 Despite the royal patronage, Peter Dear notes that the monarch did not take much interest in The Royal 
Society. In fact, the king was known to have referred to its Fellows as “fools.” He also allegedly mocked 
them for their attempts at weighing air (115). 
9 Hunter, like other scholars cited in this chapter, uses terms such as “science” and “scientific” in a broader 
sense that includes natural philosophy. See chapter two for a more in-depth discussion on how scholars 
often use the term “science” to anachronistically refer to natural philosophy. Because so many scholars rely 
on this term, it is impossible for me to avoid, but I only do so when directly quoting from scholars. In 
regard to natural philosophy as a public good, see James R. Jacob in The Scientific Revolution: Aspirations 
and Achievements, 1500-1700 (1998). Jacob discusses that Francis Bacon felt that science must be a 
collaborative endeavor, “directed, administered, and paid for by the monarchial, bureaucratic state” (57). In 
Bacon’s view, this was not so that knowledge should be subject to state control but so that it could be made 
available for the public good. 
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2).10 Additionally, when the Society received its royal sanction, it was bestowed with a 
corporate personality, in that it was given the right to employ officers, own property, 
build colleges, have a seal and coat of arms, begin its own printing, and license its own 
books (3). Some of these rights directly benefitted the Society’s mission to promote 
public experimental philosophy. The printing and licensing of books, for example, gave 
them a direct method through which they could communicate with the public, as 
exemplified in Sprat’s History.  
Part of their public mission seems also directly tied to their establishment during a 
time that coincided with a period of turbulence within the mid-seventeenth century. It is 
remarkable that this institution was established within months of the restoration of the 
monarchy, and the Society’s Fellows, despite any previous political views, were quite 
enthusiastic about the restoration of the king (Lynch 157).11 Brian Vickers argues that the 
Restoration ushered in a confidence in the social and political stability and that new sense 
of constancy “encouraged the institutionalizing of science” (Vickers ix).  Hunter contends 
that this institutionalization occurred at a moment when there was a “general urge to 
organize various facets of intellectual and public life” (Establishing 6). The Royal 
Society was also intended to be enduring, constant, and safe, something that was 
necessary after “the uncertainties associated with the Interregnum of the mid-century” 
(Hunter Establishing 10). Its organizers, in fact, seem to have “sincerely believed that the 
																																																								
10 These ideas were based upon Bacon’s views and the overall break from ancient ways of teaching. Bacon 
complained that the customs of schools and universities viewed the progress of science in an adversarial 
manner. Empiricism would usher in a new way of learning, and the Royal Society viewed their endeavors 
as not just changing England, but as changing the world.  
11 Lynch goes on to explain the remarkable nature of the Royal Society’s organization in that it represented 
a reform of knowledge, which was an interesting undertaking considering that this was a period in which 
reform was viewed in an unfavorable light (157). 
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enterprise to which the early Royal Society was dedicated was healing, that it would in 
some sense escape from politics by bringing together reasonable men from a wide range 
of ideological positions” (Hunter Establishing 10). In other words, the members of the 
Royal Society saw themselves as meeting a public need for a nonpartisan and stable 
organization that could join people of differing opinions together under the common 
interest of “scientific” observation and experimentation. Consequently, the Royal Society 
and its methods were inseparable from broader attempts to stabilize the political arena 
after the civil wars. The Society’s interest in characterizing itself as a healing enterprise 
contributes to the Society’s interest in the public. In essence, the belief in experimental 
philosophy as a public good provided its mission with a larger purpose and justified the 
emerging epistemology as essential to a healthy nation.  
The society justified its focus on experimental philosophy by claiming it to be a 
balanced and moderate approach to understanding the world, which becomes part of its 
public mission, as well. In an anonymous memorandum from the Royal Society, the 
Society’s purpose is stated: “to improve the knowledge of natural things, and all useful 
Arts, Manufacturers, Mechanick practices, Engynes and Inventions by Experiments – 
(not Meddling with Divinity, Metaphysics, Moralls, Politicks, Grammar, Rhetorick, or 
Logick)” (qtd in Hunter Establishing 56).12 This focus on experiments and observations 
becomes a hallmark of the Royal Society and appears to create a dividing line between 
what the members saw as their business and what, to them, would not be worth 
undertaking. In their view, the proper focus for the Society was on observation and 
																																																								
12 According to Mikuláš Teich, this appeared in a draft of the Society’s preamble of its statutes in 1663 and 
has been ascribed to Hooke (57). 
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experimentation, which was grounded in Francis Bacon’s writings. In fact, the Society’s 
“emphatic emphasis upon observation and experiment” and the utility of each was 
something that was repeated again and again in the organization’s memos and discourse 
(Hall 9). Bacon did place importance on the utility of experimental philosophy, 
specifically on the benefits it would provide for Britain as a nation.13 Ultimately, the 
Royal Society claimed these same ideals as its own to ensure that “Bacon’s name was 
continually associated with its own” (Dear 116). 
 Despite the attempt to present a unified mission and focused organization, it is 
important to acknowledge that there were not singular methods or conventional beliefs 
shared by all Fellows (Hunter Science 47). Bacon’s ideas provided the Society with an 
ideal cooperative approach, but in reality, it “failed even to act as a successful coordinator 
of the projects of individuals. Shared ideals among the early Fellows did not, as a rule, 
translate into shared projects or programs of research” (Dear “Toitus” 57). The individual 
Fellow within the Society, although part of a supposed cooperative organization, held his 
own views on natural philosophy, which did not always align with Bacon’s ideas. Some 
Fellows, for instance, advocated for a “rigid Cartesianism,” which others found 
“distasteful.” Additionally, non-members practiced Baconian inductivism, similar to that 
practiced by many in the society, while also within the society were Fellows who relied 
on deduction (Hunter Science and Shape 104). Within the institution of the Royal Society 
																																																								
13 Please see the previous chapter for the difference between natural philosophy and experimental 
philosophy. Experimental philosophy is a part of natural philosophy, but its methods rely on observation 
and experimentation, while relying also on a collective experience of witnessing. See Francis Bacon’s The 
Novum Organum for aphorisms on the utility of natural philosophy. For instance, “But the root cause of 
practically all the evils in the sciences is but one thing: that while we mistakenly admire and magnify the 
powers of the human mind, we fail to seek out true helps for it” (67). Also, “Thus truth and utility are (in 
this situation) the very things themselves” (187).  
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many were committed to experimental philosophy; however, others still looked to occult 
explanations for the natural world, relying on the “more arcane aspects of alchemy and 
astrology” (Hunter Science and the Shape 105).  
This mixed approach to truth and knowledge is evident in my exploration of 
varied dictionary definitions of natural philosophy in the previous chapter. It also 
supports my argument that the public’s understanding of natural philosophy was one that 
incorporated both old and new epistemologies, especially when considering the mixed 
messages sent within the Society’s discourse. Understanding this mixed message helps us 
better appreciate the way experimental philosophy was understood at the time and how 
the Society’s rhetoric may have been received, which is especially important when 
considering that non-practitioners, as I will establish in later chapters, contributed to the 
Society’s discourse. When perusing the Society’s Philosophical Transactions, for 
example, a member of the reading public would just as likely come across a fantastical 
account of a monstrous birth as she would a detailed description of a beetle, indicating 
that they were apt to accept what we would now call fantastical as aligning with the 
experimental.14 The older and newer converging epistemologies resulted, at least in part, 
because the Society was founded in a moment in which Aristotelian science was 
“dethroned”; however, there was no established replacement that had materialized yet 
(Hunter Science and the Shape 105). The Royal Society, despite its public and vocal 
																																																								
14 The Royal Society’s secretary Henry Oldenburg headed the Society’s journal up in 1665, originally as a 
“money making venture” (Dear 118). Similar to Sprat’s History, the Transactions became a place to 
rhetorically position the Society as Baconian in philosophy and to stress the practicality of its work. 
Oldenburg’s prefaces tended to focus on championing empirical and experimental natural philosophy. 
Consequently, there was a “scarcity of articles in the journal that might have appeared too theoretical, 
hypothetical, or speculative” (Dear 118). 
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support of the experimental method, was still in the process of establishing the new 
methods of natural philosophy, but natural philosophy, at least during the Restoration, 
was still in transition. With that being said, the Royal Society very seldom entertained 
occult theories in its meetings, and during the isolated moments when the occult was 
discussed, the evidence in surviving minutes shows that such discussions led to 
discontent (Hunter Science and Shape 105).15 This type of discontent was associated with 
ancient philosophy, something the Society believed that observational and experimental 
methods would remedy. The Royal Society, therefore, “was representative of the general 
character of Restoration science,” but this, according to Hunter, “was largely due to 
random selection” (Hunter Science 47). Despite the fragmented views and practices of 
the Fellows, the Society was viewed during the Restoration as “the institutional 
embodiment of the new science” (Hunter Science 48). 
 
Experimental Philosophy and the Royal Society 
The Royal Society and its initial practices serve as inspiration for early 
speculative writing. Consequently, the Royal Society represents one available lens 
through which to analyze the relationship between speculative writing and the vast array 
of the era’s interest in natural philosophy. Although there were other “scientific” 
																																																								
15 See Birch’s History from his notes of the Society’s meeting on December 13, 1677, in which a Mr. 
Oliver Hill asks permission to discuss his theory at the next meeting. The president indicated he would be 
allowed even though “the method and business of the Society were very different from those [Hill] 
propounded.” On December 20, the notes from the meeting indicate Hill was called upon and he described 
how the “the skin of the pepper being very porous” […] “was the cause of the receiving of the spirit of the 
air” and that these pores allowed for little creatures to hatch within the black pepper, claiming that these 
worms had been produced by the pepper without seed or egg but by the “spirit of nature.” Birch notes that 
the Society objected to Hill’s ideas (iii, 363, 366-7, 371). 
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enterprises at the time, including scholars who had enough financial means to conduct 
experiments in natural philosophy outside of the Royal Society, it is the public profile of 
the Society that inspired and galvanized a range of responses to its tenets and 
experiments.16 Peter Dear argues that the public presentation of the Society’s members 
was one of the ways it “attempted to legitimize its role in English society” (116). 
Moreover, the Society’s publication of its Philosophical Transactions reached a still 
wider public audience, in a way that in-person exhibitions of experiments could not. 
Through the Philosophical Transactions the Society circulated reports of experiments, 
and this was one avenue through which the Fellows attempted to gain the public’s trust 
(Johns 249). Members of the reading public, which extended to virtuosi outside London, 
acquired access to the Philosophical Transactions despite not having direct access to the 
Society. Hunter goes so far as to argue that it was the Transactions that became a “public 
symbol of the [Royal] Society’s vitality” (51). Many of the articles within the 
Transactions were written for actual practitioners of natural philosophy, but the “journal 
was also aimed at a wider public.” Hunter notes that Henry Oldenburg, the publisher of 
the Transactions, positioned the journal as a commonplace book that is published in 
English so that any Englishman who is interested in “curious things” can benefit without 
having to know Latin (qtd in Hunter Science 53).  
 
																																																								
16 Michael Hunter establishes that the Royal Society was not the central research location for men with 
interests in natural philosophy and that the Society’s Fellows did much of the work of experimental 
philosophy on their own (Science 46). Despite the fact that Hunter argues that experimental philosophers 
often worked outside the Society, he also posits that we must give credit to the Society for its ability to gain 
“social respectability by recruiting eminent public figures to its ranks. Its membership lists, profusely 
decorated with the names of (mainly inactive) bishops, statesmen and aristocrats, enjoyed wide circulation, 
disseminating esteem for the Society among non-members at home and abroad” (48). 
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Exhibitions of the Society’s experiments were also made public, and collective 
  
observation of those experiments became a vital component of the Society’s stance on  
 
experimental philosophy. Steven Shapin notes, “The Royal Society vigorously advertised  
 
its experimental program throughout Europe” (96).  Shapin details the importance of  
 
public demonstrations of experiments:  
 
 
English empirical tradition laid special emphasis on factual particulars as the 
secure foundation for national philosophical knowledge. If particular experience 
was to serve that function, however, their authenticity as actually occurring, 
historically specific happenings somehow had to be guaranteed and made 
persuasive to a community. Consequently, if such particulars were to become part 
of a shared stock of knowledge, reliable ways had to be found to make them 
travel, to extend them from an individual to many others. (106-7) 
 
 
Experimental philosophy, according to Shapin, depended upon the conveyance of fact in 
a way that would be believable to the public; therefore, an imperative project within 
experimental philosophy was finding ways to get the discoveries to travel from person to 
person. Thus, public observation and understanding of experimental philosophy is 
crucial, and conclusions about the way the natural world works have to reach the public 
in order to become an accepted part of knowledge. In order to persuade the general public 
of the findings that experimental philosophy yields, those experiments have to be made 
available to the public. Essentially, experimental philosophy stressed the notion that 
observations and conclusions derived from those experiments only had value when they 
could be observed collectively, and it was ideal if those experiments could be repeated 
(Johns 247). Shapin specifically discusses the demonstrations of the air pump for 
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audiences.17 Robert Boyle found that certain techniques could be demonstrated on 
instruments such as the air pump, and the air pump could be brought to many locations. 
Demonstrating the air pump for public audiences extended experimental philosophy’s 
reach from the “individual to the public domain.” These public demonstrations allowed 
for more witnesses to observe the experiment, lending credence to its authenticity. Shapin 
establishes such public experimentation as “a routine feature of the meetings of the Royal 
Society” (107).  
 As Sprat’s History will show, the Society insisted on forwarding knowledge that 
comes only through observation and experiment because of their belief that they were 
creating an organization free from political, religious, and social bias, adding to their 
mission of stabilizing the political environment after the Interregnum. Bacon’s teachings 
allowed the Society to pursue its cooperative endeavor, in that Bacon believed that 
experimental undertakings should be taken on as a community.18 We also know that 
Bacon’s ideas were prominent in the minds of the founding members of the Royal 
Society because his image was chosen as one of the two men represented on the 
frontispiece to Sprat’s History of the Royal Society.19 Bacon’s philosophy, therefore, 
represented an ideal philosophy for the Royal Society, since it was centered on gathering 
																																																								
17 The experimentations and demonstrations with the air pump took place in the 1660s. The air pump was a 
device used for experimenting with the pressure and volume of air within a closed system. At the top of a 
machine sat a globe made of glass, into which objects and small animals could be placed, such as candles 
and mice. 
18 In The Great Instauration Bacon says all must “join in consultation for the common good” (75). In Book 
One, aphorism 113, Bacon advocates for the “gathering in of experience” in which the labors of men may 
be “brought together.” Bacon’s “Preparative Towards a Natural and Experimental History” acknowledges 
that the work of natural philosophy cannot be done without “great labor,” “requiring as it does many people 
to help” (190). 
19 The other man pictured is King Charles II. 
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observational data, an action that the Society felt was “impartial” and “balanced.” 
Relying on experimental philosophy, at least in their opinion, “would end the 
divisiveness which traditional intellectual activity was often deemed to have fostered” 
(Hunter 10).20 Sprat stresses the Society’s philosophy of community and togetherness, in 
that he saw the application of experimental philosophy as benefitting everyone; Sprat 
asserts of the early Fellows of the Royal Society that “they openly profess, not to lay the 
Foundations of an English, Scotch, Irish, Popish, or Protestant Philosophy; but a 
Philosophy of Mankind” (Hunter 63). 
The experimental method, therefore, did take center stage at Royal Society 
meetings. They may not have intended to exclude mathematical or speculative science, 
but the experimental method dominated meetings for practical reasons. For example, 
mathematics did not prove to be a topic that was “suited for discussion at meetings” 
because the members who attended would have had “diverse interests,” and many of 
these men were virtuosos (Hall 10). Virtuosos found experimental philosophy to be 
enjoyable to watch, but they were not “mentally or temperamentally equipped to 
investigate it themselves” (Hall 10).21 Additionally, the discourse of speculative 
philosophy, which included hypotheses, was seen as something that led to disputes and 
“wranglings, upsetting the properly quiet atmosphere of learned debate, while experiment 
and observation could usually be spoken of without passion and dispute” (Hall 11). As 
																																																								
20 The institution felt that the consensus that experimental philosophy allowed for, in addition to its mixed 
membership, created a more balanced approach to knowledge, something that Cartesianism, for instance, 
would not have fostered (Hunter 10). The public, according to Hunter in Science and Society, were looking 
for consensus and rationalism (27).  
21 Hall establishes that virtuosos were not “learned” but instead were only interested in nature and others’ 
discoveries; therefore, they participated in natural philosophy in its “simplest form,” often just observing 
and not experimenting or by “collecting rarities” (10).  
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seen later in this chapter when I examine Sprat’s History in more detail, debate and 
disagreement are positioned in opposition to the experimental method because 
impassioned dispute was associated with divisive ancient and speculative philosophy.22 
The Royal Society did its best to put forth an image of community, but the public 
did not always see the Society as existing for the greater good. The Royal Society had a 
“rather naïve” presumption that the new science was “not only harmful to no one,” but 
that the public would also find it positive and appealing (Hunter 56). One of the goals of 
Sprat’s History was to explain the broader role of experimental philosophy, and the 
Society hoped this explanation would not offend anyone. Instead, “the Society’s 
organizers found that they had stirred up a hornet’s nest of hostility, illustrating that some 
of the religious, intellectual, and political implications of the new science were 
potentially more controversial than they seem to have appreciated” (Hunter 65).23 Sprat’s  
attempt to offer a rebuttal to these early criticisms of the Royal Society, therefore, did not  
 
quell the stream of criticism lobbed at the Society. Nevertheless, his History was issued  
 
as an apology, in part because of the constant scrutiny. In the opening to the third part,  
 
which serves as the Society’s defense, Sprat contends:  
 
 
It is therefore fit that they alone, and not others, who refused to partake of their 
burden, should be Judges by what steps, and what pace, They ought to proceed. 
Such men are then to be intreated not to interrupt their Labours with impertinent 
rebukes; they are to remember that the Subject of their Studies is as large as the 
																																																								
22 See the previous chapter for an in-depth explanation of the differences between speculative and 
experimental philosophy and why hypothesis was viewed pejoratively. 
23 Hunter explains that the publication of Sprat’s History was a disaster in England (65). For several years 
after it was printed, some of the most serious attacks on new science were published: Meric Casaubon’s 
Letter…to Peter du Moulin (1669) and Henry Stubbe’s A Censure upon Certain Passages Contained in the 
History of the Royal Society, As being Destructive to the Established Religion and Church of England 
(1670).  
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Universe: and that in so vast an Enterprise, many intervals and disappointments 
must be recon’d upon. (318) 
 
 
Sprat entreats those not involved in experimental philosophy to remain silent in their 
judgments, claiming that only those who practice experimental philosophy are in 
positions to critique the Society’s past. Only those who have taken on the “burden” can 
decide what methods will best serve the Society’s goals. Sprat’s plea centers on the 
important work the Society has undertaken, reminding his reader that “impertinent 
rebukes” only detract from the very real and very significant business of understanding 
the universe. Sprat does not claim infallibility but instead acknowledges the time it will 
take and the mistakes that will be made in such important and large studies. Despite 
Sprat’s attempt at public relations and despite the public’s fascination with following 
what experiments had recently been performed by the Royal Society, this did not keep 
writers from turning experimental philosophy and its practitioners into objects of ridicule. 
But the poets and dramatists who ridiculed and attacked the Royal Society and its new 
philosophy actually increased the popular interest in experimental philosophy (Stimson 
86). 
  
Sprat’s History 
 In 1662, the same year of its royal sanction, the newly founded Royal Society 
considered publishing a defense as a means to ensure its “continued existence” (Morgan 
27). According to John Morgan, Sprat had little interest in experimental philosophy, but 
he did “already have a reputation as a ‘wit,” so he was asked to join the Society to write 
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its history, which was printed in 1667 (27).24 Ereck Jarvis agrees with Morgan’s 
assessment, asserting that Sprat’s sole reason for becoming a Fellow was to write the 
defense and that he never actually practiced experimental philosophy (55).25 For those 
reasons, Jarvis also believes that Sprat did not have the ability to “accurately explicate the 
Society’s early methodologies” (55). Morgan goes so far as to label Sprat’s propaganda 
as both “forceful” and “inaccurate” (27), and he lists some of the following errors of 
Sprat’s History: it relied too heavily on Bacon’s influences, it underplayed the 
contemporary impacts on the Society, and it downplayed the speculative and 
mathematical activity taking place within the Society (Morgan “Sprat”). Although 
Morgan and Jarvis would have us believe that Sprat’s representation of the Society 
should not be trusted, they both include information that complicates such an assertion. 
For example, each of them lists the many reviewers who oversaw Sprat’s work. Morgan 
details how a council was created in 1664 to select materials to be included in the text 
when Henry Oldenburg became concerned that the text did not provide enough “evidence 
of the society’s scientific productivity” (“Sprat”). Furthermore, another committee was 
established to review Sprat’s text in 1665, and, in 1667, John Wilkins penned an 
abridgement of some of the society’s statutes, which were included in the History 
(Morgan “Sprat”). Jarvis also acknowledges Sprat’s unique position as writer of the 
history, noting that since he was a Fellow, he “was drawn into the group’s complex 
																																																								
24 Sprat’s early poetry is what marked him as a wit. Morgan lists the following poems by Sprat in the 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: “Ode on the English Ovid” (1657), about Abraham Cowley; 
contributions to “Naps upon Parnassus” (1658); “To the happie memorie of the most renowned prince, 
Oliver, lord protector” (1659); and “The Plague of Athens” (1659), which imitated Cowley’s style.  
25 Sprat did remain a member of the Society until his death, despite his inactivity (Morgan “Sprat”). 
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negotiation of authority” and that his writing was mediated by the Society (56).26 
Additionally, J.R. Jacob details the Fellows who, in addition to Wilkins, would have 
inspected Sprat’s work before publication: William Brounker, president from 1662 to 
1677; Sir Robert Moray, president of the Society before its incorporation; John Evelyn, 
the Society’s secretary, and Robert Boyle, “probably the most respected natural 
philosopher in Restoration England” (“Restoration” 25). Jacob uses this list of reviewers 
to suggest that Sprat’s views would have had to be shared with some of the principal 
founding members of the Royal Society. He admits that Sprat’s History cannot be 
representative of every single Fellow, but that it “does hold for the leading Fellows” 
(“Restoration” 25).  
Based on these divergent opinions, it would be problematic to state that Sprat’s 
rhetoric stands in for all beliefs held by all Fellows. As I have established, the emerging 
experimental philosophy did not immediately replace other methods, so Sprat’s History 
does not represent these other philosophical methods that were present within the Royal 
Society. I do not propose that Sprat’s History be read as representative of each individual 
member; however, I do think Sprat’s History is valuable because it was written during a 
time in which England was still experiencing turmoil and because it promotes the Society 
in a way that proved “amenable to a Restoration audience” (Jarvis 63). No matter how 
inaccurate Sprat’s representation of the Society might be, we cannot disregard the fact 
																																																								
26 Jarvis draws attention to Sprat’s aforementioned desire to preface the History with Bacon’s prose. His 
plan for the work, however, did not materialize; instead Cowley’s ode prefaces Sprat’s text. Jarvis argues 
that this incident reveals Sprat’s “authorial positioning” and showcases his membership in the collective: 
“the dialectical figure of association at once requires the elective participation of individuals to constitute 
its authority and yet subjects each individual, including Sprat, to the mediation of the group” (65). 
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that many important founding members reviewed and gave his work their stamp of 
approval, and we cannot deny the message the reading public received about the ideals of 
the Royal Society. It is propaganda, and there are overstatements, misrepresentations, and 
inaccuracies, but that does not negate the impact of the message or the influence it might 
have had on the public’s conceptions of experimental philosophy. 
One of the reasons for the Society’s success was because of the public ways in 
which they promoted experimental philosophy, and Sprat’s History was one of those 
essential forms of promotion. Although Charles II’s charter provided the Royal Society 
with valuable support, his royal sanction “did not eliminate the perceived need for Sprat’s 
history as both a justification directed at potential critics and a basic primer in science for 
the uninitiated” (Hillyer 32). Similar to the dictionaries, Sprat’s History informed a 
reading public about a field that was very new, so new in fact that its founding members 
also struggled toward defining their enterprise (32). The public, however much it desired 
definition, did not necessarily embrace experimental philosophy without reservation 
because they often took issue with the way the Royal Society redefined the objectives of 
inquiry as departing from deduction and theoretical suppositions to relying on inductive 
methods. Consequently, this new approach brought with it the need for legitimacy. In the 
early years of the Royal Society, it seems that much energy was spent doing just that 
(Gaukroger 1). Sprat’s History not only promoted its work but also combatted its critics. 
The main focus of the History is a passionate defense of and support for experimental 
philosophy. In advocating for experimental philosophy, Sprat also devotes much attention 
to explaining why speculative philosophy, which relies on hypothesis, is in opposition to 
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the Society’s methods. Sprat’s History, consequently, became the Society’s “major 
platform for propaganda” (Dear 116).  
Despite Sprat’s insistence on the opposite, experimental philosophy and 
speculative philosophy were not clearly distinguished from each other in the seventeenth 
century. Myth, magic, alchemy, and hypothesis would all be considered to be speculative 
in nature. Sprat, due to the type of the apology he was writing, set up a somewhat 
“artificial polarization between science and magic, between the clarity of the aims and 
method of the new empirical science and the obscurity” of speculative philosophy 
(Hunter Establishing 55). Essentially, Sprat’s History gives the impression that members 
of the Royal Society “wholly eschewed a concern with magical phenomena” or with 
alchemical investigations, when in actuality, “a more mixed position was the norm” 
(Hunter Establishing 55).27 Furthermore, Sprat does present and examine a list of 
hypotheses made by the Royal Society, which must mean that speculation and theory 
building were a vital part of the early activities of the Society. However, Sprat 
continually takes a defensive position against speculation.28 Barbara Shapiro suggests 
																																																								
27 G. MacDonald Ross notes how natural philosophers in the seventeenth century “had a considerable 
problem if they wanted to maintain that they were different in kind from the magicians of old and were not 
simply the first generation of successful magicians” (102).  
28 Thomas Birch reveals a Society that was very concerned with separating itself from hypotheses. He 
details the instructions the Society gave Robert Hooke in 1664 before they would print his Micrographia. 
They wanted him to specify in a dedication that the Society licensed the book “yet they own no theory, nor 
will be thought to do so: and that the several hypotheses and theories laid down by him therein, are not 
delivered as certainties, but as conjectures; and that he intends not at all to intrude or expose them to the 
world as the opinion of the society” (490). Hooke did meet the Society’s request. He begs for their pardon 
in the preface to Micrographia and says, “The rules YOU have prescrib’d YOURselves in YOUR 
Philosophical Progress do seem the best that have ever been practis’d. And particularly that of avoiding 
Dogmatizing, and the espousal of any Hypothesis not sufficiently grounded and confirm’d by 
Experiments.” He admits there may be some expressions of his which will not suit the “prescriptions [they] 
permit” so he makes sure to note that his conjectures were not done by the Society’s directions. For, Hooke 
says, “it is most unreasonable, that YOU should undergo the imputation of the faults of my Conjectures.” 
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that Sprat may have been aware that some of his readership would have found hypothesis 
“to be inconsistent with the primary task of gathering empirical data and 
experimentation” (47-8). Whatever Sprat’s justification for acknowledging speculation as 
part of the Society’s work, while also criticizing it, it is important to note that the History 
provides a bit of a mixed message concerning speculation. This mixed message 
highlights how early experimental philosophy had not divorced itself from speculation, 
despite the public rhetoric that insists on the superiority of experimental philosophy.29 
 The rhetoric in Sprat’s History clearly sets up a divide between the speculative 
and the experimental. In the epistolary dedication to the King, Sprat states, “a higher 
degree of Reputation is due to Discoverers, than to the Teachers of Speculative 
Doctrines.” This leaves no room for argument. Sprat clearly denigrates those who spread 
speculative knowledge, by creating a hierarchy in which the “Discoverers,” or those who 
engage in experimental philosophy, deserve more esteem than those who pursue other 
avenues of knowledge. Sprat continues to set up experimental philosophy in opposition to 
older forms of learning. He first brings up ancient methods of natural philosophy, or 
those associated with Aristotle, and says of the men who practiced and still continue to  
practice it that they are 
 
 
Men of hot, earnest, and hasty minds: and so lov’d rather to make sudden 
Conclusions, and to convince their hearers by argument; then to delay long, 
																																																								
29 It is important to remember the distinctions between what we know today as hypothesis and the way 
hypothesis was understood at the time. During the Restoration and early eighteenth century, hypothesis and 
theory were aligned with speculation, supposition, and conjecture.  Because of these connections, 
hypotheses had a clear connection to the imagination. Even though we associate hypothesis today with an 
essential part of the scientific process, this term was used pejoratively at the time. For more information 
about this, please see chapter one.  
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before they fixt their judgments; or to attend with sufficient patience the labour of 
Experiments. (7)  
 
 
The attacks Sprat makes against Aristotelian philosophy also implicitly enforce the ideals 
put forth by the Royal Society – those of moderation and balance. Ancient philosophers 
exhibit, in Sprat’s view, an excess of passion or fervor: their minds are too intense. Their 
decisions are made too quickly, and their egos are too entrenched in rhetoric and 
persuasion, when they should instead exhibit patience by conducting experiments and 
avoiding hasty conclusions. As mentioned previously, the Royal Society regarded itself 
as an institution that might be able to heal the nation after the strife associated with the 
civil wars and Interregnum, and part of that healing is tied to the Society’s moderate 
methods. Sprat’s attack on Aristotelian methods of natural philosophy was more than just 
a break from the ancients; therefore, references to the excessive passion of ancient 
philosophy resembled the intensity associated with political instability. Conversely, Sprat 
saw the experimental method as something that could rebuild English nationhood (Lynch 
32). The Restoration itself resulted in a “flurry of examination,” focused precisely on 
what united the English as a nation (159). What tended to emerge, especially in 
opposition to what was seen as the frenzied enthusiasm associated with the civil war, was 
a focus on moderation. Sprat’s History attempts to align the natural philosopher with the 
values of English moderation, exemplifying a model citizen (160). Ultimately, Sprat 
positions the ancient method of formulating knowledge as part of the type of excess that 
led to the civil wars and Interregnum. 
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 Sprat continues his attack by shifting his focus to university learning or what he 
refers to as “the Philosophy of the Schole-men.” In the case of this type of learning, Sprat 
condemns it because the only course such learning takes is “that of disputing.” He 
contends: “the very way of disputing itself, and inferring one thing from another alone, is 
not at all proper for the spreading of knowledge” (17). Sprat admits that disputes are 
advantageous to making men’s minds more versatile and sharpening their wits, but 
disputation also leads men to defend “Principles, which they already know.” Such 
knowledge can never replace “the solid substance of Science itself” (18).30 Sprat lists 
several complaints that he says men make against the type of learning and knowledge 
found in ancient and university education: it makes men “unsettled”; it takes up too much 
of their time; it makes them “Romantic”; it makes men “become averse from a practical 
course”; it makes them too concerned about “things” and things have no “use in the 
world”; and it makes them too intent on looking to the past, causing them to neglect their 
own time (331).31 Sprat contends that experimental knowledge “contains the best 
remedies for the distempers which some other sorts of Learning are thought to bring with 
them” (332). In referring to “distempers,” Sprat speaks of individual bodies that suffer 
the consequences brought on by other philosophical methods. In this case Sprat relies on 
																																																								
30 Sprat uses the term “science” to compare ancient philosophy with experimental philosophy. It is 
disputing and deductive reasoning that sharpens “mens wits” and allows them to defend principles they 
“already know,” but those methods do not produce the substance that experimental philosophy does (18). In 
this context, it seems Sprat is relying on the understanding of “science” to mean “the state or fact of 
knowing,” especially since he dismisses ancient philosophy for focusing on that which is already known 
(“science,” OED). 
31 Sprat explains that being “Romantic” is associated with making men “subject to frame more perfect 
images of things, than the things themselves will bear” (331). Sprat’s usage seems to align most with the 
OED definition of Romantic as meaning: “arising from, suggestive of, or appealing to, an idealized, 
fantastic, or sentimental view of life or reality; atmospheric, evocative, glamorous.” (“romantic,” OED).  
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older philosophy, referring to humoral theory to justify the new methods. Being 
distempered was associated with a disordered mind, once thought to be associated with 
an imbalance of humors.32 Again Sprat aligns knowledge that departs from experimental 
methods as connected to disorder, imbalance, and disease. The fact that he positions the 
new experimental philosophy as a “remedy” implies that England is in need of healing 
and the source of that cure will come in the form of Baconian philosophy. By aligning 
knowledge associated with former philosophies as excessive and unhealthy, Sprat is able 
to legitimize the Royal Society because of his fundamental “appeal to objectivity and 
non-partisanship, what later became the idea that science should be value-free” 
(Gaukroger 1-2). 
 Sprat characterizes imbalances as dangerous to the nation, but these same 
imbalances are also ones that he sees as detrimental to the individual. Drawing attention 
to the deficiencies found in the man who practices speculative philosophy provides Sprat 
with an additional way to uphold experimental philosophy as superior. It is the 
speculative philosopher, or he who “only contemplates,” who is inclined to the 
weaknesses mentioned above. This inferior type of philosophy seems, at least in Sprat’s 
apology, to originate in the weaknesses associated with the imagination.33 Of all men, it 
																																																								
32 “distemper,” OED. 
33 Sprat contrasts the experimental philosopher with the speculative philosopher. Of the experimental 
philosopher, Sprat argues that the satisfaction he finds is “real,” “not imaginary.” Instead of drawing 
knowledge from things that are not “out of the world,” he draws knowledge from within the world. The 
speculative philosopher gets carried “farther off” by his suppositions, while the experimental philosopher is 
brought “nearer to Practice.” (336). In this case, Sprat’s use of the word “imagination” does provide the 
reader with an understanding that speculative philosophy focuses on drawing truth from things which can 
only be supposed in the mind and not observed by the senses and known for certain. For more discussion 
on the ways the term “imagination” was understood, refer to the discussion and Table 3 of dictionary 
definitions in the last chapter.  
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is the “Speculative Men” and their “solitary imagination[s]” that are the most prone to 
distraction from the business of the world because their imaginations make them 
“converse in the shadow with the pleasant productions of their own fancies” (335-36). 
Sprat insinuates that it is speculative philosophy that relies on the imagination for 
discovery, a type of discovery, however, that is opposed to everything experimental 
philosophy relies on to alleviate any public anxieties and concerns. It is not, according to 
Sprat, the community of experimenters that one ought to fear; it is the individual who 
allows himself to be pulled into the darkness of contemplations within his own 
imagination. Those solitary ruminations and fancies are products of substandard methods 
and thinking, leading to unfounded fears about the world. In fact, Sprat aligns speculation  
with the “poets of old,” whom he sees as the origins of some of this false thinking: 
 
 
And as for the terrors and misapprehensions which commonly confound the 
weaker minds, and make mens hearts to fail and boggle at Trifles; there is so little 
hope of having them remov’d by Speculation alone, that it is evident that they 
were first produc’d by the most contemplative men amongst the Ancients; and 
chiefly prevail’d of late years, when that way of Learning flourish’d. The Poets 
began of old to impose the deceit. They to make all things look more venerable 
than they were, devis’d a thousand false Chimæras; on every Field, River, Grove, 
and Cave, they bestow’d a Fantasm of their own making; With these they 
cloath’d with what shapes they pleas’d; by these they pretended, that all Wars, 
and Counsails, and Actions of men were administered. And in the modern Ages 
these Fantastical Forms were reviv’d and possess’d Christendom, in the very 
height of the Scholemens time: An infinit number of Fairies haunted every house; 
all Churches were fill’d with Apparitions; men began to be frighted from their 
Cradles, which fright continu’d to their Graves. (339-40) 
 
 
In Sprat’s view, “terrors” and mistaken beliefs confuse those who exhibit deficient minds. 
It is these kinds of minds that are startled by stories and fictions. Speculation, according 
to Sprat, will never be able to repair these inadequacies because speculation is the root of 
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these problems. Sprat briefly traces the root of contemplation to ancient philosophy, and 
he faults the poets of that time for creating a type of deceit. The ancients may have started 
it, but Sprat asserts that in the “modern Ages” these forms have been “revived,” putting 
deceit in an authoritative position within schools and churches. Sprat aligns this kind of 
poetry (and speculative philosophy) with falsity, and he admonishes those poets for 
creating worlds where there are none. These types of poets, like the speculative 
philosophers, manifest what they want, with meanings and conclusions that please them. 
He claims their poetry produces “chimeras,” “fantasm[s],” “fairies,” and “apparitions.” 
This kind of poetry creates a type of knowledge based on mere fables and hallucinations. 
Speculation, therefore, is of the supernatural. It takes what is invisible and makes it 
appear to be real and visible, which is in direct opposition to experimental philosophy, 
which seeks to take that which is visible and understand it. It is speculation that creates 
and perpetuates fears, and these false representations of the world have infiltrated both 
schools and churches. For Sprat, it is speculative thinking that will keep man “possess’d.”  
 When contrasted with the speculative philosopher above, the experimental 
philosopher is made moderate and his passions temperate because his philosophy takes 
place as part of a communal effort. It is when the collective comes together to pursue 
truth that they will find “an excellent cure for that defect” (85).  In this case, the defect to 
which Sprat refers is the defect of an imagination that runs too swiftly. Part of the cure 
comes from the way this type of natural philosophy – that is, experimental philosophy – 
is practiced, in that it requires multiple observations and repeated experimentations by 
more than one man in order to draw definitive conclusions: 
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For this, the best provision must be, to join many men together, for it cannot be 
imagin’d, that they should be all so violent, and fiery: and so by this mingling of 
Tempers, the Impetuous men, not having the whole burthen on them, may have 
more leisure for intervals to recruit their first heat; and the more judicious, who 
are not so soon posses’d with such raptures, may carry on the others strong 
conceptions, by soberer degrees, to a full accomplishment. (85-6)  
 
 
Although this may have not been the case in actuality, Sprat formulates and envisions a 
Royal Society that promotes a checks and balances of sort. By mingling together various 
temperaments, from the “fiery” to the “judicious,” the Society is able to achieve a type of 
moderation through the joining of many men. Because the philosophers are working 
together, the strengths in one cover over or rectify the weaknesses in another. This 
balanced approach to experimental philosophy allows them to guard “themselves against 
themselves” so that their individual thoughts do not lead them into error (92). Those who 
do not practice experimental philosophy open themselves up to the strengths of their own 
beliefs, as well as exhibiting too much confidence in their own abilities. In other words, 
Sprat contends that the individual is too prone to error because of how easy it is for him 
to focus on his own thoughts, successes, and discouragements, and such views do not 
allow for objectivity. When attempting to formulate knowledge about the natural world, 
there is also a risk of error. The senses can deceive, and our understanding can fail, both 
of which could undermine the conclusions derived from observation. This problem of 
fallibility is also partly what Sprat addresses by drawing attention to “many men 
together.” Essentially, he and the Royal Society believed that “collective efforts by many 
investigators, over time, would achieve relatively error-free findings that, if not ‘certain’ 
in the old sense, would at least attain to the highest level of the probable” (Shapiro 5).  
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 Clearly, Sprat’s History denigrates speculative philosophy so that experimental 
natural philosophy can be lauded and defended. Sprat calls the experimental philosophers 
the “new Philosophers.” Experimental philosophers not only disagree with the ancients 
but have also taken it upon themselves to rectify philosophy’s aims by focusing on 
experimenting (35). Unlike the speculative philosophers and poets detailed above, the 
experimental philosopher is freer because “the satisfaction he finds, is not imaginary, but 
real: It is drawn from things that are not out of the world, but in it” (336). Again, Sprat 
makes a distinction between speculative/imaginary and experimental/real to align the 
project of the Royal Society with more practical and tangible aims. In describing the aims 
of the experimental philosopher, Sprat’s imagery is reminiscent of the faults he finds with 
speculation and poetry. Those “few” philosophers who experiment “must devest 
themselves of many vain conceptions, and overcome a thousand false Images, which lye 
like Monsters in their way” (35). These terror-filled fancies are a hindrance to the new 
philosopher’s direction and project. He cannot just begin his experiments, but he first has 
to contend with all his false thinking. Sprat comes back to these types of metaphors again 
and again when speaking of the plight of the experimental philosopher. He must perform 
a type of unlearning in order to move forward. 
This separation that Sprat creates between the speculative and experimental 
allows him to position experimental philosophy as useful, not only to discovery, but to 
the health of the nation. Experiments provide not only help to public and civil life, but 
they also assist British subjects with the “management of the privat [sic] motions, and 
passions” (342). Speculative philosophy moderates both public and private life by 
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keeping one’s passions and emotions under control. Although he blames speculative 
philosophy for being fantastical and impractical, Sprat finds even more blame to place 
upon conjecture when he associates indolence with speculation. Sprat argues that when 
we consider what causes “violent desires, malicious envies, intemperate joys, and 
irregular griefs,” we find that “they are chiefly produc’d by Idleness,” and experimental 
philosophy can cure that idleness with the diversion of “innocent Works” instead of the 
delusions provided by idleness” (342). Explicitly, Sprat aligns indolence with delusions, 
and idleness also denotes trivial and worthless activity.34 The danger, therefore, to the 
individual who meddles in speculative philosophy is the cultivation of negative emotions. 
The individual is prone to longing or feelings that are dangerous, sinful, disorderly, and 
unregulated. Even positive emotions such as joy are tinged with excess, in that 
pleasurable feelings should also be moderated. Once again, it is experimental philosophy 
that is positioned as a rectifying and moderating activity. Because the “Art of 
Experiments” is “active, and industrious,” it has “power enough to free the minds of men 
from their vanities, and intemperance” (343). Instead of idleness, Sprat champions 
experimental philosophy because it is more practical, which harkens back to the 
dictionary definitions of the new philosophy, as well.35 Unlike the experimental 
philosopher, the speculative philosopher “vainly reduces every thing to grave and solemn 
general Rules, without discretion, or mature deliberation” (Sprat 341). Experimentation, 
on the other hand, is a “more practical way, to prepare their minds for the world, and the 
																																																								
34 “idleness,” OED. 
35 In the previous chapter, I detailed several dictionary entries for the term “speculative.” Phillips (1706), 
Bailey (1730), and Johnson (1755) all define the speculative as being opposed to the practical because of its 
focus on the theoretical. Experimental philosophy, at least the type practiced by the Royal Society, 
defended their project, partly, because of the usefulness of these experiments to practical life.  
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business of human life” (329). Sprat’s praise of experimental philosophy focuses on its 
utility for the nation, as a whole, in both private and public behavior.  
 A society that calls for an apology and history after a mere seven years is one that 
definitely has a public relations problem, a fact that Sprat concedes when he says, 
“Experimental Philosophy has met with very hard usage” (26).36 Sprat acknowledges the 
public’s criticisms of experimental philosophy throughout his explanations when he  
admits the Society and its visions could fail: 
 
 
But if all this should fail; there still remains a refuge, which will put this whole 
matter out of dispute: and that is, that the Royal Society will be able by degrees, to 
purchase such extraordinary inventions, which are now close lock’d up in 
Cabinets; and then to bring them into one common Stock, which shall be upon all 
occasions expos’d to all mens use. This is a most heroick Invention: For by such 
concealments, there may come very much hurt to mankind. (75) 
 
 
Essentially, Sprat contends that even a failed experimental philosophy is a worthwhile 
endeavor because of its mission to bring the individual speculator into a collective, where 
observation, speculation, and conclusions happen in a community. In so doing, truth that 
has been kept private and hidden will become part of public knowledge. Truth will be 
available to any who want to discover it. Not only does the speculative pose a danger to 
Britain, as a whole, or to the individual subject, but speculative philosophy poses a 
danger to “mankind” because it keeps discoveries and technologies hidden and locked up. 
																																																								
36 I use the term “apology” to signify a type of writing meant to defend and/or vindicate from accusations 
and attacks. For more on how the Royal Society was ridiculed and critiqued see: Dorothy Stimson, 
Scientists and Amateurs: A History of the Royal Society; Margery Purver, The Royal Society: Concept and 
Creation; Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Pepys’ Diary and the New Science; Michael Hunter, Establishing the 
New Science: The Experience of the Early Royal Society; Marie Boas Hall, Promoting Experimental 
Learning: Experiment and the Royal Society 1660-1727; Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and 
the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life; and Frank Boyle, “Old Poetry and New Science: 
Swift, Cowley, and Modernity.”  
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Experimental philosophy, on the other hand, turns the private cabinet of curiosity into a 
“publick Treasure” (74).  
As much as Sprat and the Royal Society distanced themselves from speculative 
philosophy and presented those methods as the foundation of many societal ills, Sprat has 
to acknowledge speculation in the work being done by the Royal Society at the time. P.B. 
Wood asserts that Sprat could not ignore the Society’s speculative (or theoretical) activity 
because he is replying to the Society’s critics: “yet the brevity of this section and the lack 
of concrete examples indicate that, had it not been necessary to silence the critics, 
discussion of the Society’s theoretical interests would have been omitted” (Wood 12). 
Even in acknowledging that natural philosophers in the Royal Society do sometimes have  
to speculate, Sprat is careful to keep certain divisions in place: 
 
 
I will next declare, what room they allow’d for conjecturing upon the Causes; 
about which they also took some pains, though in a farr different way from the 
antient Philosophers; amongst whom, scarce any thing else was regarded, but 
such general contemplations. This indeed, is the Fatal point, about which so 
many of the greatest Wits of all Ages have miscarried; and commonly the greater 
the Wit, the more has been the danger: so many wary steps out to be trodden in 
this uncertain path: such a multitude of pleasing Errors, false Lights, disguised 
Lies, deceitful Fancies must be escap’d: so much care must be taken, to get into 
the right way at first: so much, to continue in it; and at last, the greatest caution 
still remaining to be us’d; left when the treasure is in our view, we undo all, by 
catching it too soon, with too greedy, and rash a hand. (101) 
 
 
When Sprat speaks of conjecturing, he means speculative philosophy. That becomes clear 
because of the way he associates conjecture with the ancient philosophy and because of 
the detriments he lists as associated with missteps and dangers of too much speculation. 
His repetitive warnings against errors, deceit, and falsity continue, even as he attempts to 
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justify any dabbling in the speculative. Sprat attempts to legitimize any small need for 
speculation by making sure to note that experimental philosophers only engage in it after 
much caution beforehand and by making sure they use speculation for different ends than 
the ancients did. Sprat contends, “It is their study, that the way to attain a solid 
Speculation, should every day be more and more persued: which is to be done, by a long 
forbearing of speculation at first, till the matters be ripe for it; and not, by madly rushing 
upon it in the very beginning” (107). By using the word “solid” to describe the type of 
speculating experimental philosophers perform, Sprat still relies on a binary of good 
versus bad. Experimental methods, even those that rely on the speculative, are strong and 
based upon reason or sound principles. It is not frivolous, but instead represents a serious 
study.37 Implicitly, he aligns the former speculation with a methodological hollowness, 
bereft of the gravity such study should have. Speculation is only considered slowly, 
thoughtfully, and moderately by members of the Royal Society, as opposed to “madly 
rushing upon it.” Fundamentally, it is avoided; it is a last resort. Sprat’s defensive tone 
insinuates some level of embarrassment in admitting that Fellows in the Royal Society do 
theorize and hypothesize (Wood 12). The humiliation of disclosing that seems evident 
when Sprat admits that his readers would “imagine” that any reliance on speculation does 
not mesh well with their purported “Method, and with the main purpose of their Studies, 
which I have often repeated to be chiefly bent upon the Operative, rather than Theoretical 
Philosophy” (257).  
																																																								
37 “solid,” OED. 
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 Sprat’s justification for the Society’s members’ dabbling in speculation is 
grounded in the assertion that speculation done well and carefully might lead to new 
knowledge in the future. The Society, overall, abstains from unnecessary and untimely 
speculation because they prefer facts and experiments; however, they did not “deny the 
possibility of discovering true theories at some future date” (Wood 10). Any speculative 
activity by the Royal Society takes place only to further experimental philosophy. Sprat 
seems to be aware of how the Society’s principles conflict with their practice, but he 
hopes that any doubts the public may have will be rectified by knowing that the Society 
does not rely on speculation as an “absolute end, but only use them as a means of farther 
Knowledge” and to ultimately “promote our Experimenting” (257).38 Throughout the 
History there is sustained focus on the usefulness of experiments and observations; 
therefore, any acknowledgement of speculative pursuits has to be either downplayed or 
justified for “their ability to further the fundamental utilitarian aims of the Society” 
(Wood 12). Sprat presents theoretical/speculative philosophy as inferior to 
empirical/experimental philosophy, a claim to which fictive responses in prose, poetry, 
and drama will critique and investigate in relation to society and the individual, as I will 
explore in subsequent chapters. Margaret Cavendish, for instance, will present readers 
with a natural philosophy that incorporates the speculative with the experimental, while 
Restoration playwrights will speculate about the practitioner’s inability to practice 
experimental philosophy without speculation.  
																																																								
38 In this quotation, “them” replaces the words “principles” and “speculations.” The complete quotation is: 
“I hope [the reader] will be satisfied, if he shall remember, that I have already remov’d this doubt, by 
affirming, that whatever Principles, and Speculations [the Society] now raise from things, they do not rely 
upon them as the absolute end, but only use them as a means of farther Knowledge.”  
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Cowley’s Ode 
Many of Sprat’s positions on the best way to formulate knowledge and his views 
on why speculation should be avoided are reiterated in Abraham Cowley’s ode.39 In 
March 1667, Cowley, who was then in retirement, received a letter from John Evelyn, 
who complained that the Royal Society had become the ‘subject of satyr and the songs of 
drunkards.’40 Evelyn requested that Cowley write a poem in support of experimental 
philosophy and the Royal Society.41 In May, Cowley agreed to the request, “happy to 
inform Evelyn that he had seen Thomas Sprat’s soon to be published History of the Royal 
Society of London” (Green 69). Cowley’s subsequent “Ode to the Royal Society” opens 
Sprat’s History. Cowley proclaims allegiance to Baconian experimental philosophy, 
praises the work done in the Society, and “declares its noble purpose and destiny” (Butler 
1). In addition to championing the cause, Cowley uses his poem as an opportunity to 
chastise those who disparage the Society. According to Cowley, the new philosophy is 
“despised” and criticized for being “impertinent” and “vain” (lines 152-3). The public’s 
attacks on the Society highlight what they see to be absurd, trivial, and useless practices, 
																																																								
39	Not much work has been done on Cowley’s poem. His ode is often referenced in relation to Sprat’s 
History but frequently in a tangential way. Similar to Sprat, scholars who have discussed Cowley’s ode 
focus on the language reform project of the Royal Society. See Peter Dear’s “Toitus in verba: Rhetoric and 
Authority in the Early Royal Society.” Dear notes that Cowley’s poem forwards the momentum of 
“rhetorical plainness in Restoration England” (104). Jeffrey Gore claims that “Cowley penetrated more 
deeply into the problem with rhetoric than Sprat does (362). Other discussions of Cowley’s ode focus on 
his knowledge of Bacon’s writings. Green, whom I cite in this chapter, focuses on Cowley as a transitional 
figure in the debate about the function of poetry and sees his championing of Baconian ideals as what 
contributes to that transition. Achsah Guibbory discusses Cowley’s Baconianism in “Imitation and 
Originality: Cowley and Bacon’s Vision of Progress.” She reveals the relationship between authority and 
originality in Cowley’s work. Hinman, whom I also cite in this chapter, disagrees with the idea that Cowley 
turns his back on poetry in favor of the new science. Hinman argues that Cowley sees the poet as someone 
who could unite experimental philosophy with imagination. As with Sprat, other scholars have not explored 
the divide each paint between experimental and speculative philosophy.   
40 Evelyn was one of the founding members of the Royal Society. 
41 Interestingly, Cowley and Sprat were friends. Sprat wrote Cowley’s first biography.  
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but Cowley refers to these accusations as “blows of ignorance” and the “sharp points of 
envious wit” (lines 158-9). Part of Cowley’s rhetorical purpose, like Sprat’s, is to 
convince his reader of the “virtuous” aims of experimental philosophy and its usefulness 
for all humans (150-51).42  
The poem, written as a Pindaric, is divided into nine parts and contains 184 lines 
devoted to praising Francis Bacon and the work being done within the Royal Society.43 
Cowley’s use of the Pindaric form brings grandeur to his representation of experimental 
philosophy as a stagnant knowledge rescued by Francis Bacon, whom he aligns with 
Christian and Greek heroes.44 The poem opens with Cowley setting up a clear divide 
between the ancients and the moderns, or between ancient philosophy and the philosophy 
performed by the Royal Society. Cowley’s description of the history of philosophy 
																																																								
42 According to the Alexander Lindsay, Cowley was interested in experimental philosophy, although he 
was never a member of the Royal Society. In 1661, his short pamphlet on experimental philosophy was 
printed, entitled “A proposition for the advancement of learning.” “This is an appeal for the foundation of a 
college for the pursuit of experiments, to which is attached a school providing a scientifically orientated 
education for boys.” Cowley’s ode is the last one published before his death and may also be the last one he 
wrote.  
43 Part I begins the history of natural philosophy over the past “three or four thousand years” and the claim 
that natural philosophy has remained stagnant due to negligence and ambition. Part 2 and 4 lists the many 
ways that natural philosophy has been distracted over the years by certain types of wit, poetry, art, and 
images within one’s fancy until Francis Bacon rescued it. Cowley lists the many accomplishments of 
Bacon in part 3 and announces that Bacon has set knowledge free for all to gather their “fill,” and it is in 
part 5 where Bacon is pronounced the metaphorical Moses leading natural philosophy out of a barren 
desert. In part 6 and 7, Cowley shifts the focus to the Royal Society, first by proclaiming it as Gideon’s 
army picked by God himself as the victors and celebrating the discoveries in nature it has already 
accomplished. Cowley then chastises anyone who might dare to laugh at or scorn the Society, labeling 
those attacks as ignorant and envious before concluding his poem in the final part with praise for the 
Society’s courageous work in removing errors from natural philosophy, partly through its attempt to focus 
less on language and more on a “candid Stile” to represent nature.  
44 Scott Brewster notes that the Pindaric was originally written to “celebrate athletic victories in ancient 
Greece, serve particular occasions – including marriages, funerals, success in warfare – and bestow praise 
on monarchs, generals, the nobility, scientists, and writers.” Cowley’s odes, Brewster argues, are generally 
celebratory but can also be critical of power (64). The Concise Oxford Companion to English Literature 
defines the Pindaric as typically “passionate, visionary, and sonorous” (512). For more on Cowley’s use of 
the Pindaric, see Trotter who claims that Cowley saw the Pindaric as a mode of argument and knowledge 
formation (141-42). 
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“denounces both scientific endeavour in a generalized past [that] stretches back into 
antiquity,” as well as the most recent past just prior to the Civil War (Sawday 237). One 
way in which Cowley positions old philosophy against the newer methods practiced by 
the Royal Society is through anthropomorphizing natural philosophy in line 5, referring 
to it as “he” and claiming philosophy as a “male-virtue” (6). Cowley’s characterization of 
experimental philosophy as male supports his hierarchical separation of the old from new 
methods since prior philosophical practices were often gendered female. Although Sprat 
positions both speculative and experimental philosophy as male, the deficiencies he 
associates with the speculative – excesses of passion and emotion and being prone to the 
distractions of the imagination – could clearly be aligned with his culture’s views of 
feminine attributes. Jonathan Sawday notes, “a female Philosophia would never do for 
this resolutely masculine endeavor” (237). The Biblical Fall has not affected this male 
figure, but he has also not advanced because of selfish men’s mismanagement of him 
(Boyle 83). These “negligent” and “ambitious men” would not let natural philosophy be 
free (Cowley 15-16). Although natural philosophy has aged, they have kept him 
immature, unaware of his great abilities. Consequently, the kind of natural philosophy 
practiced prior to the formation of Royal Society (that which Sprat marks as ancient 
philosophy) restrained, instead of advanced knowledge of the natural world. In the last 
line of the opening stanza, Cowley accuses ancient philosophers of never being willing to 
let natural philosophy be “free, / Or his own natural powers to let him see, / Lest that 
should put an end to their authority” (16-17). Authority, in this case, is “associated with a 
blind submission” to the methods of ancient philosophy, particularly those of Aristotle 
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(Butler 2). As with Sprat, there are clear political implications in Cowley’s description of 
how knowledge has been represented. Negligence, imprisonment, “long-oppressed 
right[s]” (36), and selfish authority are what have kept philosophy from reaching its 
potential.  As Catherine Martin argues, we can read Cowley’s ode as a testament “to the 
post-revolutionary hype” of attempting to free truth from the impact of human error (97).  
Cowley’s allusions to war and strife become more focused with his extended 
metaphor of Francis Bacon as the rebel, warrior, and spiritual leader who sets philosophy 
free from the detriments of ancient or speculative philosophy.45 Figuring the 
epistemological shift from ancient to experimental philosophy as war, Cowley 
hyperbolically captures what is at stake – the old has been vanquished to usher in a new 
and restored philosophical kingdom. Following the civil wars and Interregnum, the 
parallel would not be lost on the reader. The Royal Society prevails, it seems, just as the 
monarchy is restored. Throughout the poem, Cowley relies on powerful imagery to 
capture Bacon’s role in this metaphorical battle: he is a “mighty man” (38), the “Lord 
Chancellor” chosen by nature (40), and “like Moses” (93). Bacon, in reality, was 
appointed Lord Chancellor, the most powerful position in England, in 1618. He was 
removed from that position, however, under charges of corruption. Interestingly, Cowley 
places nature as the appointer of Bacon’s important place in British society, perhaps 
implying that Bacon was wrongly removed from his position. Not only does Cowley 
remind his readers of Bacon’s important position in the nation, but he also compares him 
to the prophet Moses, leading his people to the promised land of experimental 
																																																								
45 For more on Cowley’s representation of Bacon see Achsah Guibbory, “Imitation and Originality: Cowley 
and Bacon’s Vision of Progress.”  
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philosophy. The Royal Society is described as “Gideon’s band” (117); since Bacon is 
their leader, that would mean he is their Gideon, as well as their Moses. In this allusion, 
Cowley represents Bacon as a warrior since it was Gideon’s military prowess that helped 
free the people of Israel. Moreover, Cowley seems to align Bacon with a knight-like 
figure when he imagines him to have destroyed the ancient figure of authority: 
“Authority, which did a body boast, / Though ‘twas but air condens’d and stalked about, / 
Like some old giant’s more gigantic ghost” (41-43). Ancient philosophy is represented as 
a giant, but a giant only filled with air. This seems to allude to Orgoglio, the giant filled 
with air that symbolizes pride in Edmund Spenser’s The Fairie Queene.46 Bacon, 
represented here as one of Spenser’s knights, is able to break through “th’ orchard” (51) 
enchanted by the “phantom” (49) of Authority. The prize at the end of the hero’s journey 
is a free and opened orchard with “ripened fruit,” available to all who desire it (61). 
Albeit a much more metaphorical conceit than what we find in Sprat’s three-volume 
defense, the goal is the same for both Cowley and Sprat. Speculative philosophy must 
appear to be detrimental so that experimental philosophy can be appreciated for its 
healing and restorative powers.  
Clearly, Bacon is the champion and the leader that the Society follows, but what 
exactly has he battled against and won? Cowley credits Bacon’s victory to his attack on 
words. In “recognizing the ways words are untrustworthy, Bacon moved philosophy from 
the delusory grip of words to the verity of mechanics” (Boyle 84). In Cowley’s ode 
philosophy has suffered because it has been distracted all these years with poetry, wit, 
																																																								
46 Orgolio’s defeat is described by Spencer as “That huge great body, which the Gyaunt bore, / Was vanisht 
quite, and of that monstrous mas / Was nothing left, but like an emptie bladder was” (1.8.24). 
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and discourse, and it is Bacon who arrives to liberate philosophy from its prison. He is 
the hero that has come “at last” (37, 93).47 Tita Chico notes that Cowley “narrates the 
emergence of scientific practice as a victor vanquishing the delusional forces of the 
imagination that have obscured true understanding” (145).  
In promoting Bacon and his followers in the Royal Society, Cowley, like Sprat, 
implies a division between the imagination and reason. Cowley does rely on the term 
“reason” to describe how the ancient philosophy is vanquished, but what we would now 
deem imaginative creations are not named as such in Cowley’s poem.48 Criticizing those 
philosophers who came before, Cowley accuses art of being responsible for the 
languishing and stagnation of experimental philosophy for “Three or four thousand 
years” (10). He then lists the many injuries experimental philosophy has suffered when   
still under ancient authority: 
 
 
They amus'd him with the sports of wanton Wit,   
With the Desserts of Poetry they fed him, 
Instead of solid meats t' encrease his force; 
Instead of vigorous exercise, they led him 
Into the pleasant Labyrinths of ever-fresh Discourse: 
Instead of carrying him to see 
The Riches which doe hoorded for him lie 
In Natures endless Treasurie, 
They chose his Eye to entertain 
																																																								
47 L.C. Martin notes that Cowley was “essentially modern in his philosophical outlook, turning his face 
from the darkness of superstition and welcoming the great Enlightenment.” He argues that Cowley does 
disparage poetry in this ode and that he does so “without seeming to realize how much he was slighting his 
own profession or how he was helping to create an atmosphere in which poetry might seem to be no more 
than an elegant way of saying things” (ix). 
48 Cowley describes discourse as a “pleasant Labyrinth,” describes paintings as “pageants of the Brain,” 
and discusses the “images” which can be found in our own “fancy.” He also refers to the ancient 
philosophy as a “conquer’d Phantome.” As I established in the last chapter, there is a connection between 
Phantasy, Phantoms, Fancy, and Imagination in the dictionary definitions. See chapter two for a more in-
depth explanation of the way dictionaries conceived of the imagination.  
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(His curious but not covetous Eye) 
With painted Scenes, and Pageants of the Brain. (20-30) 
 
 
In Cowley’s account, experimental philosophy has been led astray by deformed poetry, 
art, and rhetoric, and those deformations lead, in turn, to a diseased imagination. Cowley 
again anthropomorphizes experimental philosophy in line 20, referring to “him,” and he 
argues that philosophy was someone whom other philosophers have not used but instead 
have merely amused over the years. That is, experimental philosophy has been led astray 
by being preoccupied with distortions and distractions. The first distraction is the sport of 
“wanton Wit.” The word “sports” repeats the idea of a type of diversion, in this case 
being entertained by false wit.49 Wit does allude to a type of cleverness, often a type of 
creative genius that relies on the imagination, but wanton wit is positioned as “unruly,” 
“unrestrained” and “ungoverned,” ideas that were frightening in the wake of the 
Interregnum.50 Cowley then moves on to attacking the “desserts of poetry” (21). 
Experimental philosophy, instead of being fed with meat and receiving the kind of 
nutrients it needed, was given, instead, a kind of poetry that lacks sustenance. Jeffrey 
Gore argues, “in Cowley’s account, we see that one kind of learning – in this case Poetry 
– serves to ‘spoil our supper’; it is the dessert that keeps us from eating our meat (i.e. 
from nourishing ourselves with Science’s ‘real’ learning)” (362). Gore also argues that 
																																																								
49 See Cowley’s poem on wit, “Ode. To Wit” printed in 1668 in The Works of Abraham Cowley. In it, he  
describes the difference between a true and false wit, noting that it is easy to misinterpret false wit as  
genuine, like birds who fly to “painted grapes” (line 12). Wit comes in a “thousand different shapes” (line  
6), and he defines wit mostly by what it is not (line 56). Wit is not “a tale” or a “jest” (21), it is not “florid  
Talk” (23), and it is not a forced “lifeless verse” (25). Wit is not “An’grams and Acrostiques” (44), lines  
that “crack the Stage” (49), or “tall Meta’phor[s]” (51). True wit brings divergent things into an integrated  
whole without “forcing an odd similitude” (54). See also the OED definition on wanton. 
50 “wanton,” OED. 
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we should read poetry as synecdoche, as poetry standing in “for the embodied 
conventions of language that allow for poetic enframing, or rhetorical invention, and 
would be much more invested in the preservation of the past than in the invention of 
anything ‘new’” (363). On the other hand, Robert Hinman, establishes that Cowley is 
often accused of attacking poetry and the imagination in this Ode, but that he is, instead, 
attacking empty words. Cowley, Hinman notes, is against those who insist that their 
imaginations have a “phenomenal reality” and that is what leads natural philosophy 
astray. When they feed philosophy with the “desserts of poetry,” they bring disgrace to 
both natural philosophy and poetry. Cowley, therefore, laments those who pay too much 
attention to ornamentation instead of matters of more substance, such as poetry that takes 
on the phenomena of the natural world as its subject matter.  
Cowley’s focus on poetry is an important one because of his insistence on 
referring to philosophy as male. Perhaps, then, ancient philosophy was not originally 
feminine, but was instead emasculated and “feminized by a sickly-sweet diet of poetic 
tropes and figures” (Sawday 237). The ancient paths to knowledge have taken away his 
power and force, essentially seducing him away from his original aims. Furthermore, 
instead of exercising him, they entertained him with rhetoric and “painted scenes” and 
“Pageants of the brain” (30), or paintings and plays. Overall, Cowley has managed to 
denigrate certain aspects of language and the arts because of their tendency to distract. 
Although this kind of discourse has kept ancient philosophy entertained, it led 
experimental philosophy astray. In referring to hoarded riches and treasures available in 
the proper study of nature, Cowley implies that there are great gains to be made if 
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philosophy is willing to switch its focus from speculation to experimentation. He says 
when we rely on speculation or that “within our selves,” we make ourselves like deities 
and determine “truth and falsehood,” “Good and Evil,” without the use of our “sences 
aid.” It is only God, says Cowley, who can find truth in his mind (64-68). 
 In speaking of the downfalls of speculation or drawing truth from “our selves,” 
Cowley, like Sprat, is also able to promote the Society’s methodology as something that 
heals and rectifies. In lines 69-73, Cowley again relies on Bacon’s leadership to  
demonstrate the changes he inspired:  
 
 
From words, which are but pictures of the thought, 
(Though we our thoughts from them perversely drew) 
To things, the mind’s right object, he it brought,  
Like foolish birds to painted grapes we flew; 
He sought and gather’d for our use the true; 
 
 
Bacon brought the focus of experimental philosophy from “words” to “things.” Words, 
Cowley contends, merely represent the image in our thoughts. It is humans, therefore, 
who are at the root of the problems associated with ancient philosophy when they 
perversely draw their thoughts from words and not things. Words as a source of truth, 
therefore, are unreliable and untrustworthy. Bacon’s methods moved philosophy from the 
grip of words to mechanics, shifting philosophy’s focus from human descriptions of 
objects to concentrating on how the things can be independently observed outside of 
language (Boyle 84). Cowley, therefore, contrasts those who studied the “painted grapes” 
instead of the real thing. In Cowley’s view, Bacon and experimental philosophers, not 
wanton wits and desserts of poetry, are better able to represent the natural world because 
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they rely on a clean style of language (179). They are able to capture all “the Beauties 
Nature can impart […] without the paint of Art” (186-7). Within his poem, Cowley issues 
a call to action, directing experimental philosophers to judge the “real object” of their 
eyes (83-4, 87) and to not rely on the “ideas and images which lie / In his own fancy, or 
his memory.” According to Chico, “Bacon’s epistemological innovations turn the 
observational, and thus discriminating, eye outward, ennobling sensory perception as the 
proper and true avenue for knowledge acquisition” (145). Essentially, Cowley reinforces 
the dichotomy we find in Sprat’s apology: that which originates in the mind or fancy is an 
illusion and that which originates from sensory observation is somehow more reliable. 
One’s imagination leads to falsity, but empirical sight leads to truth. One has no value 
and has kept knowledge locked in chains; the other is useful and fruitful. It is the 
“monstrous god” (51) of ancient philosophy that misled us with uselessness, but the 
Royal Society, under Bacon’s methods, will save us with the practical (Stogdill 203).    
 One cannot help but notice that Cowley employs poetry to attack certain qualities 
to be found in poetry and other imaginative arts. Many critics have noted this irony, as 
well. As Boyle points out, “that Cowley used the Pindaric, among the most elaborate and 
formal of poetic forms, to celebrate the triumph of mechanical descriptions of nature and 
to condemn the cheat of words, might be taken as a textbook illustration of irony” (85). 
Cowley’s poem celebrates experimental philosophers as the successors to poets (84), yet 
Cowley is a poet trying to communicate experimental philosophy to the public. Cowley 
and many members of the Royal Society viewed words as “objects of suspicion, and any 
elaboration of words was likely to distort truth rather than provide access to it” (Butler 5). 
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His poem, of course, does not rely only on concrete descriptions, as Cowley does employ 
figurative language and allusions, both of which he claims are deceptive.51 Furthermore, 
Cowley associates certain kinds of poetry with a loss of proper focus due to its ability to 
enrapture readers and sidetrack them from more meaningful pursuits (4). Yet, it is poetry 
that Cowley finds the most fitting and capable form when attempting to fascinate the 
reader with new philosophy and gain his attention to the useful endeavors of the Society. 
Cowley also positions poetry as a female art, one that for centuries has emasculated 
experimental philosophy and feminized it away from its potential (4); however, despite 
his rigid insistence on philosophy as male and any poetry as detracting from the pursuit 
of fact, it is poetry that opens Sprat’s History. Cowley claims that Sprat’s History is a 
success because it is able to capture the beauty of nature “without the paint, of art” (184). 
This claim is misleading, nevertheless. There are plenty of instances where Sprat employs 
his own figurative language and allusions to communicate his ideas. His is not a stripped 
down, bare usage of words. For example, when attempting to explain the Royal Society’s 
relationship with the past, Sprat employs a metaphor of an ancestor’s grave. He also 
describes the advancement of experimental philosophy by allegorically aligning it with a 
journey and sea expeditions.52 Cowley’s Ode and Sprat’s History both depend on 
metaphorical language as they promote “the project of a plain and unadorned language as 
an unattainable goal” (Butler 5). Despite the goal of representing things more concretely, 
both works underscore how far they were from the ideal of a truly “scientific” lexicon 
																																																								
51 Andrew Black argues, “Cowley’s flamboyant similes are the kind of ‘specious tropes and figures” Sprat 
deplores, yet nonetheless preface the very text that purports to eliminate them (15).  
52 These are just two examples in a book that is filled with figurative language. 
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and how the genre of philosophical writing was still emerging, forming, and drawing 
inspiration from one writing we today would call literary.  
 
Conclusion 
The methods and practices of the Royal Society and their study of experimental 
philosophy did rely more on experimental methods during the Restoration than on 
speculative philosophy, and experimental philosophers concerned themselves more with 
what they saw as matters of fact, meaning truth for which observable evidence and proof 
could be offered, making those conclusions “morally certain” (Shapiro 15). The new 
methods promoted by the Royal Society assigned a clear and central role to “experience, 
probability, and degrees of certitude, and primary, though not exclusive, emphasis was 
placed on the acquisition and analysis of empirical data” (Shapiro 15).53 Sprat’s History 
exemplifies the Society’s main focus as aligned with a type of knowledge that was based 
on observation and experimentation. Additionally, Shapiro notes that conclusions reached 
by means outside of observation and experimentation were not as respected and “were 
characterized as ‘fiction,’ ‘mere opinion,’ and ‘conjecture’” (4). The many attacks Sprat 
makes on speculative philosophy, even when having to acknowledge its necessity at 
times, highlights the beginnings of the divide between knowledge derived from what will 
become the category of “science” and certain elements associated with and valued as 
																																																								
53 Shapiro draws her conclusions by looking at the ways that England and the Royal Society “adopted the 
Baconian research program.” She marks a break between a model of knowledge that was based on opinion 
and one based on “science” or data collection and experiments (16). Through exploring both 
“propagandists” and “practitioners” (such as Sprat, John Wilkins, Joseph Glanville, Robert Boyle, and 
Robert Hooke, among others), she traces changes in “theories of knowledge” and how “science” was 
discussed (17). 
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“art.” Because of Sprat’s rhetorical aim, creating a continuum of fact, which places 
speculation at the lower end of that continuum, diminishes the importance of speculation 
in the formation of knowledge. Speculation does not rely on conclusions drawn from thin 
air; it, too, relies on observations, as evidenced by the dictionary definitions discussed in 
the previous chapter. In contrast with experimentation conjecture allows someone to 
develop possible theories based on those observations. As I will establish in the next 
chapter with Margaret Cavendish and even Bacon to certain extent, there is value in the 
speculative because it can lead to outcomes that can be associated with knowledge 
formation.  
Although it is nearly impossible to avoid hypothesizing and speculation within 
experimental philosophy, Sprat and Cowley would have us believe that experimental 
philosophy is opposed to speculation. Even within the dictionary definitions explored in 
the last chapter, one can notice that speculation and experimentation focus on what seem 
like divergent outcomes (the impractical vs. the practical, and deductive vs. inductive 
reasoning). It is true that “from a philosophical perspective, all hypotheses are fictional, 
but the most serviceable (those that appear to yield scientific truth) are the ones most 
probable, given the evidence and the prevailing rules of verification” (Bender 238). John 
Bender discusses the paradoxical need for hypothesis in the Royal Society, while 
acknowledging the damage that hypotheses can do to the Society’s ethos: the plausibility 
of hypotheses “renders them suspect because they are products of imagination that are 
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logically indistinguishable from poetic fictions” (238).54 As we have seen with Sprat and 
Cowley’s propaganda, much attention was devoted to championing reason and 
observation, so it is ironic that speculation and experimentation must arise from the same 
imaginative process. Experimental philosophy needs the imagination and speculation 
because experimental philosophy relies on hypothesis and theory as much as it needs 
observation and experimentation; yet, rhetorically, Sprat’s and Cowley’s writing, which 
celebrate the Royal Society’s work, veer away from acknowledging this practice. 
What the rhetoric associated with these defenses of the Society fails to appreciate 
is that speculative hypotheses, while they only represent possible truths, have persuasive 
storytelling capabilities (Bender 239). Bender promotes the idea that there is a 
“discursive space for scientific speculation,” and I argue that seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century speculative writers, composing in various genres, seized some of that 
discursive space (239). The imagination’s power in formulating knowledge was being 
challenged by experimental philosophy, in works as important as Robert Hooke’s 
dedication to Micrographia.55 Experimental philosophers, nonetheless, must first have to 
																																																								
54 Bender compares hypothesis and empiricism in “science” to fictionality and verisimilitude in the 
eighteenth-century novel. He looks at the novels of Daniel Defoe, Samuel Richardson, and Henry Fielding, 
putting them into conversation with Isaac Newton’s views on hypothesis as the opposite of “inductive 
proof” (241). 
55 Hooke’s Micrographia: or some physiological descriptions of minute bodies moade by magnifying 
glasses: with observations and inquiries thereupon was printed in 1665. Hooke notes in his epistle to the 
King that “Philosophy and Experimental Learning have prosper’d” under his “Royal Patronage.” He then 
details in his preface the many errors that have kept experimental philosophy from progressing, errors in 
the senses and memory. After detailing the errors, he proposes some solutions, such as instruments to 
correct the senses and observations to correct the false conclusions of the mind. He says that philosophy 
must be reformed, and it is not the “strength of Imagination” or “depth of Contemplation” that is required 
for that reformation. Instead reformation will come from a “sincere Hand, and a faithful Eye, to examine, to 
record, the things themselves as they appear.” He goes on to argue that “the Science of Nature has been 
already too long made a work of the Brain and the Fancy: It is now high time that it should return to the 
plainness and soundness of Observations on material and obvious things” (n.p.). 
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imagine before they can discover or demonstrate (Lamb 188). The Royal Society 
grounded their philosophy in observation and experimentation and strove for a type of 
knowledge that they believed was practical and universal (187). Astronomy, for instance, 
relies on observation and the technology of the telescope, but the conclusions that must 
be drawn after peering through the telescope require a “deliberate use of the imagination” 
(Aït-Tourati 10).56 In essence, the experimental philosopher must speculate regarding 
“phenomena that are “inaccessible or difficult to observe” (Aït-Touati 10). Knowledge of 
the real world can be ascertained when data, technology and “the operation of fancy” 
combine (Lamb 193).  
In a work first printed nearly twenty years after Sprat’s History, Bernard de 
Fontenelle recognizes this connection between the imagination and experimental 
philosophy, instructing his reader of A Discovery of New Worlds to read astronomy like a 
“novel.”57 We must also remember that when Cowley wrote about experimental 
philosophy he used poetry to do so and that Sprat relied heavily on imagery and 
figurative language to communicate his points. We can appreciate the interest taken by 
																																																								
56 Aït-Tourati says this use of the imagination must be applied when “treating phenomena that are 
inaccessible or difficult to observe.” He argues that natural philosophers would have to call on their 
imagination in order to have an understanding of what they are studying. It is in “resisting received 
doctrine,” however, that he supposes that necessitates an even greater need for the imagination (10). 
57 This was published in French in 1686 as Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes or Conversations on the 
Plurality of Worlds. The first English translation, by John Glanvill, was printed in 1687, followed by Aphra 
Behn’s translation in 1688. The passage in reference can be found in “The Author’s Preface,” where he 
instructs his reader to give the same attention to his theories about the plurality of worlds at they would to 
The Princess of Cleves, a French novel printed in 1678. Astronomy, he contends, has the same “Intrigue,” 
and “Beauties” as that novel, although his reader would be more familiar with the novel than with 
astronomy. But, he says of ideas about astronomy: “They are not more obscure than those of that Novel.” 
He goes on to say that his theories are not without a basis, that he is grounding his views in “Notions of 
Philosophy.” While these theories “satisfie the Reason, they content the Imagination with a Prospect as 
agreeable, as if they had been made on purpose to entertain it” (A Discovery of New Worlds from the 
French, made English by A. Behn, 1688, Early English Books Online). 
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writers who were not themselves practicing experimental philosophy but who seized on 
its possibilities for exploring other experiences. For such writers, poetry, drama, and the 
novel could be enlisted in these discoveries and reshaped by them. What Sprat and 
Cowley seemed unwilling to admit was “the interdependence between empirical 
knowledge and literature, form, and the isomorphism of science and literatures desire to 
make sense of the world” (Bratach 209). In other words, what we now consider 
imaginative literature and the modes of thinking that we now call science employed 
similar forms that interanimated each other and contributed to knowledge and 
imaginative discourse. With the printing of the Royal Society’s Philosophical 
Transactions beginning in 1665, the scientific report was forming as a new genre. 
Admittedly, the Transactions do contain speculation, but the purpose of these writings is 
to document experimental philosophy and educate the reader on discoveries. The 
Transactions show that the written word is just as important to the development of 
experimental philosophy as the experimentation itself (Bradbury 39). Thus, as 
experimental philosophers sought out new ways of writing, literary writers were also 
attempting new forms, inspired by the work of experimental philosophy. As Anne 
Bratach asserts, “new ways of knowing, then, emerge simultaneously with new ways of 
writing; genre and epistemology coeval” (214). As speculation lost its foothold in 
experimental philosophy, a type of speculating emerged in the writing of the day. As 
writing in the speculative mode attempted to capture the natural world, writers borrowed 
from experimental philosophy, and experimental philosophers (whether they admitted it 
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or not) drew upon poetic and figurative devices in attempting to communicate new 
knowledge.  
In Sprat’s History, he positions figurative language as deceptive and a wrongful 
use of the imaginative faculties; the proper use of one’s fancy or imagination would be in 
contemplating Nature. Instead of using the imagination to craft criticism of the Society, 
writers should focus their imagination on nature in order to increase their knowledge. 
Toward the end of his History he offers, almost as an afterthought, his views on the  
relationship between experimental philosophy and those who write in response to it: 
 
 
I will add as an appendix another benefit of Experiments, which perhaps it will 
scarce become me to name amidst so many matters of greater weight: and that is, 
that their discoveries will be very serviceable to the Wits, and Writers of this, and 
all future Ages. But this I am provok’d to mention by the consideration of the 
present Genius of the English Nation; wherein the study of Wit, and humor of 
Writing prevails so much, that there are very few conditions, or degrees, or Ages 
of Men who are free from its infection. I will therefore declare to all those whom 
this Spirit has possess’d, that their is in the Works of Nature an inexhaustible 
Treasure of Fancy, and Invention, which will be reveal’d proportionably, to the 
increas of their Knowledge. (413) 
 
 
Sprat refers to his thoughts on writing about experimental philosophy as an “appendix,” 
and these views are brought up approximately twenty pages before the end of the History. 
In a treatise that numbers over 400 pages, his thoughts about written responses to the 
Royal Society only number a few pages. Perhaps in his view, there were more important 
matters to attend to, but the remaining chapters of this study consider just how significant 
the public’s response was in shaping the overall views of experimental philosophy. 
Despite repeated denigrations of fancy and adorned language, Sprat concedes that the 
discoveries made by experimental philosophers will be useful to writers of both this and 
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future times. At the same time, he notes that writing by false wits has had too much of an 
influence on the English nation; it has infected and kept them enraptured for far too long. 
The inspiration for writing, therefore, should not come from individual musings on 
fanciful conjectures; the only place to exercise the imagination is in considering Nature. 
Sprat elaborates: “It is now therefore seasonable for Natural Knowledge to come forth, 
and give us the understanding of new Virtues and Qualities of things; which may relieve 
their fellow creatures, that have long born the burden alone, and have long bin vex’d by 
the imaginations of Poets. This charitable assistance Experiments will soon bestow” 
(416). It is only experimental philosophy and writings based on the observations of 
nature, therefore, that can reverse the damage inflicted by a diseased imagination.  
 After all the admonishments and condemnations of speculation and imagination 
that Sprat laid out throughout his History, it would seem that any acknowledgement of a 
relationship between experimental philosophy and those who speculate about it might be 
a necessary concession. Unfortunately, we come to see that his admission was a ploy to 
disarm the Society’s most severe critics: “And now I hope what I have said will prevail 
something with the Wits and Railleurs of this Age, to reconcile their Opinions and 
Discourses to these Studies” (417). Effectively, Sprat admits that the whole point of his 
“long digression” into poetry and wit was to convince the wits that their opinions about 
experimental philosophy were wrong. Sprat’s warning to “these terrible men” is “that if 
they shall decry the promoting of Experiments, they will deprive themselves of the most 
fertile Subject of Fancy” (417). It is a crafty argument on his part. Instead of telling wits 
and railleurs to stop fanciful writing altogether, he attempts to persuade them that the 
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greatest source of imagination lies in exploring experimental philosophy. He is correct in 
assuming that the new philosophy will inspire the imagination; unfortunately, Sprat’s 
History did nothing to deter writers from speculating about and evaluating the Royal  
Society. It seems Sprat understood that his apology would not detract the critics:  
 
 
I acknowledge that we ought to have a great dread of their power: I confess I 
believe that New Philosophy need not (as Cæsar) fear the pale, or the melancholy, 
as much as the humorous, and the merry: For they perhaps by making it 
ridiculous, because it is new, and because they themselves are unwilling to take 
pains about it, may do it more injury than all the Arguments of our severe and 
frowning and dogmatical Adversaries. (417) 
 
 
Here we find a humble admission. We see that Sprat is concerned about how the 
imagination, poetry, and speculation might lead minds astray; an even bigger concern, 
however, is his fear of the power such methods possess. When satire takes on 
experimental philosophy specifically, it becomes an even bigger fear for the Society. 
Sprat marks ridicule as the biggest slight because the wits take what the Fellows see as 
very serious and practical work and turn it into farce. It is ridicule that does the most 
damage; however, speculative writing, even that which satirizes the Royal Society, 
performs an important task in disseminating knowledge about the natural world and about 
experimental philosophy. In not just relying on the reality of what can be physically 
observed, the speculative literature explored in the following chapters draws attention to 
many aspects of the new philosophy that Sprat and Cowley seem unwilling to 
acknowledge – the limitations of methods that are absent of imagination, the conflicts 
that empirical science can create within society, the anxiety that new philosophy can 
inspire, and the inherent bias of all practitioners. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IS THE HARDEST OF ALL HUMAN LEARNING”: THE 
SPECULATIVE MODE AS AN EXAMPLE OF BALANCED AND PUBLIC 
INSTRUCTION IN FRANCIS BACON’S NEW ATLANTIS AND MARGARET  
CAVENDISH’S BLAZING WORLD  
 
 
Men have proposed to answer two different, and contrary ends by the use of 
parable; for parables serve, as well to instruct or illustrate, as to wrap up and 
envelope: so that though, for the present, we drop the concealed use, and suppose 
the ancient fables to be vague, undeterminate things, formed for amusement; still 
the other use must remain, and can never be given up. And every man, of any 
learning, must readily allow that this method of instructing is grave, sober, or 
exceedingly useful; and sometimes necessary in the sciences: as it opens an easy 
and familiar passage to the human understanding, in all new discoveries that are 
abstruse, and out of the road of vulgar opinions. Hence, in the first ages, when 
such inventions and conclusions of the human reason, as are now trite and 
common, were new and little known; all things abounded with fables, parables, 
similes, comparisons, and allusions; which were not intended to conceal, but to 
inform and teach […] For as hieroglyphics, were in use before writing; so were 
parables in use before arguments. And even, to this day, if any man would let new 
light in upon the human understanding, and conquer prejudice, without raising 
contests, animosities, opposition, or disturbance, he must still go in the same path, 
and have recourse to the like method of allegory, metaphor and allusion.1 
            Francis Bacon, “The Wisdom of the Ancients” 
 
 
Francis Bacon, Abraham Cowley’s metaphorical “Moses” of experimental 
philosophy, discusses the role of storytelling in his preface to “The Wisdom of the 
Ancients” (1609). As established in the last chapter, Thomas Sprat’s The History of the 
Royal Society (1667), along with Cowley’s “Ode” both present Bacon as the champion of   
																																																								
1 In volume 3 of The Works of Francis Bacon (7). 
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natural philosophy, rescuing experimental philosophy, specifically, from the ancient grip 
of speculative philosophy and the trappings associated with certain kinds of rhetoric and 
poetry. To those ends, Sprat and Cowley both promote knowledge through experimental 
methods, devaluing the function and role of the imagination in contemplating truths about 
the natural world.2 While there are similarities between Bacon’s statements about 
parables and the kinds of language that Sprat and Cowley condemn, there are also 
differences. For example, in the passage above Bacon refers to fables as “vague, 
undeterminate things, formed for amusement.” Such admonishments remind us of Sprat’s 
claim that certain types of poetry produce “chimeras,” “fantasm[s],” “fairies,” and 
“apparitions.”3 Cowley denigrates the speculative for its ability to distract and distort. In 
light of these examples, fictive stories and poetry might be seen as somehow deficient or 
lacking, due to their inability to lead a reader to definite or exact meaning.4 Furthermore, 
as established in chapter three, Sprat and Cowley’s rhetoric demonstrates that imagined 
stories have the power to deceive a reader and lead them into falsehood, while also 
leading to foolishness and idleness.5  
Bacon, however, as demonstrated in the excerpt above, concedes that 
experimental philosophy needs storytelling in order to communicate effectively with a 
																																																								
2 According to Rhodri Lewis, “to judge from Sprat’s History of the Royal Society, Bacon could not have 
thought [mythology] very useful at all […]. For Sprat, the age of philosophy had superseded the muddle-
headedness of the poets, and mythography had no place within the province of the new learning.  […].” 
This is a view that “is fundamentally at odds with Bacon’s own attitudes to mythography” (Lewis 362). 
3 History of the Royal Society (340).  
4 “vague, adj., adv., and n.2,” OED.  
5 “fable, n.,” OED. The OED actually quotes from Bacon’s Advancement of Learning (1605) as an example 
of using the word “fable” to signify a type of story that is ridiculous and foolish: “After a…time...they 
[sc. narrations of miracles] grew to be esteemed, but as old wiues fables.” 
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general public who may struggle to understand new epistemologies.6 Unlike Sprat and 
Cowley, Bacon positions storytelling as something that society needs when he says that 
these stories “must remain, and can never be given up.” Although fables, parables, and 
other narratives can serve the purpose of mere entertainment, Bacon acknowledges that 
the general public can also be instructed through such stories.7 In other words, parables 
and allegories, although associated with falsehood in the Royal Society’s rhetoric, 
become valid ways of knowing, although that knowledge is gained indirectly instead of 
through observation. Every learned man, he says, “must readily allow this method of 
instructing” for it is “grave, sober, and exceedingly useful.” Stories, in this view, become 
a serious and an important way through which the public can be instructed on 
“discoveries that are abstruse,” meaning those methods that are too difficult for them to 
understand or that they do not have enough expertise to comprehend. Bacon also 
insinuates that representing new knowledge through fictional narratives results in less 
resistance from those who do not yet understand the “new light” that is “upon human 
understanding.” Although Bacon does not describe parables and fables as speculative, 
since they are methods of indirect knowledge, they do fit Sprat’s and Cowley’s definition 
of speculative thinking. At the same time, Bacon advances a system of knowledge based 
																																																								
6 Lewis argues that Bacon divided human learning into three categories – history (memory), poesy 
(imagination), and philosophy (reason). Within the category of poesy, Bacon considered narrative, drama, 
and allegories or parables (366). Each, therefore, is identified with the imaginative faculty, but Bacon 
placed more value on parable for its instructive capabilities.  
7 My understanding of the terms “fable,” “parable,” and “allegory” is drawn from the OED. A “fable” is 
defined as “a fictitious narrative or statement; a story not founded on fact,” a “parable” as “an allegorical or 
metaphorical saying or narrative,” and an “allegory” as “a story, picture, etc. which uses symbols to convey 
a hidden or ulterior meaning, typically a moral or political one.” Each definition highlights narrative, 
storytelling, and representations that are metaphorical and not literal. These definitions all also allude to 
stories that are imaginative.  
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in observation and experimentation. In advocating for multiple methods of instruction, 
therefore, Bacon’s philosophy implicitly supports turning to the instruction that 
imaginative stories can provide and for their ability to communicate experimental 
philosophy and its discoveries with the public.  
In context, Bacon’s passage is geared towards understanding the function of story 
telling in the ancient world; however, when viewed in light of the philosophical 
revolution happening during the Restoration, the justification for stories as a means 
through which to communicate discoveries in experimental philosophy seems quite 
fitting. Interestingly, Bacon’s New Atlantis (1627) was printed with his philosophical 
treatise Sylva Sylvarum, illustrating how difficult philosophical concepts, when paired 
with a fable, can better communicate with the public on his ideas. After the formation of 
the Royal Society in 1660, another philosophical treatise and fictional narrative were 
printed together – Margaret Cavendish’s Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. To 
which is added, The Description of a New World Called the Blazing World (1666).8 In 
both cases – New Atlantis and Blazing World – the writers rely on narrative fiction in 
prose to communicate their ideas about experimental philosophy to a general audience.9 
As such, their fictional utopic societies, in which experimental philosophy takes center 
stage, educate readers. But in the pages that follow, I argue that these stories depend on 
																																																								
8 Through the remainder of this chapter I will refer to Observations upon Experimental Philosophy as 
Observations and The Description of a New World… as Blazing World. All quotations of Observations are 
taken from Eileen O’Neill’s Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (2001), and references to 
Blazing World are all from Kate Lilley’s 1992 edited edition of Cavendish’s text.  
9 For other scholarship on the connections between New Atlantis and Blazing World see Bronwen Price, 
“Journeys Beyond Frontiers: Knowledge, Subjectivity and Outer space in Margaret Cavendish’s The 
Blazing World,’ Literature and History (1998) and Marina Leslie, Renaissance Utopias and the Problem of 
History (1998).  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the speculative mode as a means to communicate ideas related to experimental 
philosophy. Each example serves as an alternative to the emerging epistemology, which 
favored experimentation and denigrated speculation. Despite the Royal Society’s 
emphasis on experimentation, New Atlantis and Blazing World serve as powerful 
examples that speculation still has an epistemological value. In conjecturing and 
imagining what a society might be like when experimental philosophers are given special 
designations and rankings by the state, Bacon and Cavendish also ask their readers to 
envision a world that is both similar to and different from their own. Their speculative 
writing becomes a means through which to communicate about experimental philosophy 
while enabling them to offer readers an approach to understanding the natural world that 
integrates knowledge taken from both methods, the experimental and the speculative.  
Bacon and Cavendish each present the reader with speculative societies in which 
experimental philosophy is positioned as an important component to the two envisioned 
worlds. For Bacon, a society headed up by experimental philosophers creates a utopia, 
while Cavendish presents a society that while including certain utopian elements falters 
under the conflict fostered by experimental philosophy. Bacon’s New Atlantis serves as a 
model for how the experimental and the speculative can both be used to understand 
experimental philosophy, but Cavendish takes this model and provides a critique of 
experimental philosophy. Each seems to realize that the world cannot be understood 
without relying on speculative modes of thought. In allowing for and focusing on the 
speculative to communicate ideas related to experimental philosophy, Bacon and 
Cavendish present us with a moderate and balanced approach to formulating truth, a 
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balance that is absent when considering the rhetoric in Sprat’s History, in which 
knowledge found through experimental methods is promoted to the exclusion of other 
kinds of knowledge.  
Their combined texts represent two purposes, one which details how experimental 
philosophers find and make knowledge, and the other exemplifies how such knowledge is 
to be written about. Scholars such as Bronwen Price have acknowledged how Bacon’s 
story “stands on the cusp between the fictional and factual, the visionary and practical, 
utopia and utility, unknown and known” (Price 2). But there has been no sustained study 
into the impact such a mixture might have for a reader or why such a mixture may be 
necessary in allowing for varied and nuanced approaches to understanding the natural 
world. For Bacon, instructions about experimental philosophy are best communicated to 
the general public through storytelling, whereas for Cavendish, experimental philosophy 
must remember its ties to speculation. It is Cavendish’s more integrated and balanced 
approach to experimental philosophy that she posits will keep disorder, divisiveness, and 
rebellion at bay. Subsequently, in pairing a philosophical treatise with a fantastical 
narrative, Cavendish offers not just a critique of experimental philosophy, but a vision 
and example of a unified approach to understanding the natural world, one that allows for 
knowledge grounded in sensory observation and imagination.  
 
Francis Bacon and New Atlantis  
The print history of New Atlantis sheds light on the purposeful interconnectedness 
between Bacon’s paired texts Sylua syluarum: or A naturall historie In ten centuries and 
 
 136 
New Atlantis.10 According to David Colclough, the folio volume of Bacon’s work 
appeared for sale not long after Bacon’s death in April of 1626, and it was printed either 
in late 1626 or early in 1627 (181).11 In the seventeenth century, Sylva was printed at 
least fifteen times, while also seeing additional printings in French and Latin. In all of the 
printings, New Atlantis was included.12 At the end of Sylva, there is a note from William  
Rawley that explains what kind of work New Atlantis is and why it is paired with Sylva:13 
 
 
This fable my Lord devised, to the end that he might exhibit there – in a model or 
description of a college instituted for the interpreting of nature and the producing 
of great and marvellous works for the benefit of men, under the name of 
Salomon’s House, or the College of the Six Days’ Works. And even so far his 
Lordship hath proceeded as to finish that part. Certainly the model is more vast 
and high than can possibly be imitated in all things; notwithstanding most things 
therein are within men’s power to effect. […] This work of the New Atlantis […] 
his Lordship designed for this place; in regard it hath so near affinity (in one part 
of it) with the preceding Natural History.14 
 
 
Rawley’s note to the reader addresses intentionality.15 If we can assume the veracity of 
Rawley, who was Bacon’s chaplain, it answers the question whether Bacon intended that 
these two works be paired together or whether it was done for other reasons. In Rawley’s 
																																																								
10 Sylva consists of a list of 1,000 experiments, divided up into ten different centuries. The subject matter 
ranges from botany to fire and from brewing to acoustics. Sylva is 284 pages long, while New Atlantis is 50 
(Colclough 182). All quotations from New Atlantis are taken from Brian Vickers edition of Bacon’s work.  
11 Colclough lists the book as entered in the Stationers’ Register in April 1626, but there are two different 
letterpress title pages that exist, one that lists 1626 and the other 1627 (181). Brian Vickers notes that New 
Atlantis “was one of Bacon’s most popular and influential works” and that “it left its greatest mark in the 
seventeenth century on the many and diverse groups concerned with science” (788). 
12 See Gibson’s Francis Bacon: A Bibliography of his Works and Baconiana to the Year 1750 (xv, 147-58).  
13 William Rawley was Bacon’s chaplain, and Rawley was the one who posthumously published Bacon’s 
work. 
14 See “To the Reader,” The Works of Francis Bacon (127). 
15 According to Alan Stewart, Rawley was a literary editor who assisted Bacon in getting texts ready for 
publication. Stewart writes, “After Bacon’s death Rawley devoted his life to creating an unblemished 
portrait of his master, compiling a volume of commemorative verse, and editing, translating, and publishing 
selections of his work” (n.p.). 
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account, Bacon wanted New Atlantis paired with his philosophical text. In fact, he 
designed it that way. The two texts – one a record of experimental philosophy and one a 
speculative work of fiction – form what Paul Salzman refers to as “an intersecting genre 
of natural history/fable, treatise/fiction, which readers were encouraged to see as 
inseparable” (44). Even if Bacon did not intend them to be paired, it remains a fact that 
original readers of these two texts encountered them as a pair, and whenever two or more 
texts are joined within a single volume, our interpretations of those texts should take the 
conjoining seriously (Colclough 183).  
 Since the so-called “father of empiricism” turned to speculative writing to 
represent experimental philosophy, while in other writings criticizing the speculative 
modes to truth, he must have seen a need for it.16 New Atlantis is, as Hutton argues, 
interesting because of its fictional qualities but it presents us with “an interpretative 
paradox” (48). This is Bacon’s only prose narrative, so it would seem to be a work of the 
imagination. At the same time, this is a text that represents Bacon’s viewpoint on how to 
advance learning and experimental philosophy, and Bacon is known for his aversion to 
“the charms of language” (Hutton 49). Bacon also draws influences from utopian and 
travel narratives, while making those genres work for his own mixed purpose of 
communicating his philosophical ideas through fiction.17 Scholars have noted that 
																																																								
16 See Bacon’s Novum Organum and a passage quoted later in the chapter as an example.  
17 See Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science; Jerry Weinberger, Science, Faith, and Politics: 
Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age; Charles Whitney, “Merchants of Light: Science 
as Colonization in New Atlantis; J.C. Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian 
Writings 1516-1700; Denise Albanese “The New Atlantis and the Use of Utopia;” Jerry Weinberger, 
Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age; and Susan Bruce, 
“Virgins of the World and Feasts of the Family: Sex and the Social Order in Two Renaissance Utopias” for 
discussions of Bacon’s influences.  
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Bacon’s New Atlantis is actually part of his six-step plan of the Great Instauration.18 
Since it presents the reader with a description of an academy and society run by 
experimental philosophers, New Atlantis is thought to be representative of Bacon’s final 
step in the Instauration – “The New Philosophy; or Active Science.” Part six is meant to 
forward how the "developed and established" new philosophy will become the “real 
business and fortune of the human race, and all power of operation” (Bacon “Great” 84). 
New Atlantis, therefore, is Bacon’s speculative vision of how his philosophical vision 
might be executed. Reid Barbour notes that Bacon’s tendency is to disregard the power of 
the imagination, but that fancy serves Bacon’s purpose: it is “the one delightful, 
expansive, and powerful faculty that might serve to make the Instauration great” (179). 
Employing a speculative narrative as a way to communicate his philosophical ideas 
highlights the strong relationship between the speculative and the experimental, 
especially in light of readers who must receive and understand his theories. Essentially, 
as Kimberley Hurd Hale argues, it made Bacon’s philosophy more “palatable to the 
public” (Hale 2). Admittedly, clear communication presented in an agreeable manner 
would be important to Bacon’s project. On the other hand, in Francis Bacon and the Style 
of Science, James Stephens argues, that Bacon relies on myth and metaphor as a way to 
captivate his reader; instead of expecting them to accept his new ideas without 
																																																								
18 The Great Instauration was Bacon’s plan to bring a state of peace back to the world through knowledge 
of truth. The first five steps are: “The Divisions of the Sciences,” “The New Organon; or Directions 
concerning the Interpretation of Nature,” “The Phenomena of the Universe; or a Natural and Experimental 
History for the Foundation of Philosophy,” “The Ladder of the Intellect,” and “The Forerunners; or 
Anticipations of the New Philosophy” (76). See Alfred B. Gough’s edition of New Atlantis, F.H. Anderson, 
The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, and Jerry Weinberger New Atlantis and The Great Instauration for 
scholarship on New Atlantis and The Great Instauration.  
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speculative contemplation, he takes the reader’s imagination and passions into 
consideration (Stephens 171). Stephens’s comments portray a different purpose of 
Bacon’s fictional narrative – it does more than instruct; it also entertains, which 
underscores the persuasive aspects that a pleasurable story about experimental philosophy 
might have on a reader and might have on the popularization of Bacon’s ideas. Although 
scholars have noted Bacon’s turn to fictional prose as a means through which to 
communicate his experimental methods, there has been no acknowledgement of how 
doing so can be seen as Bacon’s participation in speculative modes of thought. At the 
same time, he is forwarding his new philosophy, he is employing methods associated 
with older epistemologies without acknowledging the benefit of one for the other. 
 New Atlantis presents readers with an adventure as they read about an unnamed 
narrator who travels to an unknown world and interacts with members of a society 
referred to as Bensalem. The narrator remarks, “we are beyond both the old world and the 
new” (Bacon 461). The narrator and his companions land in Bensalem after a storm at sea 
but are given permission to come ashore. Much of the story focuses on describing 
Bensalem’s most important institution, known as Salomon’s House. Centered on the 
study of experimental philosophy, Salomon’s House is run by experimental philosophers. 
Bacon describes Salomon’s House as “the noblest foundation (as we think) that ever was 
upon the earth, and the lantern of this kingdom. It is dedicated to the study of the Works 
and Creatures of God” (467). As an institution dedicated to experimental philosophy, it is 
a space composed of various laboratories and caves, in which state-sponsored 
experiments are performed. The Father of Salomon’s House informs the narrator that the 
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purpose of their “foundation” is the “knowledge of Causes and secret motions of things” 
(Bacon 480). As such, their work is quite varied. Their endeavors include imitating and 
showing “meteorological phenomena”; “experiments of grafting”; “dissections and trials” 
on beasts, birds, and fishes; the preparation of medicine; and “demonstrations of all lights 
and radiations, and of all colors” (Bacon 481-83).  
 As a text used in tandem with Bacon’s philosophy, part of its purpose seems 
grounded in convincing his readers of the great value that experimental philosophy can 
have for society. The governor tells the narrator, “But thus you see we maintain a trade, 
not for gold, silver, or jewels, nor for silks, nor for spices, nor any other commodity of 
matter, but only for God’s first creature, which was Light: to have light (I say) of the 
growth of all parts of the world” (Bacon 472). The speculative society that Bacon 
envisions trades in knowledge. Assigning an economic value to knowledge and 
presenting it as something precious that can be traded like a commodity shows not only 
the importance Bacon places on experimental philosophy, but also what England can gain 
by participating in philosophic endeavors. Many of the commodities that the governor 
lists represent knowledge as a domestic resource and one that can be exported – gold, 
silks, and spices, for instance. Near the end of the story, when the Father of Salomon’s 
House tells the narrator about its system, he says, “I will give thee the greatest jewel I 
have. For I will impart unto thee, for the love of God and men, a relation of the true state 
of Salomon’s House” (Bacon 480). Bacon figures that just knowing the history and 
workings of a “scientific” society provides a material gain.  
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 Once the Father begins listing the many commodities in which they trade, it 
becomes clear that Bacon’s speculative society represents a way to attain superiority over 
other nations. For instance, when the Father remarks that Bensalem has “diverse 
mechanical arts, which you have not,” he is referring to technologies used for 
experimental philosophy, such as microscopes and telescopes (Bacon 484). Although he 
does not go into any specifics as to what exact “arts” they have, they are more diverse 
than what would have been currently available to the English reader at the time. The 
Father lists several other advantages that can be found within Bensalem and that the 
narrator lacks, advantages that the Father makes a point to emphasize: Bensalem has “a 
number of fossils, and imperfect minerals, which you have not”; “harmonies which you 
have not […] and diverse instruments of music, likewise to you unknown, some sweeter 
than any you have”; and  “swifter motions than any you have” with muskets that are 
“stronger and more violent than yours are” (Bacon 485). These comparisons show the 
English reader just what they are lacking – things they may not have even been aware of 
– as a means through which to convince them of the great good, both in pleasure and 
power, that can be done for society when experimental philosophy is at the helm. Not 
only will they have access to minerals and fossils previously unknown, but their 
entertainments will also be improved, while becoming a stronger world power, as well. 
Greater and faster muskets, after all, can only help England to become even more 
dominant.  
 The Father not only brags about all the things experimental philosophy has 
provided for Bensalem and that England lags behind in, but he also draws attention to 
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how much they know that the narrator does not. They have, for example, found many 
means through which to produce light and all those means are “yet unknown to you” 
(Bacon 484). Metaphorically, the Father could be insinuating that Bensalem has 
discovered many avenues through which to produce knowledge and discover more truth, 
but his literal message is that they can see more, both near and far, within the human 
body, and rectify deficiencies in human sight. Bensalem also has discovered “precious 
stones of all kinds, many of them of great beauty, and to you unknown” (Bacon 485). The 
repetition of “to you unknown” is a subtle reminder of all that is left to still be 
discovered, if only one lived in a society devoted to discovery. These findings also have 
economic value. The “jewel” of knowledge mentioned earlier becomes literal jewels of 
material value. With that being said, each of the aspects the Father mentions – ranging 
from guns that shoot better to light that allows them to see the inner workings of the 
human body – have practical value, in addition to aesthetic value. This is not just 
experimental philosophy practiced only for the sake of knowing, but rather it is practice 
for its usefulness to the members living within Bensalem. Bacon’s speculative society, 
therefore, becomes a way for him to advocate for a civilization that values experimental 
philosophy because of its dual goals of pleasure and utility. 
 Knowledge and discovery as practical advantages, however, are not the only 
speculative aspects to Bacon’s utopic society of experimental philosophers; his utopian 
speculative society also has worth because it is a civilization that finds peace and 
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happiness because of its pursuits of experimental philosophy.19 Once the narrator is free 
from quarantine and able to explore, he goes abroad to experience what “was to be seen 
in the city.” After spending some time observing, he remarks: “obtaining acquaintance 
with many of the city, not of the meanest quality, at whose hands we found such 
humanity,” while also noting that the nation showed itself to be “compounded of all 
goodness” (Bacon 472).20 The narrator’s first observations concern the pure benevolence 
of Bensalem’s citizens. Since Bensalem is a society run by experimental philosophers, 
Bacon’s text implies that the goodness of this place exists because the society has been 
fostered by experimental philosophy. The people of Bensalem live in such harmony that 
even though there are decrees and orders that the governor can put in place if he is 
disobeyed, those orders are “seldom needed because there is such reverence and 
obedience [that] they give to the order of nature” (Bacon 473). A respect for nature, in 
Bacon’s speculative society, equates with a respect for order, which results in a society 
that is governed but does not rely on laws and punishments to keep that order.21  
 Bacon’s society is one of balance, where its citizens understand their relationship 
both to each other and to nature. This balance creates, in addition to order, a lifestyle 
bereft of sexual sin. Joabin, a Jewish merchant, tells the narrator, “There is not under the 
																																																								
19 In speaking of knowledge as practical and speculative, I mean that Bacon’s predictions regarding the 
utility of experimental philosophy are speculative in nature because he is only theorizing on the benefits to 
society, since he has not seen his ideas come to fruition. 
20 The narrator, along with his companions, arrives in Bensalem after getting lost at sea. In order to be 
given permission to come ashore and explore the society, Bensalem’s officials require the narrator to be 
quarantined.  
21 Just prior to the narrator’s conclusions about Bensalem, the governor tells him that Salomon’s House is 
dedicated towards the study of the “Works and Creatures of God” and that the House was instituted for “the 
finding out of the true nature of all things (whereby God might have the more glory in the workmanship of 
them, and man the more fruit in the use of them)” (253-54).   
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heavens so chaste a nation as this of Bensalem, nor so free from all the pollution or 
foulness. It is the virgin of the world […] there is nothing among mortal men more fair 
and admirable than the chaste minds of this people” (Bacon 476). Experimental 
philosophy, when it grounds and becomes the foundation of a society, produces a nation 
that exemplifies innocence, restraint, morals, and honor. The inhabitants of such a society 
have excellent and uncorrupted minds. In calling Bensalem the “virgin of the world,” 
Bacon acknowledges the special place Bensalem has because of its religious 
steadfastness and because of the piety its members exemplify.22 In response to these 
descriptions (and after Joabin has listed the many manifestations of sin in Europe – 
brothels, prostitutes, unmarried libertines, marriage as a business transaction, infidelity, 
and unnatural lust), the narrator admits, “I confess the righteousness of Bensalem was 
greater than the righteousness of Europe” (Bacon 477). In this way, Bacon promotes his 
experimental program not only for its material, aesthetic, and practical gains, but also for 
its ability to stave off the many immoral and unsavory aspects found in other societies. 
These kinds of descriptions remind us of Sprat’s claims of the good of experimental 
philosophy for its ability to create moderation and balance in the lives of English 
subjects. This pure, religious, and ethical approach to life, evidently, also leads to 
																																																								
22 “Virgin, n. and adj.,” OED. Bensalem is actually a Christian society, in which supernatural explanations 
are readily accepted as truth. For example, we are told about a great pillar of light seen “twenty years after 
the ascension of our Savior,” one of the men of Salomon’s House prayed as follows: “Lord God of heaven 
and earth, thou has vouchsafed of thy grace to those of our order, to know thy works of creation, and the 
secrets of them; and to discern […] between divine miracles, works of nature, works of art, and impostures 
and illusions of all sort” (Bacon 247). For scholars who discuss the intersections of science and religion in 
Bacon’s thought see Richard Westfall, Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England; John C. 
Briggs, “Bacon’s Science and Religion”; Stephen A. McKnight, Religious Foundations of Francis Bacon’s 
Thought; Jerry Weinberger, “On the Miracles in Bacon’s New Atlantis”; David Innis, “Civil Religion as 
Political Technology in Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis”; and Reid Barbour Literature and Religious Culture 
in Seventeenth-Century England. 
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happiness, as the narrator observes on the feast day where “there is an acclamation by all 
that are present in their language, which is thus: ‘Happy are the people of Bensalem’” 
(Bacon 474). Of course, Bacon’s imaginings are purely speculative, and he has ulterior 
motives in painting Bensalem in such an idyllic light. With that being said, Bacon’s story 
about a society run by experimental philosophers assists readers in contemplating a 
society different than their own, one that has not yet been established.  
 However impressive Bacon’s turn to storytelling is, what may be more impressive 
is that some of his speculative musings on a society run by experimental philosophers 
actually came to fruition when the Royal Society was formed in 1660. Granted this was 
not an entire society in the exact way Bacon envisioned, but the Society felt part of its 
purpose was to improve the nation through the pursuit of experimental philosophy. It is 
ironic that an institution dedicated to promoting experimental philosophy and to 
demoting speculative philosophy would draw its inspiration from a speculative text. 
Joseph Glanvill’s dedication in Scepsis Scientifica (1665) clearly links Bacon’s 
speculative society with the founding of the Royal Society when he describes the 
Society’s goals of being an “Empire of Man over Nature” and designates Salomon’s 
House as “a Prophetick Scheam of the ROYAL SOCIETY.”23 Price also establishes a 
connection between Salomon’s House and the Royal Society: “the sanctioning of a 
collective scientific community by the State through royal charter, and the Royal 
Society’s aims to compile comprehensive data on the works of nature and art, and to 
develop practical and experimental knowledge for the benefit of mankind, are broadly 
																																																								
23 “Address to the Royal Society,” Early English Books Online. 
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akin to the goals of Salomon’s House” (15). Of course, the implementation of any 
organization outside the confines of utopia will not produce results nearly as perfect or 
nearly as accepted by greater society. In speculative writings during the Restoration that 
specifically focus on the Royal Society, for instance, the Society is often turned into an 
object of ridicule and is regularly criticized for its mission. In this chapter, that critique 
comes in Cavendish’s speculative society found in Blazing World, and in the following 
chapter, we see the Royal Society mocked on the Restoration stage. Like Bacon, 
Cavendish pairs her speculative text with a philosophical one, and although her pairing is 
less favorable towards experimental philosophy, it serves a similar purpose for the reader. 
In allowing readers to conjecture and imagine the worlds they are presented with, they 
can better understand the philosophical concepts each writer wants to communicate, 
while also seriously contemplating the ramifications such an institution of experimental 
philosophers may have in actual society, of which Cavendish was particularly critical.  
 
Cavendish and Her Observations 
 Cavendish is well known for her interest in natural philosophy, and many scholars 
have studied her interest in experimental philosophy in recent decades, as she is the only 
woman to publish works on experimental philosophy in the seventeenth century.24 
																																																								
24 For discussions of Cavendish's natural philosophy, see G. D. Meyer, The Scientific Lady in England. An 
Account of her Rise, with Emphasis on the Major Roles of the Telescope and Microscope; Stephen Clucas, 
“The Atomism of the Cavendish Circle. A Reappraisal”; Sarah Hutton, “In Dialogue with Thomas Hobbes: 
Margaret Cavendish's Natural Philosophy”; John Rogers, The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry and 
Politics in the Age of Milton; and Susan James, “The Innovations of Margaret Cavendish.” On the gendered 
character of Cavendish's natural philosophy, see Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature. Women, Ecology 
and the Scientific Revolution; Sarah Hutton, “Anne Conway, Margaret Cavendish and Seventeenth-century 
Scientific Thought”; “Lisa T. Sarasohn, “A Science Turned Upside Down: Feminism and the Natural 
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Despite her writing about experimental philosophy and her clear interest in the subject, 
her requests to join the Royal Society were denied.25 Even though she was never admitted 
as a member, she was granted access to the Society when they gave her permission to 
attend one of their meetings in 1667. Samuel Mintz details the Duchess’s historic visit in 
“The Duchess of Newcastle's Visit to the Royal Society.” Mintz notes that the Duchess’s 
desire to attend a meeting was made known on May 23, but that the Duchess wished to be 
invited by the Society. Lord Berkley urged the Society to agree to her visit, so the Society 
took a vote. Despite “considerable opposition,” due to the public ridicule the Society had 
been facing, which they were “not eager” to see increased by her visit, the Society voted 
to allow the Duchess’s visit (171). Once approved, the visit was met with much 
anticipation by the members of the Royal Society, and Cavendish’s presence was treated 
as any other visit by an aristocrat, meaning that her attendance was viewed by the Society 
more as “a social rather than a scientific event” (Nate 404). As they would do with any 
visit from a member of the nobility, they entertained her with the “usual visitors’ 
program,” performing a number of experiments designed to enthrall a spectator with 
																																																								
Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish”; Lorna Schiebinger, The Mind has No Sex? Women in the Origins of 
Modem Science; Sylvia Bowerbank, “The Spider’s Delight: Margaret Cavendish and the ‘Female’ 
Imagination”; Eileen O’Neill, “Disappearing Ink: Early Modern Women Philosophers and Their Fate in 
History”; and Janet Kourany, Philosophy in a Feminist Voice 
25 Keller notes, “Although born and married into monied families, Cavendish lacked a formal education, 
and even though she knew some of the most influential scientific thinkers of her time, she was denied 
access because of her sex to the correspondence networks and the increasingly formal institutions that 
constituted the forums for contemporary scientific practice” (449). Cavendish was exposed to natural 
philosophy through her social circle and her family. Her husband was known to be a virtuoso who owned 
many telescopes, and her brother, Lord John Lucas, was one of the original Fellows of the Royal Society. 
Margaret Cavendish’s writings on natural philosophy include: Philosophical Fancies (1653), Philosophical 
and Physical Opinions (1655), Philosophical Letters (1664), Observations upon Experimental Philosophy 
(1666), Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668). 
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visual spectacle (Nate 404).26 Cavendish’s invitation represents the only time a woman is 
known to have attended a meeting of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century (Dear 
127). 
 Clearly, Cavendish’s visit during a meeting of the Royal Society showed interest 
in the organization; however, her writings on experimental philosophy prior to her visit 
were quite critical of the Society’s methods (Observations and Blazing World appeared a 
year before her visit). Tessie Prakas argues that Cavendish’s curiosity about the Royal 
Society and her decision to write on experimental philosophy show “a desire to 
participate in the intellectual exchanges that the Society fostered.” But Prakas also 
contends that we can see her writings as emblematic of a frustration at being excluded 
from those “exchanges” (128). Prakas goes on to explain that Cavendish may have found 
“grounds for complaints” because of her exclusion since it highlights the true nature of 
the Society: “the Society’s openness and commitment to experimentation was something 
of a fiction, and that it functioned ultimately to legitimize decisions made arbitrarily by a 
relatively small, elite group of gentlemen scientists” (Prakas 128). Prakas draws attention 
to the fact that Cavendish viewed her exclusion from the Society as symptomatic of the 
exclusivity of an organization that claimed to stand for inclusivity. Although we cannot 
know for sure why Cavendish focused so much attention on criticizing the Royal Society, 
Prakas makes a valid claim about the Society’s unwillingness to accept certain members, 
despite its contrasting rhetoric – that anyone, regardless of viewpoint and status was 
																																																								
26 Mintz notes that Robert Boyle was instructed to prepare: experiments with color, the weighing of air, and 
the dissolving of flesh with a “certain liquor” (172). 
 
 
 149 
welcome. Scholars such as Eve Keller and Lisa T. Sarasohn argue that Cavendish’s 
exclusion from the Society forced her to develop her own thoughts on how to formulate 
knowledge about the natural world. Since she was unable to join the Society and access 
the “male preserves of learning,” Cavendish’s only option was to reject the Society’s 
methods and “develop her own speculative philosophy” (“A Science” 294).  
Cavendish, as we will see, relies on a type of philosophy that values reason 
without experimentation, and Keller argues that she does so because “those were the only 
avenues open to her.”27 Sarasohn and Keller each argue that Cavendish created a new 
method through which to practice her own brand of experimental philosophy. Although I 
do not disagree with either, I also believe that Cavendish is doing more than inventing her 
own methods. Cavendish, like Bacon, combines her philosophical treatise with a fictional 
narrative. Instead of merely developing her own approach, Cavendish is combining 
approaches. This combination allows her to undermine the Royal Society’s methods, 
which eschews speculation and hypothesis in favor of the experimental method. In this 
way, Cavendish’s writing does not present her own practice of experimental philosophy 
or merely an alternative, but instead calls attention to the need for fancy and reason to 
coexist in the pursuit towards truth. Consequently, Cavendish forwards a type of 
knowledge about the natural world that combines ancient and emerging methods, so as to 
acknowledge the imagination’s crucial role in experimental philosophy, a role that 
																																																								
27 According to Keller, since Cavendish was not given a chance to participate as a member of the Royal 
Society and since she was unable to interact with and consider the technologies the Society made use of, 
“Cavendish had no alternative but to fall back on the only ‘methods’ that were available to her: what her 
unaided senses perceived and what she could ‘reason out’ for herself, without any training in logic or 
mathematics” (449). 
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practitioners within the Royal Society distanced themselves from. Cavendish’s 
participation in and critique of experimental philosophy gives us an example of how a 
reading public interested in experimental philosophy may have conceived of the 
Society’s methods. Keller positions Cavendish as an outsider, noting that Cavendish 
gives us a “stranger’s account” of experimental philosophy, displaying “epistemological 
problems” associated with the new philosophy (Keller 450). Cavendish’s viewpoints do 
not have the rhetorical purpose of promoting new methodologies and she had no need to 
fund or get support for an institution like apologists such as Sprat or experimentalists 
such as Robert Hooke did, both of whom Cavendish directly criticizes in Observations; 
therefore, Cavendish’s stance on experimental philosophy is both important and 
“insightful precisely because it is spoken from outside the discursive and institutional 
forums it explores” (Keller 450). Thus, Cavendish’s position (or lack of position) is 
strongly aligned with others in the public who were interested in experimental 
philosophy. Although her anxieties and questions quite possibly are not representative of 
those held by other non-practitioners, her writings still provide us with a valuable lens 
through which to understand the tension between speculative and experimental thinking.  
Printed during the first decade of the Royal Society’s foundation, Cavendish’s 
critiques of experimental philosophy and her speculative society found in the Blazing 
World participate in a cultural response to the new philosophy. Cavendish’s writings 
were printed during a time when experimental philosophy had not yet been accepted as 
the “right” way to understand nature and during a time when members of the Society 
were “routinely under attack for not producing incontestable results” (Keller 450). As 
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such, Cavendish’s view of experimental methodology within the Society is critical of the 
use of technologies, such as microscopes and telescopes, for she believes those 
technologies were not able to “discover the interior secrets of nature” (Sarasohn “A 
Science” 292). As I will establish when discussing Blazing World, the schools of 
experimental philosophy that the Empress forms in her speculative society represent a 
break from the example we find in Bacon’s New Atlantis. In Cavendish’s view, the Royal 
Society has not stayed true to Baconian ideals because they “have lost sight of the 
usefulness of knowledge and the common good,” and she recognized that focusing on 
experimental philosophy could lead to division instead of unity (Cottegnies 90). As 
Cavendish declares in her Observations, there is no way that anyone can know anything 
with absolute certainty; hence, her speculations could be as accurate or even more 
accurate than anyone else’s (Sarasohn “A Science” 292-93).  
Cavendish’s Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, which precedes her 
Blazing World, is a direct and lengthy (more than 400 pages) critique of the Royal 
Society’s methods, while also a treatise on her approach to understanding the natural 
world. Her treatise focuses on her rejection of Robert Hooke’s (a prominent member of 
the Royal Society) ideas in Micrographia (1665).28 Cavendish’s system outlined in 
																																																								
28 Chico argues that Hooke’s Micrographia was a “monument to the Royal Society and the experimental 
method” (146). The main focus of Observations is a “point-by-point refutation of Hooke’s findings, along 
with thorough critiques of Henry Power’s Experimental Philosophy in Three Books (1664) and Robert 
Boyle’s Experiments and Considerations Touching Colours (1664)” (147). Keller also notes that “the book 
Cavendish chose to attack—Robert Hooke’s Micrographia—was a model of all the Royal Society 
promoted: lavishly printed with large, detailed engravings, the text recorded Hooke’s extensive 
experiments with the microscope, which he had newly improved to better illuminate his subjects. The book 
was the first to publicize the revelatory powers of the microscope, and, because it bore the imprimatur of 
the Royal Society, its methods, illustrations and results carried the endorsement of the new institution of 
mechanistic science” (452). See Eileen O’Neill’s “Introduction to Observations for a more detailed 
discussion of the philosophers that Cavendish is refuting. For more on Cavendish and Boyle see Stephen 
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Observations rejects his views in favor of her own theories of vitalistic materialism, 
which understands nature as infinite, sensitive, and alive. Cavendish argues in “Of 
Motions of Heat and Cold,” “Thus the variety of nature, is a stumbling block to most 
men, at which they break their heads of understanding, like blind men, that run against 
several posts or walls: and how should it be otherwise, since nature’s actions are infinite, 
and man’s understanding finite?” (Cavendish Observations 99). Because nature is varied 
and infinite and because humans are not able to view nature objectively since they are 
part of it, there is no way we can ever fully understand or know nature. Her perspective 
undermines the Society’s rhetoric of objectivity and “value-neutrality” (Keller 452). As 
humans, we lack the ability to see clearly, so the best we can do is make informed 
guesses and speculations, but we will never arrive at absolute certainty. Such viewpoints 
make Cavendish’s philosophy rationalist because she believes knowledge comes from 
reason and not from sensory perception. It is important to note that when Cavendish uses 
the word “reason,” she does so to indicate the rational, thinking mind, but as we shall see, 
for Cavendish, the term also includes the mind’s ability to imagine. Sensory perception, 
on the other hand, refers specifically to the five senses.29 Consequently, in advocating for 
																																																								
Clucas, “Variation, Irregularity and Probabilism: Margaret Cavendish and Natural Philosophy as Rhetoric.” 
For discussions of Cavendish, Boyle, and Hooke see Lisa T. Sarasohn, The Natural Philosophy of 
Margaret Cavendish.   
29 Cavendish refers to the imagination as “fancy,” and she positions reason and imagination along the same 
continuum. She sees both reason and sense as material, but says the imagination is a “rational perception” 
and sense is a “sensitive perception” (81). In Observations, rational perceptions “being not encumbered 
with any other parts of matter, but moving in their own degree, are not at all bound to work always with the 
sensitive, as is evident in the production of fancies, thoughts, imaginations, conceptions, etc.” (150). In 
Blazing World’s “To the Reader,” Cavendish defines reason as “a rational search and enquiry into the 
causes of natural effects,” and fancy or imagination as “a voluntary creation or production of the Mind” 
(123). Gabrielle Starr concludes in a study of Cavendish’s understanding of imagination, that this faculty is, 
throughout her work, understood “as a tool of inquiry” (298). Of sense, Cavendish writes, “when I speak of 
sense, I mean the perception of our five exterior senses, helped (or rather deluded) by art, and artificial 
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a method that relies on reason, she is also promoting contemplative speculation as a 
means towards knowledge. As Mintz notes, Observation is Cavendish’s appeal for less 
experimentation and more speculation in experimental philosophy (168). Such a plea is a 
critique of the Royal Society because in promoting rationalism and deduction, she is able 
to undermine the Society’s focus on experiment and induction. Ironically, according to 
Battigelli, “the members of the Royal Society espoused experimentalism for the same 
reasons she espoused rationalism. Both Cavendish and the members of the Royal Society 
believed that their particular approach was best at avoiding the passions and madness that 
led to civil war” (Battigelli 89).  
In rejecting sensory perception and technologies used to assist sensory 
perceptions (which she refers to as “arts”), Cavendish’s foremost objection is her doubt 
that the senses and arts can lead anyone to undeniable truth.30 Instead of sensory 
observations, she advocates for “rational and judicious observations, before deluding 
glasses and experiments” (4). “Delude” is a term that Cavendish frequently relies upon 
when denigrating experimental philosophy. Such a word connotes disappointment, fraud, 
and deceit. In the context in which she uses it, she seems to speak of the ability of 
experiments to “befool the mind.” In misleading the mind with deceptive sight, falsehood 
																																																								
instruments: for I see, that in this present age, learned men are full of art, and artificial trials; and when they 
have found out something by them, they presently judge that all natural actions are made the same way” 
(Observations 99-100). 
30 When Cavendish refers to “art” she is engaging with Hooke’s argument that “artificial instruments and 
methods” will correct the errors of human sensory perception. Chico argues that “for Hooke, sensory 
perception in its pure state is the only true way to acquire knowledge, and any physical limitations are 
themselves merely idiosyncratic and local. For Cavendish, the fact that sensory perception is not standard 
or universal impugns its reliability; all perceptions, therefore, are characterized by delusion and error” 
(147). 
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can be accepted as truth.31 It is ironic that Cavendish and Sprat both use similar 
accusations to denigrate the philosophy they are opposed to. For Cavendish, it is 
speculative philosophy that leads to truth because contemplation removes the barrier of 
misleading senses and technologies that deceive. But for Sprat, speculation involves 
conjecture, which relies on imaginative faculties, so it is speculation that deludes. In the 
section titled “Of the Motions of Heat and Cold,” Cavendish details exactly why she  
views human senses as unreliable: 
 
 
I perceive, that oftentimes our senses are deluded by their own irregularities, in 
not perceiving always truly and rightly, the actions of art, but mistaking them, 
which is a double error: and therefore that particular sensitive knowledge in man, 
which is built merely upon artificial experiments, will never make a good 
philosopher, but regular sense and reason must do it; that is, a regular, sensitive, 
and rational inquisition, into the various actions of nature. (Observations 100) 
 
 
The human senses, then, prove untrustworthy because they are imperfect. The observer, 
as she explains, does not always view things in the right way. Then, when something like 
a telescope is added to an already erroneous eye, it results in “double error.” The 
experimentalists constructed the technologies they employ, and if at the root of the senses 
is the potential for error, how can a human-made instrument be reliable? She asserts, 
“The truth is, most of these arts are fallacies, rather than discoveries of truth; for sense 
deludes more than it gives a true information, and an exterior inspection through an optic 
glass, is so deceiving, that it cannot be relied upon: Wherefore, regular reason is the best 
guide to all arts” (Cavendish Observations 9). The term “regular reason” appears after a 
																																																								
31 “delude, v.,” OED.  
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long discussion on why microscopes are unnecessary and deceptive. Regular reason, 
therefore, is directly contrasted with knowledge derived from the senses.  
In “Of Human Sense and Perception,” Cavendish again juxtaposes regular reason 
with senses and technology. She writes, “Whatsoever the sensitive perception is either 
defective in, or ignorant of, the rational perception supplies. But, mistake me not: by 
rational perception and knowledge, I mean regular reason, not irregular; where I do also 
exclude ‘art’” (47). As established earlier, “art” refers to technologies used to assist the 
senses. Taken together, when Cavendish mentions “regular reason,” she means the 
mind’s ability to instruct and inform without reliance on tools such as microscopes. 
Cavendish expands her view of technologies and experimental philosophy in “Of Art and  
Experimental Philosophy”: 
 
 
For how can a fool order his understanding by art, if nature has made it defective? 
or, how can a wise man trust his senses, if either the objects be not truly presented 
according to their natural figure and shape, or if the senses be defective, either 
through age, sickness, or other accidents, which do alter the natural motions 
proper to each sense? And hence, I conclude, that experimental and mechanic 
philosophy cannot be above the speculative part, by reason most experiments 
have their rise from the speculative, so that the artist or mechanic is but a servant 
to the student. (Observations 49) 
 
 
In this passage, Cavendish draws attention to the mind as the root of all knowledge when 
she establishes that knowledge cannot be gained through art or the senses but instead 
through the speculative part, or reason. A person with deficiencies of mind– a fool – 
cannot have those deficiencies rectified by an artificial technology.32 On the other hand, 
																																																								
32 The OED defines a fool as “One who is deficient in, or destitute of reason or intellect; a weak-minded or 
idiotic person.” 
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people without mental deficiencies – or the “wise” – have objects presented to them 
through microscopes and telescopes and draw observations based on an image that is not 
true to life. Cavendish also reminds the reader that human senses are altered over the 
course of one’s life for various reasons, making the senses inconstant and unreliable. 
Even though Cavendish may fail to understand the actual benefits of microscopes and 
telescopes, she correctly asserts that the viewer’s faculties will always be flawed. At the 
end of her statement, she reaffirms the need for the speculative by positioning it as the 
chief faculty in ascertaining truth. Experiments and technologies, she argues, cannot exist  
without first contemplating and imagining them. In this way, Cavendish highlights a truth 
that Sprat would go to great pains to deny.33  
 In rejecting the accuracy of experimentation and “arts,” Cavendish is able to 
advocate for the speculative – or fancy – as a better means to access truth. In so doing she 
also undermines the Society’s reliance on the tenet that experimental philosophy serves 
the greater good because of its practicality. This is a common criticism directed at the 
Royal Society, as will be explored more in the next chapter. If experimental philosophy 
has no practical value, then what good is it to see a flea enlarged 1000 times? In the 
opening epistle to Observations, entitled “To His Grace The Duke of Newcastle,” 
Cavendish sets up her point of contention early for the reader: “The truth is, My Lord, 
that most men in these latter times, busy themselves more with other worlds, than with 
																																																								
33 Sprat’s History was first printed in 1667; however, Jackson I. Cope and Harold Whitmore Jones note that 
Sprat’s project was mentioned as early as 1663. They also establish that part of Sprat’s History might have 
appeared in print at the end of 1664 or the beginning of 1665 based on Sprat’s “An Advertisement to the 
Reader” in which he says, “much of this discourse was Written and Printed above two years before the rest 
[…] those having pass’d the Press so long ago, were out of my power of changing them” (xiii-xiv). 
Cavendish’s Observations with Blazing World was printed in 1666, with another edition printed in 1668.  
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this they live in, which seems strange unless they could find out some art that would 
carry them into those celestial worlds” (4). Essentially, Cavendish’s complaint is that 
viewing another planet through a telescope results in a lack of utility because the 
philosopher cannot make accurate assessments unless he were able to travel there. 
Without that possibility, there is no use or need to busy oneself with such sensory 
knowledge when there is more to focus on in their own world. On the other hand, 
traveling to another world is exactly what Cavendish pursues in Blazing World, but 
speculatively, of course. In essence, Cavendish advocates for imaginative travel as more 
likely to access truth than experimental methods can. In addition to her critique of 
examining subjects unworthy to study, which Cavendish sees as misguided, she poses the 
following rhetorical questions to her readers in order to help them understand what little 
can be gained by enhanced sight: “if it be true, that telescopies make appear the spots in 
the sun and moon, or discover some new starts, what benefit is that to us? Or if 
microscopes do truly represent the exterior parts and superficies of some minute 
creatures, what advantageth it our knowledge?” (Cavendish Observations 9). These 
questions are quite sound, and they implicitly ask her reader to consider whether there is 
any actual benefit to be gained from experimental methods. Her repetition of “if” 
connected to “truth” (“if it be true” and “if” they “truly represent”) undermines the 
supposed certainty these instruments are said to provide, while drawing attention to the 
little function they have to increasing understanding.  
Cavendish’s critique of such inutility grows more blunt and aggressive as she 
turns her attention from the concept of experimental philosophy to the practitioner in the 
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section titled “Of Micrography, and of Magnifying and Multiplying Glasses.” Her focus 
on the individual practitioners highlights the flawed individuals who practice the 
experimental method and represents them as selfish and oblivious to what the public  
actually needs.  
 
 
But could experimental philosophers find out more beneficial arts than our 
forefathers have done, either for the better increase of vegetables and brute 
animals to nourish our bodies, or better and commodious contrivances in the art of 
architecture to build us houses, or for the advancing of trade and traffic to provide 
necessaries for us to live, or for the decrease of nice distinctions and sophistical 
disputes in churches, schools and courts of judicature, to make men live in unity, 
peace and neighbourly friendship, it would not only be worth their labour, but of 
as much praise as could be given to them: But, as boys that play with watery 
bubbles or fling dust into each other’s eyes, or make a hobbyhorse of snow, are 
worthy of reproof rather than praise, for wasting their time with useless sports; so 
those that addict themselves to unprofitable arts, spend more time than they reap 
benefit thereby. Nay, could they benefit men either in husbandry, architecture, or 
the like necessary and profitable employments; yet before the vulgar sort would 
learn to understand them, the world would want bread to eat, and houses to dwell 
in (Cavendish Observations 52) 
 
 
Cavendish’s tone is one of frustration as she admonishes the Society for its failure to do 
any public good. She lists many societal aspects that might be improved if attention given 
to experimental philosophy were diverted to more fruitful endeavors. Since these views 
represent someone on the outside of the Royal Society, Cavendish’s own philosophical 
ideas become important indicators of how the new and emerging epistemologies might 
have been received. In this passage, as an outsider to the Royal Society, she wants to 
know how the experimental methods benefit her or others in her society. If experimental 
philosophers were to use their new-found knowledge for the greater good and for utility 
(as they profess they do), then maybe that would mean demonstrable improvements to 
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food, housing, trade, religion, education, or law. On a larger scale, her accusations center 
on the presence of disputes and the absence of peace. If the Royal Society is as healing as 
they claim, then why has there not be an increase in unity? Cavendish admits that she is 
open to experimental methods and would be willing to lavish praise on the Royal Society 
if any of these utilitarian aims were approached. Instead the Society, in her view, is only 
deserving of “reproach.” In calling experimental philosophers “boys,” she insinuates that 
their methods lack maturity and proper aim, and referring to them as “addicts” only 
underscores even more how immoderate their approach really is and how useless their 
discoveries are. 
 Clearly, Cavendish finds much fault with experimental philosophy, and she 
advocates for her own methods, which are more speculative in nature. On the other hand, 
she admits that she does not “despise sense, or sensitive knowledge,” but that she prefers 
the study of contemplation, in which “reasons shall be [her] guide” (Observations 101). 
She acknowledges that we must employ our senses whenever we search out the causes of 
nature but that we should mainly rely on our reason when drawing conclusions “for, 
sense is only a workman, and reason is the designer and surveyor; and as reason guides 
and directs, so ought sense to work. But seeing that in this age, sense is more in fashion 
than reason, it is no wonder there are so many irregular opinions and judgments amongst 
men” (Cavendish Observations 99). Part of her critique, therefore, seems directed at 
misaligned priorities in valuing sense over reason. Earlier, she referred to sense as the 
student, and here she anthropomorphizes sense as the worker, but she argues that it is 
reason that guides both the student and the worker. Cavendish sees reason as able to 
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delve deeper into the meaning of things than sense, for “our exterior senses can go no 
further than the exterior figures of creatures, and their exterior actions” (Observations 
100). Although it can be erroneous, reason is less likely to be because one is more likely 
to arrive at truth when he or she can “pierce deeper” and “consider” and “guess” (100). 
Cavendish’s approach to experimental philosophy, therefore, is not grounded in methods 
she has invented; rather, she combines methods from ancient and emerging philosophies, 
allowing both a role and an importance in understanding the natural world.  
 Near the end of Observations, Cavendish makes a final plea to her reader to see 
reason as the needed force towards ascertaining truth, emphasizing reason as the 
originator of all discoveries, technologies, and knowledge. She also seems to be speaking 
to views found within the Royal Society, which often denigrate and disregard the  
importance of speculation. She remarks:  
 
 
Neither ought artists, in my opinion, to condemn contemplative philosophy, nay, 
not to prefer the experimental part before her; for all that artists have, they are 
beholden for it to the conceptions of the ingenious student, […] and therefore 
speculation must need go before practice […] Reason must direct first how sense 
ought to work; and so much as the rational knowledge is more noble than the 
sensitive, so much is the speculative part of philosophy more noble than the 
mechanical. (Observations 196) 
 
 
Cavendish’s final critique centers on reestablishing the contemplative and speculative 
mind – or reason – as the source of all information, including the sensory data it receives. 
Whether experimental philosophers admit it or not, Cavendish argues that they cannot 
escape from reason; it occupies them and directs their efforts even when they believe they 
are guided by sensory observation and experiment. Speculative philosophy is at the core 
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of experimental philosophy, according to Cavendish, because it is reason that dictates 
how one will observe and what one will notice. When Cavendish remarks that reason and 
speculative philosophy are more “noble” than the sensitive and mechanical, she is 
attempting to assert reason as superior due to its intelligence and knowledge.34 Despite 
what Cavendish thinks, she recognizes that her society does not value what she does. She 
mentions that experimental philosophers do not value rational arguments, seeing them as  
‘tedious babble’ and inferior to sense.35 Many experimental philosophers, she argues  
 
 
Will not admit of rational arguments; but the bare authority of an experimental 
philosopher is sufficient to them to decide all controversies, and to pronounce 
truth without any appeal to reason; as if they only had the infallible truth of 
nature, and engrossed all knowledge to themselves. Thus reason must stoop to 
sense, and the conceptor to the artist, which will be the way to bring in ignorance, 
instead of advancing knowledge; for when the light of reason begins to be 
eclipsed, darkness of understanding must needs follow. (Observations 197) 
 
 
Cavendish’s final words reveal her anxieties about emerging epistemologies. She cannot 
seem to make sense of how experimentation results in knowledge without the use of 
rhetoric or reason. In referring to experimental philosophers as having “bare authority,” 
she insinuates that their power lacks quality and sustenance, yet that authority is enough 
for “them to decide all controversies.” Cavendish also speaks to the experimental 
philosopher as having too much pride in himself and his methods. In assuming that his 
way is the only way to truth, he limits other avenues and methods. It is because of the 
Society that speculation has been lowered in esteem and has had to bow down to 
																																																								
34 “noble, adj. and n.,” OED.  
35 Cavendish is quoting Glanvill here. In his “Address to the Royal Society,” he refers to rhetoric as 
“tedious babble.” 
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experimental philosophy, but in Cavendish’s view that could have negative consequences 
for society. She issues her reader a warning that dismissing reason as inferior and 
invaluable will lead to a “darkness” in understanding. She fears that experimental 
philosophy will puzzle readers with “such a confusion of truth and falsehood,” and will 
“confound both divinity and natural philosophy, sense and reason, nature and art, so 
much as in time we shall have, rather a chaos, than a well-ordered universe, by their 
doctrine” (Cavendish Observations 8).  
If Cavendish had only written Observations and never attached her speculative 
account of the Blazing World to it, I might agree more with the aforementioned scholars 
who say Cavendish has invented her own philosophy, even though she advocates for a 
more blended approach to knowledge in Observations. However, Cavendish did pair this 
critique of the Royal Society and experimental philosophy with her fictional narrative, 
Blazing World. Pairing these two divergent texts not only exemplifies her philosophical 
beliefs, but also show how fancy, or speculation, can be employed as a means through 
which to understand. Blazing World, therefore, not only critiques experimental 
philosophy, but, as a speculative text paired with a philosophical one, it demonstrates to 
readers how the best understanding is derived from both ways of knowing. She offers her  
own approach as a speculative vision of how experimental philosophy might exist in 
more harmony with speculative philosophy. 
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Blazing World 
 In Poems and Fancies (1653), Cavendish attempts to justify her use of verse in 
her poem “To Naturall Philosophers.” She remarks that she writes in verse because “I 
thought errors might better pass there, than in prose; since poets write most fiction, and 
fiction is not given for truth, but pastime” (unpaginated). Although Blazing World is 
prose, the same rationale suffices. While someone could comb through her Observations, 
looking specifically for errors in thought, presenting the same ideas through fictional 
narrative removes the expectation that readers anticipate finding truth there. In her note 
“To the Reader,” Cavendish writes, “fictions are an issue of man’s fancy, framed in his 
own mind, according as he pleases, without regard, whether the thing he fancies, be really 
existent without his mind or not” (123). This is a powerful rhetorical strategy on 
Cavendish’s part because she is able to present her philosophical ideas in a way that 
shows she is cognizant of her reader. She has the potential to double her impact and her 
influence in writing these two different – and yet connected – texts on experimental 
philosophy.37 It seems that Cavendish, like Bacon, understands the power of fiction to 
communicate and popularize her philosophical ideas.38 Although Cavendish classifies 
																																																								
37 Thell notes that Cavendish may have intended the work to appear in three instead of two parts. The 
original goal was to attach a play to Observations and Blazing World. In the end, “she abandoned her play 
after just two acts, although she published the incomplete version, “A Piece of a Play,” in her Plays, Never 
before Printed (1668) (Thell 31). In the play’s “Advertisement to the Reader,” Cavendish sheds light on 
why the play remained unfinished: “the following Fragments are part of a Play which I did intend for my 
Blazing-World, and had been Printed with it, if I had finish’d it; but before I had ended the second Act, 
finding that my Genius did not tend that way, I left that design” (2). Thell argues that Cavendish’s 
comment that her “Genius did not tend that way” “raises the possibility that she may have found drama an 
inappropriate genre for exploring the content of Observations and Blazing World, while it also implicitly 
emphasizes that Blazing World’s genre is suitable for her project (31).  
38 Even though New Atlantis was a source of inspiration for Cavendish, she does not mention Francis 
Bacon. Cottegnies argues that the “conspicuous absence of Bacon, when she does mention him elsewhere, 
is somewhat surprising” (72). 
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Blazing World as a work of fiction and Observations as an inquiry into knowledge, Keller 
notes that the first part of Blazing World has much in common with Observations, in that 
it acknowledges many of the same issues: “the questionable value of the experimental 
method, the untrustworthiness of optical instruments, the contentiousness and 
unproductiveness of scientific societies” (461).39 
Cavendish provides readers with some insight into why she may have paired these 
two texts. In Observations and in Blazing World, Cavendish addresses her readers, 
presenting them with rationales for her choices. In Blazing World Cavendish tells her 
reader, “If you wonder, that I join a work of fancy to my serious philosophical 
contemplations; think not that it is out of a disparagement to philosophy,” but is instead a 
way for her to join philosophy and fiction “as two worlds at the ends of their poles” […] 
“to delight my reader with variety” (Cavendish 124). Tito Chico argues that Cavendish’s 
rationale “explicitly indicates the appropriateness, and even necessity, of a literary 
approach to natural philosophy” (147). Chico’s assessment draws attention to the fact that 
Cavendish sees this approach as necessary; however, when we compare her messages to 
her readers in both Observations and Blazing World, it seems that Cavendish, as a reader 
of philosophy herself, appreciated the need to be understood by one’s reader. In 
Observations, Cavendish mentions the difficulty in understanding writings on 
																																																								
39 See other scholars who have mentioned the pairings between Blazing World and Observations: “The 
duchess's writings are a curious combination of scientific speculation and fantasy, largely uncritical and 
hopelessly repetitive” (Sarasohn 290); “Her texts were consciously self-contradictory, paradoxical, and 
admittedly fanciful. Her natural-philosophical conceptions were intentionally detached from any trace of 
empirical foundation” (Mascetti 15); “Appending a work of fiction to Observations was also part of a 
larger strategy aimed at highlighting the inner life of the mind and its vagaries, which the experimentalists 
seemed to overlook” (Battigelli 102). 	
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experimental philosophy: “Their hard words did more obstruct, than instruct” […] instead 
of making hard things easy, make easy things hard” (12). Cavendish poses the following 
question to her readers, “what benefit would it be to me, if I should put forth a work, 
which by reason of its obscure and hard notions, could not be understood? especially it 
being well known, that natural philosophy is the hardest of all human learning” 
(Cavendish Observations 11). In admitting how difficult it is to understand experimental 
philosophy, Cavendish demonstrates an understanding of her audience’s need, something  
she also mentions to them in her address in Blazing World:  
 
 
Fancy creates of its own accord whatsoever it pleases, and delights in its own 
work. The end of reason, is truth; the end of fancy, is fiction: but mistake me not, 
when I distinguish fancy from reason; I mean not as if fancy were not made by 
the rational parts of matter; but by reason I understand a rational search and 
enquiry into the causes of natural effects; and by fancy a voluntary creation or 
production of the mind, both being effects, or rather actions of the rational parts of 
matter; of which, as that is a more profitable and useful study than this, so it is 
also more laborious and difficult, and requires sometimes the help of fancy, to 
recreate the mind, and withdraw it from its more serious contemplations. (124-25) 
 
 
Although Cavendish distinguishes fancy from reason based on their end goals – fiction 
versus truth – she acknowledges that both truth and fiction originate within the rational 
part of the brain. Rationality, therefore, is composed of both fancy and reason. Because 
experimental philosophy is difficult to understand, it requires this diverse approach. 
Fancy is able to assist reason in contemplation, leading readers to a “more profitable and 
useful study.” In other words, the speculative actually helps to create truth because in 
conjecturing, the mind is able to reason its way through abstruse ideas. It seems, then,  
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that Cavendish and Bacon both realized the powerful tool that fiction can be in teaching 
and communicating with the public about concepts that are difficult to grasp. 
 In Blazing World, Cavendish tackles similar topics and makes analogous 
criticisms of experimental philosophy, but in a way that is much more accessible in its 
use of the familiar elements of utopia, travel narrative, and romance. Cavendish, the 
narrator of the fictional narrative opens the story with a storm and kidnapping at sea, in 
which the kidnapped Lady survives by passing into a portal in the North Pole. This portal 
brings her into another realm called Blazing World, of which the Emperor of said world 
appoints her the Empress. In her newfound authority, she establishes governing 
structures, one of which is a society or school devoted to experimental philosophy, a 
direct satire of the Royal Society. On the surface, Cavendish’s representation of the 
Society may seem like flattering emulation, but the chaos and uncertainty that result from 
the pursuit of experimental philosophy is anything but complimentary. Over the course of 
the narrative, the Empress discourses with experimental philosophers who are half beast, 
half man, as well as discoursing with the spirit world and the soul of the Duchess of 
Newcastle. Conflict breaks out, both within the Blazing World and in the Duchess’s 
native world, and each of them assist the other – the Duchess assists the Empress in 
restoring the Blazing World back to its original condition and the Empress, through soul-
travel, helps bring a revolution to a close. For the purposes of my argument, I will focus 
mainly on the aspects within the narrative that critique experimental philosophy. Many of 
Cavendish’s critiques in Blazing World sound quite similar to the critiques in  
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Observations, which should be expected; however, the examples found in Blazing World 
strengthen and deepen her critiques by envisioning the theories in hypothetical practice.  
 One such complaint or anxiety regarding the Royal Society’s methods – one 
commonly critiqued – was the fear that experimental philosophy lacked practicality. A 
strong example of this lack can be found when the Empress asks the experimental 
philosophers to show her a vegetable under a microscope. They show her a nettle, and the 
microscope assists them in seeing that there are little “bladders containing a poisonous 
liquor” under the nettle’s points (Cavendish 143). The Empress wonders if ingesting the 
nettle’s poison might be as harmful inwardly as it is to the exterior body, but “they 
answered, that it belonged to physicians more than to experimental philosophers, to give 
reasons hereof; for they only made microscopial inspections and related the figures of the 
natural parts of creatures according to the presentation of their glasses” (Cavendish 143-
44). In this example, the experimental philosopher’s response exemplifies that just being 
able to identify what he discovers through the assistance of a microscope has no use 
value. Not only does it have no use, but it also shows how the experimental philosophers 
do not even consider such a question to be within their purview, as the experimental 
philosophers direct the Empress to question physicians on the topic. Shortly after this 
admission, the Empress is shown lice and fleas under the microscope, and “she desired to 
know whether their microscopes could hinder their biting, or at least show some means 
how to avoid them? To which they answered, that such arts were mechanical and below 
that noble study of microscopial observations” (Cavendish 144). Such examples might 
seem comical, but through satire, Cavendish is able to instruct her readers about the 
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impracticality of experimental philosophy’s focus. Both of these examples force the 
reader to question whether experimental philosophers do any good for society. They are 
not really doing anything other than just observing everything. If all they actually do is 
observe, she implies that there is no use in seeing what lice look like without speculating 
how the microscope might assist the viewer in understanding the creature more. The 
experimental philosophers, as presented in Cavendish’s speculative world, are so 
specialized that they “slavishly uphold” differences between theory and practice, while 
elevating practice to the point that they end up promoting uselessness instead of 
usefulness (Chico 149). The results of their methods are “self-perpetuating delusion,” 
according to Chico, because they have devoted themselves to methods they cannot 
master. In so doing, they fall short due to their inability to serve society in any 
advantageous way (149).  
 Although it may not improve society, this impracticality may not itself harm 
society. But Cavendish makes clear that experimental philosophers do present a danger to 
society when their methods lead to conflict and divisiveness. In a lengthy section in 
which the Empress interviews the various practitioners – those who are astronomers, 
chemists, and experimental philosophers, for instance – their answers repeatedly expose 
the philosophers’ inability to agree on any truth. The Empress asks the bird-men to give 
her a “true relation” of the sun and the moon, but concerning the sun’s health, “they were 
not of one opinion.” Some opinions were “laughed at by others, and rejected as 
ridiculous, other opinions would not hold,” and “thus, they argued” (Cavendish 136-37). 
Then, the Empress inquiries into what the air is made of, but they prove, once again 
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unable to answer, admitting “nature is so full of variety, that our weak senses cannot 
perceive all the various sorts of her [the air’s] creatures; neither is there any one object 
perceptible by all our senses” (Cavendish 138). Next, the reader gets another list, 
recounting what “some said,” and what “others” said, ending with the Empress once 
again observing that “they could not agree” (Cavendish 139). Her final round of 
questions for the bird-men concerns the nature of thunder and lightning, and the reader is 
faced, once again, with the bird-men spouting off reasons that contradict one another. So 
as “to avoid hereafter tedious disputes, and have the truth of the phaenomenas of celestial 
bodies more exactly known, [the Empress] commanded the bear-men, which were her 
experimental philosophers” to observe through their telescopes. However, “these 
telescopes caused more differences and divisions amongst them, than ever before” 
(Cavendish 140). In each of these examples, Cavendish demonstrates how subjective 
truth is, but also how speculative it is. In claiming as certain what is merely conjecture, 
and without acknowledging that uncertainty, the philosophers blindly profess their own 
truth as more valid and remain unwilling to allow for multiplicities of truth. Without the 
assistance of telescopes, the experimental philosophers only can guess at possible 
explanations, but their differing opinions create discord because they do not know how to 
account for inconsistent and divergent sensory observations.  
 The bear-men, who are the experimental philosophers, argue just as much as the 
astronomers, despite their reliance on technology. After looking through their telescopes 
at the sun, the bear-men continue to argue with each other and come to no sound 
conclusions at all. As was discussed in Observations, Cavendish disapproves of 
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experimental tools used as a means to ascertain truth, and in Blazing World, the Empress 
becomes increasingly angry the longer she is presented with proof that the telescope has 
not provided the bear-men with any better abilities to discover truth. The telescopes, she 
says “are false informers, and instead of discovering the truth, [they] delude your senses; 
wherefore I command you to break them, and let the bird-men trust only to their natural 
eyes, and examine celestial objects by the motions of their own sense and reason” 
(Cavendish 141). This well-known moment in the narrative reinforces Cavendish’s 
philosophy in Observations, but the bear-men’s reactions to this command reveals more  
than Cavendish’s critique does: 
 
 
The bear-men being exceedingly troubled by her Majesty’s displeasure 
concerning their telescopes, kneeled down, and in the humblest manner petitioned 
that they might not be broken; for, said they, we take more delight in artificial 
delusions, than in natural truths. Besides, we shall want employments for our 
senses, and subjects for arguments; for were there nothing but truth, and no 
falsehood, there would be no occasion for to dispute, and by this means we should 
want the aim and pleasure of our endeavours in confuting and contradicting each 
other; neither would one man be thought wiser than another, but all would either 
be alike knowing and wise, or all would be fools; wherefore we most humbly 
beseech your Imperial Majesty to spare our glasses, which are our only delight, 
and as dear to us as our lives. The Empress at last consented to their request, but  
upon condition, that their disputes and quarrels should remain within their 
schools, and cause no factions or disturbances in state, or government. (Cavendish 
142) 
 
 
In Observations Cavendish describes experimental philosophers as addicts, and in this 
scene, their obsession with and reliance on the telescope breaks any and all claims to 
balance and moderation. The reasons they want to keep the telescopes prove even more 
how flawed these practitioners are. Unlike the claims Sprat will make for experimental 
philosopher’s ability to quiet conflict and disagreement, these experimental philosophers 
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actually desire conflict. They find “pleasure in confuting and contradicting” one another. 
Their rationale also hints at their own issues with pride and ego, for they want to fight 
over which philosopher is wisest. Although the Empress concedes and allows the 
experimental philosophers to keep their telescopes, her requirement that the 
disagreements be kept contained highlights the dangers these kinds of disputes can have 
for society at large. It does not seem realistic to keep conflict contained, and it seems that 
her request is one that cannot be met.  
 Cavendish is able to showcase the detrimental effects experimental philosophy 
can have on the nation by presenting her reader with a view of Blazing World before and 
after the institutionalization of experimental philosophy. Before the Duchess creates the 
institutions devoted to experimental philosophy, she describes the Blazing World as 
“Paradise” and says the inhabitants “live in a continued peace and happiness, not 
acquainted with foreign wars, or home-bred insurrections” (Cavendish 130). But after she 
erected these schools and societies, the Empress complains to the Duchess of the changes 
that have taken place in the Blazing World. A focus on experimental philosophy has 
caused her world to no longer be “as quiet as it was at first,” and this troubles her. She 
identifies the source of these troubles with the “contentions and division between the 
worm-, bear- and fly-men,” and she fears “they’ll break out into an open rebellion, and 
cause a great disorder and the ruin of the government.” She turns to the Duchess for 
advice on “how I may order it to the best advantage, that this world may be rendered 
peaceable, quiet and happy, as it was before” (Cavendish 201). The Empress’s world has 
literally changed from a place of harmony and contentment to a place of disorder and ruin 
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because of the impact the establishment of experimental philosophy has had. The 
Duchess’s solution and warning to the Empress serves also as a solution and warning to 
England, as she insinuates that the Royal Society itself is a king-sanctioned disordered  
society with disordered individuals. The Duchess suggests:  
 
 
Since your Majesty complains much of the factions of the bear-, fish-, fly-, ape- 
and worm-men […] I would advise your Majesty to dissolve all their societies; for 
’tis better to be without their intelligences, than to have an unquiet and disorderly 
government. The truth is, said she, wheresoever is learning, there is most 
commonly also controversy and quarrelling; for there be always some that will 
know more, and be wiser than others; some think their arguments come nearer to 
truth, and are more rational than others; some are so wedded to their own 
opinions, that they never yield to reason; and others, though they find their 
opinions not firmly grounded upon reason, yet for fear of receiving some disgrace 
by altering them, will nevertheless maintain them against all sense and reason,  
which must needs breed factions in their schools, which at last break out into open  
wars, and draw sometimes an utter ruin upon a state or government (Cavendish 
202). 
 
 
The Duchess’s speculative warning and prediction is based on the idea that flawed 
individuals lead to flawed philosophy, which leads to flawed conclusions, which leads to 
a flawed society. Not only do their discoveries lack in practicality, but their knowledge 
also loses all use if it creates a chaotic society. The Duchess’s solution focuses on the 
fallibility of humans and their desire for more – more discoveries, more wisdom, and 
more esteem than their counterparts. These kinds of practitioners, who cannot even admit 
fault because they are so attached to their “own opinion[s],” will eventually lead society 
astray. Whatever gains in knowledge experimental philosophy is able to make, in 
Cavendish’s view those gains are not worth the losses to the state.   
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Conclusion 
 In creating fictitious worlds and societies, in which experimental philosophy 
holds positions of prominence, both Bacon and Cavendish are important and early 
contributors to the speculative mode. Many scholars have designated these works as 
science fiction, but doing so detracts from the intellectual work both Cavendish and 
Bacon were actually performing.40 Notwithstanding that there was no such thing as 
science in the seventeenth century, these texts are each attempting to speculate about 
experimental philosophy. Speculation, therefore, becomes an important tool through 
which non-practitioners such as Cavendish could contemplate and, in some ways, 
participate in experimental philosophy and the discoveries and changes that it brought, 
while Bacon could attempt to reach into the future and imagine a world in which his ideas 
could come to fruition. Writers of the day who conjectured about experimental 
philosophy’s usefulness and consequences penned a type of discourse that was both 
speculative and experimental because observation is at the root of both methods and 
because they combine conjecture with concepts of experimental philosophy. 
Furthermore, because they are both works of fiction, each story helps us to better 
understand the role of speculation in the discourse surrounding new epistemologies. The 
																																																								
40 Serjeanston says of New Atlantis, “if any early-modern work can legitimately be called science fiction, 
then perhaps Bacon’s New Atlantis can” (99), and Sessions declares that Bacon’s narrative is “one more 
fiction in the series of science fictions the Renaissance spawned” (150). Scholars who refer to Blazing 
World as “science fiction” include: Amy Boesky who argues that it is science fiction because of its 
“speculations on space travel and worlds elsewhere” (132); Laura Dodds who claims Cavendish has created 
a narrative with links to utopia, travel, allegory, and science fiction (123); Nicole Pohl contends that 
“Margaret Cavendish not only creates the first science fiction text, but science fiction in its truest sense” 
(58). Lisa Sarasohn also classifies Blazing World as a work of “science fiction” (13), while Eve Keller 
designates it as a “utopian science fiction fantasy” (448), and Tito Chico refers to it as a “science fiction 
romance” (147). 
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imaginative aspects of fiction are explicit, and yet, it is these imaginative works that are 
able to create worlds and societies in which experimental methods can be hypothetically 
tested. It is in these imagined worlds that one can forecast consequences, a practice that 
experimental philosophy does not embrace since conjecture exists outside of its methods. 
Cavendish’s text, therefore, is more speculative than Bacon’s because of the way she 
intentionally creates her own world through the mixing of genres. In combining genres 
such as romance and fantasy with philosophy, Cavendish writes that she has made “a 
World of my own Creating, which I call the Blazing-World: The first part whereof is 
Romancical, the second Philosophical, and the third is merely Fancy, or (as I may call it) 
Fantastical (153). This imagined world has multiple suns and does not follow the laws of 
nature. It is a place inhabited by animal/human hybrids and alien gemstones. Combining 
genres, therefore, allows her to speculate, while at the same time assists her in 
undermining the methods of the Royal Society.  
 Considered together, speculative writings by Bacon and Cavendish showcase the 
deep connection between the speculative and the experimental, a connection that can 
easily be forgotten, especially in light of the Royal Society’s rhetoric and even Bacon’s 
own views. Bacon’s thoughts on fancy in the New Organon (1620), for example, seem 
much more in line with how the Royal Society represented his views of the speculative.  
He writes: 
 
 
I am building in the human understanding a true model of the world, such as it is 
in fact, not such as a man’s own reason would have it be; a thing which cannot be 
done without a very diligent dissection and anatomy of the world. But I say that 
those foolish and apish images of the worlds which the fancies of men have 
created in philosophical systems, must be utterly scattered to the winds. (110).  
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In just a few years, Bacon acknowledges the need for the “fancies of men.”41 In the above 
sentiments, Bacon denigrates the speculative in order to forward a method based on 
observation. In order to really arrive at truth, he says, we must scatter foolish fancies 
created by philosophical systems “to the winds.” In New Atlantis, however, Bacon 
embraces the power of fancy and sees it as a necessary step in popularizing his methods. 
Similar sentiments can be found in Blazing World when the Empress asks the Duchess to 
write down the Jews’ Cabbala. The Duchess advises her to forget such a plan because it 
would not benefit her people (182). The Empress then decides that she wants the Duchess 
to write something philosophical, but the Duchess once again objects to philosophical 
writing because doing so would “breed confusion, especially in human understanding” 
(183). The Duchess turns down the proposal to compose a moral tract since moral rules 
are too simple to require a written document,42 and she also remarks that there is no need 
for a political tract. Instead of these options, she advises her “rather to make a poetical or 
romancical Caballa, wherein you can use metaphors, allegories, similitudes, etc. and 
interpret them as you please” (Cavendish 183). According to the Duchess, the people do 
not need religious, philosophical, moral, or political writings. What they really need are 
writings that are imaginative and that allow them to consider truth through their own 
reason and speculation.  
 Both Bacon and Cavendish present readers with an interesting alternative for 
understanding experimental philosophy. Their speculative texts remind us that we can 
																																																								
41 New Atlantis was written during the five years prior to Bacon’s death, probably around 1624 (Spedding, 
Ellis, and Heath 121). 
42 The “simple” moral rules the Duchess refers to are the fear of God and love of one’s neighbor. 
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incorporate the old with the new, without having to favor or cast aside either. When the 
Duchess is trying to determine the kind of world to make for herself, she decides to leave 
behind ancient philosophy and turn to the moderns. She then considers Descartes’s and 
Hobbes’s opinions, only to leave them both behind, as well (Cavendish 188). Her 
dismissals imply that the ancient and modern philosophers represent worldviews that she 
can accept or reject because truth is subjective and infinite. Both Bacon’s and 
Cavendish’s visions, therefore, offer Restoration readers a substitute to emerging 
epistemologies that tended to place speculation and observation on opposite ends of the 
spectrum, allowing people to envision a type of knowledge about the natural world that 
allows for truth derived from senses and speculation.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISORDERED INDIVIDUALS AND DISORDERED HOUSEHOLDS:  
SPECULATIONS ON THE EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHER CHARACTER-TYPE 
 
 
If I could fetch my materials whence I pleas’d, to fashion the Idea of a perfect 
Philosopher: he should not be all of one clime, but have the different excellencies 
of several Countries. First, he should have the Industry, Activity, and Inquisitive 
humor of the Dutch, French, Scotch, and English, in laying the ground Work, the 
heap of Experiments: And then, he should have added the cold, and circumspect, 
and wary disposition of the Italians, and Spaniards, in meditating upon them, 
before he fully brings them into speculation. All this is scarce ever to be found in 
one single Man: seldom in the same Countrymen: It must then be supply’d as well 
as it may, by a Publick Council; wherein the various dispositions of all these 
Nations, may be blended together.  
      Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal Society1 
 
 
 Thomas Sprat’s The History of the Royal Society does more than detail the origins 
of the Society and its experimental aims. It also establishes the ideal qualities of the 
individual practitioner. In the passage quoted above Sprat imagines creating the perfect  
experimental philosopher and lists what his attributes would be.2 Sprat acknowledges that 
this flawless experimental philosopher could not be an Englishman, for he would require   
																																																								
1 pg. 64. 
2 In order to avoid confusion and for the sake of consistency, when I refer to the practitioner of 
experimental philosophy in this chapter, I use the term “experimental philosopher,” even though the writers 
I reference in this chapter also use the terms “natural philosopher” or “virtuoso.” The speculative writing I 
explore very rarely refers to natural philosophy as experimental philosophy or to the natural philosopher as 
an experimental philosopher. For example, Thomas Shadwell’s play is entitled The Virtuoso, and the main 
character in Aphra Behn’s play is described as participating in natural philosophy. These satires, however, 
are aimed at the Royal Society, so when the writers refer to a virtuoso or natural philosopher, they are 
referring to the methods of the Royal Society, also known as experimental philosophy, which I defined in 
the second chapter. I use the term “experimental philosopher” to distinguish them consistently throughout 
from natural philosophers, whose views encompassed more than experimental methods and those who only 
dabbled in natural philosophy outside the Royal Society. 
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“different excellencies” that could only be found by melding together the Dutch, French, 
Scotch, English, Italian, and Spanish man. This Frankenstein-esque creation – composed 
of internal “excellencies” instead of dead body parts – would be clever and intelligent and 
would bring his diligence and curiosity to the beginning stages of experimentation. 
However, being inquisitive and hardworking are not enough to round out the flawless 
Fellow. He must also exhibit a disposition that is opposed to passion and hastiness; 
instead, he will be cautious and careful when considering any performed experiments and 
before developing any theories or hypotheses. As established in chapter three, the Royal 
Society rhetorically positioned itself as moderate and balanced after the excesses 
associated with the civil wars and Interregnum, so it makes sense that the ideal 
experimental philosopher would exhibit moderation. Sprat realizes that his “build-a-
scientist” is not possible, and he uses that impossibility to advocate for a public 
assemblage of experimental philosophy. This “council” would meet together to deliberate 
and advise one another on matters related to experimental philosophy.3 Sprat’s apology, 
as discussed in chapter three, often centers on the collective effort of experimental 
philosophers coming together, for in the many, there is less room for inaccuracy and ego.  
 There are many benefits, according to Sprat, in sharing experimental philosophy 
“amongst so great a number” (97). One of those benefits is the ability to compare one’s 
own conceptions with those of others through shared discourse and the repeatability of 
experimentation. Through collective efforts, the experimental philosopher’s thoughts will 
																																																								
3 “Council, noun.” OED. Interestingly, in addition to general meetings, the word “council” refers to either 
an assembly that convenes for deciding church doctrine or one that advises the king on matters of 
government. In using a word that designates groups of people who decide on such important matters, Sprat 
emphasizes the vital role he sees the Royal Society having.   
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be “more enlarg’d, his judgment confirm’d, his eyes open’d to discern,” and he will 
better be able to decide how best to attempt experimentation (98). He will learn patterns 
of truth and understand how to avoid the dangers of error and falsehood. These 
characteristics, nevertheless, are only a few benefits. Sprat supposes there are “a thousand 
more advantages [that] will hereby come into the minds of the most Sagacious, and acute 
Inquirers, which they would never have compass’d, if they had been onely [sic] left to 
themselves” (98). When the individual practitioner performs experimental philosophy in 
isolation, he is not practicing in a way that aligns with Sprat’s ideal philosopher. On his 
own, the practitioner is more likely to misjudge and misunderstand his own observations, 
perhaps leading him to arrive at false conclusions. Sprat implies that even if the 
individual Fellow were unable to practice moderation on his own, his colleagues would 
keep him objective and balanced.   
Despite Sprat’s insistence on a fair and objective approach, based only on 
observation and experimentation, experimental philosophers and virtuosos often became 
objects of ridicule and their antics became cautionary tales in speculative writing about 
the early Royal Society and its initial practitioners.4 In the previous chapter, for example, 
																																																								
4 Although the term “virtuoso” can have a variety of meanings, such as a person who dabbles in something 
or someone who has a special skill, I rely on the OED’s first entry for “virtuoso”: “A learned person; a 
scholar; esp. a scientist, a natural philosopher. Also, spec. a member of the Royal Society (emphasis 
added). The OED also notes in this definition that a virtuoso could be a natural philosopher who had only a 
superficial knowledge. At the time, the term “virtuoso” could refer to a member of the Royal Society who 
had specialized or superficial knowledge, meaning that the Royal Society had members who were more 
akin to what we might classify as an amateur today. We should not, however, think of virtuosos as being 
unworthy of study because they had an important role within the Society. According to Walter E. 
Houghton, Jr., the virtuoso contributed to the spread of experimental philosophy and that is “sufficient in 
itself to rescue them from the neglect accorded the amateur by our age of specialists” (51). Furthermore, the 
virtuoso was often a gentleman and his wealth benefitted the Royal Society, but he served larger functions, 
as well, assisting in experiments and recording results. Houghton tracks the term “virtuoso” from 1598 to 
the 1660s. At first, the term “virtuoso” was not strongly associated with natural philosophy, but by the 
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I explored how Margaret Cavendish’s speculations about the society run by experimental 
philosophers revealed the dangers of disorder to society at large. Part of that disorder 
comes from an approach to truth that focuses solely on experimentation, and therefore, 
disregards the importance of speculation to truth making. Even though Cavendish 
presents the experimental philosopher working as part of a collective, his approach, as 
seen in Blazing World, still leads to societal imbalance. A more inclusive approach, as 
seen in Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis and Cavendish’s speculative writing, would allow 
for an understanding of the world that is rooted in both speculation and observation. In 
this chapter, I shift the focus from the general Society to its specific members, by 
examining speculative writing that investigates the fictional individuals who may have 
composed the collective Society. I do not mean that these characters were necessarily 
members of the Royal Society but more so that they are representative of the imagined 
experimental philosopher and symbolic of the types of individuals that might have been 
members of the Society. Even within the collective Society, as evidenced in Samuel 
Butler’s poem “The Elephant in the Moon,” experimental philosophers cannot cast off 
their individual positions, and their own egos make it impossible for them to reach a 
consensus that represents reality. When we move outside the laboratory and into the 
individual practitioner’s home, writers such as Thomas Shadwell and Aphra Behn remind 
us of how easy it is to disregard the collective approach for which Sprat advocates. Each 
of the plays I investigate in this chapter warns the spectator of the isolated experimental 
philosopher who creates havoc within the home and for the nation. In this chapter, I focus 
																																																																																																																																																																					
1660s if one was said to be a virtuoso that almost exclusively referred to interests in natural philosophy (66, 
71-72). 
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on the experimental philosopher as an individual, in both poetry and prose, but my main 
focus is on speculative theatre of the Restoration because of its ability to highlight the 
individual as a character to be viewed and judged in a public forum, which I detail later in 
this chapter.  
No matter how many checks and balances the Royal Society purportedly took to 
avoid error, the practitioner always brings with him his own humanness and 
imperfections; these inherent flaws come into focus in the speculative works discussed in 
this chapter. Although Sprat insisted on the opposite, the Royal Society was composed of 
fallible men, and no matter how many of them came together in supposed unison, their 
inherent bias or individual viewpoints remain part of their approach. Speculative writers 
remind us that the collective cannot happen without the individual, but this reminder also 
serves as a source of anxiety. If the collective is composed of disordered individuals, 
what does that mean for the Society as a whole?5 Even though experiments were 
performed within the Royal Society at weekly meetings, Fellows were practicing 
individually in their own homes, as well. John Shanahan argues that in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries the “home was the primary setting for experimental philosophy” 
(226). When exploring speculative writing that focuses on the individual philosopher, 
experimental philosophy becomes more localized within the domestic space. Thus, when 
readers and spectators are also reminded that these disordered individuals are husbands 
and fathers who are in charge of households and families, the speculative anxieties over 
																																																								
5 I use the term “disorder” to speak to a lack of moderation within the individual practitioner. As was 
discussed in chapter three, Sprat’s rhetoric and Cowley’s poem both speak to and promote experimental 
philosophy’s ability to create balance.  
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experimental philosophy become more personal. Speculating about the individual 
practitioner allows writers to predict possible consequences on the microcosmic and 
macrocosmic levels. What happens in the home can happen to the nation, as disorder in 
the private realm can affect order in the public realm. Ultimately, I argue that speculative 
questions about and apprehensions of the experimental philosopher respond to larger 
concerns about national identity. The speculative writing in this chapter directly 
correlates this critique with the dangers associated with the immoderate experimental 
philosopher’s undermined masculinity and his disordered household, which underscores 
lingering anxiety about the stability of the nation due to political unrest.   
 
The Experimental Philosopher: Man versus Speculations 
 Sprat’s History provides us with insight as to what attributes the ideal 
experimental philosopher would have, but it is important to investigate just how the 
figure of the experimental philosopher was viewed outside of his portrayals in speculative 
writing. Bacon’s New Atlantis, a work that I identify in the previous chapter as operating 
in the speculative mode, outlines a society based on a new form of study and new 
methodology on observation and experiment. At the same time, it provides readers with 
the speculative vision of what kind of men “could be entrusted to carry out the great 
plan” (Haynes 24). In New Atlantis, the men in Bensalem are esteemed and valued in the 
utopian community because they practice research for the betterment of society rather 
than for their own personal interests. Of course, since Bacon’s ideas on the model 
experimental philosopher are theoretical and speculative in nature (as are Sprat’s), they 
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do not necessarily align with reality. According to Steven Shapin, at the end of the 
seventeenth century there was no consistent role or kind for the “man of science” (160).6 
The establishment of the identity of an experimental philosopher was in flux because the 
“science” of the Restoration was not “science” as we know it today. In other words, one 
could do experimental philosophy without necessarily being considered an experimental 
philosopher. One could also be an experimental philosopher while taking on other 
identities and having other concerns (Shapin 161). In reality, therefore, what defined 
someone as an experimental philosopher was not yet completely established. As my 
analysis of dictionary definitions demonstrated, one was marked as a naturalist because 
one practiced natural philosophy, but that practice might range at the time from dabbling 
in the activity to more sustained study.  
Despite having a role that was still being defined, experimental philosophers were 
often rhetorically positioned as an ideal, similar to many of Plutarch’s Greek and Roman 
heroes, in that both portray “stoic fortitude and self-denial” (Shapin 165). Comparable to 
Sprat’s model philosopher, the experimental philosopher Shapin describes focuses on the 
supposed benefits associated with practicing experimental philosophy: it made men 
“humble, serious, simple, and sincere,” and studying the vastness and magnificence of 
																																																								
6 Shapin details how many kinds of people pursued experimental philosophy at this time and that there was 
no such job yet of a “professional scientist.” Instead, men were professors, doctors, courtiers, gentlemen, 
and civil servants, so Shapin argues that the identity of an experimental philosopher was colored by the 
characteristics people associated with his main role (from the aforementioned list). Shapin uses Benjamin 
Franklin as an example to illustrate this view. While Franklin may have been known for inventing the 
lightening rod, he was identified primarily as a “printer, a businessman, a diplomat, and a statesman” 
within his culture (160-161). For more on the professionalization of science see Roy Porter, “Gentleman 
and Geology: The Emergence of a Scientific Career,” in The Historical Journal (1978). The term “science” 
is often used anachronistically to refer to the methods in the Royal Society. Although I would prefer to 
avoid the term altogether, I use it mostly in conjunction with another scholar’s usage. Anytime I use the 
word science for my own argument, I put the term in quotation marks to indicate the difference between 
our understanding of science now and in the Restoration.  
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nature made men “modest.” The pursuit of experimental philosophy resulted in a man 
who was more genuine and candid, and he was instilled with “tranquility” and 
“contentment” as a reward (165). Despite these benefits to his character, a life lived 
devoted to experimental philosophy did not usually result in material gain, fame, or 
political esteem, but an absence of such successes only furthers the experimental 
philosopher’s good character because his pursuits exemplify self-sacrifice (165).  
Shapin’s characterization of the ideal experimental philosopher aligns well with 
Sprat’s idealized philosopher; however, the experimental philosopher, as presented by 
speculative writers who often critique the practitioner, seems completely foreign to the 
morals and ethics outlined by Bacon, Sprat, and Shapin. For example, Bacon’s concept of 
experimental philosophers working together in cooperative teams supposes “that the 
scientists concerned have no need to become involved in the competitive scramble for 
individual success and honors” (Haynes 27). Mary Astell’s “Character of a Virtuoso” 
(1696) accounts for some of what Bacon may have failed to consider about the fact that 
experimental philosophers are merely human.7 She issues some scathing critiques of the 
practitioner:  He “abandon’d the Acquaintance and Society of Men for that of Insects, 
Worms, Grubbs, Maggots, Flies, Moths, Locusts, Beetles, Spiders, Grasshoppers, Snails, 
Lizards, and Tortoises” (96-97). Astell focuses on a common trope of the experimental 
philosopher as someone who shuns the knowledge of men in favor of the knowledge of 
																																																								
7 In “An essay in defence of the female sex in which are inserted the characters of a pedant, a squire, a 
beau, vertuoso, a poetaster, a city-critick, &c. in a letter to a lady.” Astell is known for A Serious Proposal 
to the Ladies (1694), in which she advocated for women’s intellectual equality and right to an education. 
Her proposed solution was to form communities where women could gather to study, read, and enjoy one 
another’s fellowship. Astell was interested in science, and she studied astronomy at the Royal Observatory 
at Greenwich from September 1697 through February 1698 (Perry). 
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the trivial. Writers in the speculative mode often ridicule experimental philosophers for 
their devotion to what many saw as inconsequential, which is similar to Cavendish’s 
critiques. In making “too much of too little,” according to Shapin, society was concerned 
that the practitioner would become corrupt and coarse because of his misplaced focus 
(172-73). Astell also brings up the uselessness of his research and the fact that none of his 
work helps to “promote our Luxury, nor encrease our Trade, and neither enrich the 
Nation, nor himself” (97). Although Sprat attempted to promote the utilitarian benefits of 
experimental philosophy, Cavendish also critiques the Society for its lack of utility, as 
established in the last chapter. Astell continues her attack on the experimental 
philosopher by drawing attention to his excessive pride. According to Astell, “he is a 
Passionate Admirer of his own Words” and he believes himself to be infallible (100-101). 
A practice rooted in impracticality and immodesty calls into question the soundness of 
the experimental philosopher’s mental faculties. Astell addresses the quality of the 
experimental philosopher’s mind, claiming that only “Mad Men” would chose to employ 
themselves in such matters (102). Speculative writing during the Restoration is quick to 
investigate these flaws in experimental philosophy and its practitioners, as we will see in 
the speculative writing examined in the rest of this chapter.  
Many stereotypes associated with the character of the experimental philosopher in 
the speculative mode, as showcased in Astell’s portrayal, paint the practitioner in a 
negative light. C.S. Duncan traces the progression of the experimental philosopher 
character-type in his essay “The Scientist as Comic Type,” in which he argues that the 
character of the experimental philosopher replaced the pseudo-scientists who had 
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formerly been associated with alchemy, astrology, and witchcraft. Before the formation 
of the Royal Society, these pseudo-scientists were comic figures on the stage. In 
Duncan’s view, the new kind of scientist, represented by the Society’s experimental 
philosophers, fills this void.8 “The man of the new science,” according to Duncan, was a 
“fool, because he was engaged in the vain pursuit of knowledge, a pedant because he was 
a mere pretender to learning,” and he was seen as a contemptible character because his 
interests were centered on what was considered “low” and “vulgar” (287-8). Roslynn 
Haynes also contends that satiric representations of experimental philosophers in the 
Restoration are mostly comic because the experimental philosopher is almost always 
presented as an idiot, who is out of touch with reality. In her view, these comic figures 
“pose no threat to society because, not having the sense to realize their own stupidity, 
they are easily outwitted or manipulated” (Haynes 40-41). While I understand the point 
that Haynes is making regarding the portrayal of experimental philosophers as imbeciles, 
she fails to consider the serious subject matters and themes these satiric attacks address 
while keeping us laughing.  
The experimental philosopher is often outwitted, usually in quite humorous ways, 
but that does not assume a character we are meant to only ridicule. The practitioners 
found in the speculative writings I examine represent larger concerns than Haynes would 
have us believe – concerns over family, the economy, society, and anxieties related to 
emerging knowledge production. Al Coppola contends that the experimental philosopher 
																																																								
8 For other Restoration plays that feature the natural philosopher as a comic character see: John Wilson, 
The Cheats (1662); John Dryden, The Wild Gallant (1663) and An Evening’s Love (1665); John Lacy, The 
Dumb Lady (1672); Thomas D’Urfey, Madame Fickle (1677); Thomas Shadwell, Sullen Lovers (1688); 
and Thomas Wright, The Female Virtuosoes (1693). 
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ends up becoming a “stereotypical learned fool” by the end of the eighteenth century; 
however, in the Restoration, this character type “serves as a lightning rod for a host of 
cultural anxieties” (Coppola 13). It is not just experimental philosophy and its methods 
that audiences should feel apprehensive about, and experimental philosophy may not 
even be the main concern. Instead, it is the actions behind the methods that pose a danger 
to society. In fact, the practitioner’s methods were represented as threats to the social 
order because of the impact the experimental philosopher’s individualistic study could 
have on the family and, therefore, the nation (Coppola 43). Coppola’s investigation into 
Restoration drama about experimental philosophy focuses on the stage and the laboratory 
as a similar type of spectacle, each informing the other and each contributing to the 
establishment of modern science. Conversely, my focus is on the speculative modes of 
thought that occur when writers suppose that certain behaviors could lead down 
dangerous paths.  
I argue that writers who critique the experimental philosopher do more than make 
a spectacle of science. Instead, these writers participate in a type of hypothesizing about 
experimental philosophy that was based on observing behaviors of practitioners but was 
not based on observation alone. Instead, beginning with such observations, these writers 
turn to theoretical and fanciful conjectures about the future of society, thereby attempting 
to forecast the future. These speculative works, which focus on the practitioner of 
experimental philosophy, also showcase the vital work done within the speculative mode 
within culture. Although Herbert Silvette focuses on the presence of doctors on the stage 
in the seventeenth century, his argument that we can find “the synthesis of scientific truth 
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and popular belief” in these types of staged characters is particularly applicable when 
considering the experimental philosopher in Restoration drama (1). Fictional characters 
as practitioners, therefore, are worthy of serious study because they represent a response 
to the role of experimental philosophy in society. As we turn our attention to satirical 
representations of the practitioner – particularly in Samuel Butler’s poem “An Elephant 
in the Moon,” Thomas Shadwell’s The Virtuoso, and Aphra Behn’s The Emperor of the 
Moon – we will see that these characters are examined against the morals and social 
norms of the day. The speculative writing I explore in this chapter critiques the Royal 
Society, some more explicitly than others. In regard to the plays in this chapter, each has 
been selected for their focus on experimental philosophy within the domestic space. 
Because I am interested in the public reaction to the Royal Society, these plays have also 
been included because of their popularity at the time and for the lasting impact they had 
in further iterations of the experimental philosopher character-type.  
 
Samuel Butler’s Speculations on the Experimental Philosopher 
In revisiting Sprat’s ideas on why the individual needs the collective for 
experimental philosophy, it is clear that he contradicts many of his aforementioned 
viewpoints regarding the unbiased and restrained methods of experimental philosophy. 
He relies on Francis Bacon’s ideas and says that he remembers him somewhere saying, 
“That it is one of the greatest secrets of Nature, that mens Passions are more capable of 
being rais’d to higher degrees in company, than in solitude: and that we sooner grieve, 
fear, rejoyce, love, admire, when we behold many others so mov’d, than when we are 
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alone” (98). He employs Bacon’s words to demonstrate that what Bacon says about the 
emotions can also be said of the mind, meaning that minds together will sharpen one 
another more than if those minds were alone. However, an observant reader might take 
exception to his admission that heightened emotions become even more extreme when 
experienced in a group. This one example undercuts his larger argument about the 
correcting and moderating force of experiment done collectively. It is plausible, after all, 
that a Fellow might get excited or rejoice over a newfound discovery or an experiment 
that finally works, and if these emotions are showcased within the presence of others, one 
could argue that the passions of all will be raised.  
Samuel Butler’s 1676 poem “An Elephant in the Moon” epitomizes the 
experimental philosopher whose emotions are elevated because he is working 
collectively.9 Although Butler’s poem focuses mostly on the collective experience, I have 
included his poem in this chapter because it exemplifies how even within the collective, 
mistakes occur because individual views cloud the practitioner’s judgment. Butler’s 
vision implies that individual work outside the collective is much more problematic since 
individuals within the collective cannot be even tempered. Although Butler’s poem 
presents the experimental philosopher as operating within the collective, he represents the 
experimental philosophers more so as individuals. They are clearly drawn as separate 
characters, instead of being lumped together without individual identities, as we see in 
																																																								
9 According to Alexander C. Spence it is impossible to determine the exact date of the poem, although 1676 
is most likely (iv). A second version of this poem was written in heroic couplets, but Spence notes that the 
first version is the preferred one, which is also the version I examine (iv). “The Elephant in the Moon” 
according to Spence, was Butler’s “most ambitious and elaborate poem next to Hudibras” (iii). Hugh de 
Quehen notes that Butler assisted Thomas Shadwell with the “scientific parts” of The Virtuoso, a play I 
discuss in this chapter.  
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Cavendish’s representation of Royal Society members. The experimental philosophers in 
Butler’s speculative poem highlight the dangers of excited practitioners who so 
desperately want to believe in their newfound discoveries that they cannot see past their 
own emotions. Butler’s poem, therefore, satirizes the supposed truth that can be derived 
from observation, especially when the experimental philosophers’ own emotions and 
pride color those observations. Within the poem, Butler recounts the theories of power-
crazed astronomers in the Royal Society who discover, through a telescope, an unknown 
world in the moon. They report civil “inhabitants” who live underground and who are 
perpetually at war with the peasants who reside above. As the experimental philosophers 
continue to peer at the moon, they are shocked to see a huge escaped elephant on the 
rampage, and though it is a startling sight, it is “as by the glass” both “clear and plain” 
(58). The experimental philosophers, in this case, rely on observation to draw their 
conclusions. After several of them look through the telescope and report seeing the same 
thing, each is willing to record his “Narrative” of the observation as truth to be shared 
with the public (321). In fact, they see this one incident as making up for all their other 
failed or inconsequential observations. Says one of the practitioners, “This one 
discovery’s enough / to take all former scandals off” (225-26). As the experimental 
philosophers record the occurrence, they commend one another for their “learned” 
observations (292). In this case, the philosophers seem to associate learnedness with 
consensus, which becomes problematic because their conclusions are drawn from 
erroneous observations.  
 
 191 
Butler’s verse satirizes the Royal Society’s repeated focus on the importance of 
observation and consensus. After some time, the experimental philosophers realize, to 
their disappointment, that the armies are swarming flies and that the elephant was a 
mouse trapped in the lens. This realization does not come through their own observation, 
but instead is noticed by a footboy, who “viewing well, discover’d more / Than all the 
learn’d had done before” (335-36). Butler issues a scathing critique here when he 
presents the reader with an unlearned man who is able to see what the experimental 
philosophers are unable or unwilling to see. As Dorothy Stimson asserts in Scientists and 
Amateurs: A History of the Royal Society, “Butler typified the common sense of the 
ordinary individual, who, without the learning of the virtuosi, uses his head instead of his 
imagination, and upsets the speculations of the learned men” (91). In satire, it is often the 
uneducated or naif who speaks with wisdom, a trend that will repeat itself in the satirical 
dramas that will be examined later in this chapter. Butler’s critique, which is directed at 
imagined actions taking place within the Royal Society, raises doubt as to the authority of 
the experimental philosophers, while undermining their supposed sole focus on 
experimental methods.  
Part of Butler’s critique is centered on the disorder that flawed methods and 
mistruths create when experimental philosophers become consumed by their own selfish 
desires. The experimental philosophers in Butler’s poem, despite the evidence before 
their eyes, argue as to whether they should retract their written narratives about their 
original “discovery.” Even after empirical proof is presented, they seem unable to admit 
that that there was never an elephant on the moon. Their behavior indicates an interest 
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“only in the hypothetical elephant, not in an actual mouse” (Haynes 44). Despite their 
insistence on representing truth, when that truth impedes their quest for fame, they 
actively suppress the truth (Haynes 44). Consequently, Butler’s speculations assume an 
experimental philosopher who is not able to cast aside his own ego and his own need for 
recognition, despite Bacon and Sprat’s belief that collective experimentation would do 
just that. In this case, their emotions do feed off one another, leading them into more 
selfish pursuits instead of refining their aims. The philosopher’s disagreements with one 
another allow the reader to question whether a practitioner can be moderate in the face of 
possible recognition, which highlights how the individual’s desires conflict with the 
cooperative methods promoted by the Royal Society. Once the supposed facts are written, 
the experimental philosophers in “The Elephant in the Moon” want to make their 
inaccurate narratives public. In painting experimental philosophers this way, Butler 
undermines the Society’s published accounts of their experiments and showcases the 
Society’s reliance on language and the power of rhetoric in swaying public opinion.10 
Butler says these disagreements between experimental philosophers cause fierce 
“brawl[s]” between them, which is ironic considering that Sprat’s History promoted 
experimental philosophy for its ability to reduce divisiveness (492). Ultimately, Butler  
issues a final criticism to those types of practitioners: 
 
 
who greedily pursue 
Things wonderful, instead of true; 
																																																								
10 Although he recognized that rhetoric and poetics are themselves kinds of knowledge, Bacon advocated 
for a type of knowledge that could be scientifically demonstrated. He understood the power of language to 
persuade, so he wanted to posit a system of truth that could be separated from verbal structures (Altegoer 
75).  
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That in their Speculations chuse 
To make Discoveries strange News; 
And Nat’ral History a Gazette 
Of Tales stupendous, and far-fet; (511-14)  
 
 
Butler criticizes methods that turn the phenomena of the heavens into not just news, but 
“strange news,” which focuses on how the Society’s discoveries are spread to the public. 
The report the experimental philosophers have written is centered on inspiring feelings of 
astonishment, wonder, and excitement in the reader – all a type of response that is 
immoderate. In Butler’s warning speculation is part of the problem, whereas in 
Cavendish it was the antidote. For Cavendish, speculation is part of the solution because 
it becomes a way to forecast or think through the possible problems that could arise when 
relying on experimental philosophy. With Butler, we see a different kind of speculation 
that the experimental philosophers are engaged in. Speculation becomes dangerous when 
it is used for selfish ends. Butler’s warning is grounded in the idea that the Society, 
instead of presenting the reader with facts, publishes news that is filled with fiction, a 
fiction disguised as fact. Not only might these stories create an excitement in the public, 
which Butler sees as problematic, but the motivation behind the origin of these reports is 
also impure. The experimental philosopher pursues these wonders out of greed, or out of 
a “strong desire.”11 It is his passions that are leading him, not his commitment to 
moderate experimental methods.  
Butler’s satire cautions the public to be wary of experimental philosophers who 
resort to exaggerated tales and untruths in order to seek fame and to satisfy their own 
																																																								
11 “greedily,” OED.  
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aspirations. The poem calls attention to those practitioners who “explicate appearances / 
Not as they are, but as they please” (517-18). Consequently, the misidentification 
represented in Butler’s poem was not the fault of the telescope; it was the fault of the men 
peering into it. Paradoxically, these instruments were intended to advance man’s vision, 
but when taken into the hands of an experimental philosopher who refuses to see and who 
suffers from moral blindness, these technologies are of no use (Haynes 44). Instead of 
associating observation with truth, Butler associates the Society’s methods with 
falsehood and turns experimental philosophy into an absurdity. His representation of 
experimental philosophy in the hands of men calls into question the unbiased nature of 
experimental philosophy’s endeavors, and Butler reminds his readers that the public 
cannot necessarily trust the written accounts of experiments that the Royal Society so 
often printed and circulated. Because the Royal Society made experimental philosophy a 
public endeavor, it opened up their methods and their Fellows to public scrutiny and 
evaluation. Butler’s poem provides us with important critiques, but he represents the 
practitioners working within a community, even though his focus is more individualized. 
When that critique is focused instead on individual practitioners experimenting alone 
outside the institution of the Royal Society, some of the concerns associated with 
experimental philosophy shift to more personal, instead of public, concerns. Speculative 
drama, therefore, becomes a powerful mode through which the public can examine the 
individual practitioner outside the confines of the Royal Society.  
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Speculation on the Restoration Stage 
 When the Royal Society received the royal charter in 1662, Charles II gave the 
Society a public presence in London, while also increasing the Society’s standing and 
significance. As established in chapter three, the Society positioned itself as politically 
uninvolved and forwarded the idea that the institution would operate under methods that 
would foster civility and stability, essentially contributing to the necessary healing 
needed after the civil wars and Interregnum. As the Royal Society represented what 
might be a useful and “gentlemanly pursuit,” experimental philosophy became one way 
through which the king could support the kind of society he hoped to “foster upon his 
return to power” (Coppola 3). Coppola suggests that Charles’s reopening of the theatre 
was a move related to his sanctioning of the Royal Society. Both, he argues, serve a 
similar purpose in that they are meant to represent “things” as they naturally are – the 
stage as representative of society and the laboratory as representative of nature. Each 
would serve as a source of instruction, as well. In both arenas, according to Coppola, “the 
Stuart monarchy patronized the performance of certain kinds of natural truths in order to 
reconstruct the ‘natural’ social order that it sought to restore in the 1660s” (3). Shanahan 
goes so far as to see experimental philosophy as a type of theater in itself because of the 
Society’s public “demonstrations of wonderful natural phenomena” (“Theatrical” 550).  
 When considering the function of Restoration theatre in London, it is not my goal 
to recount its history or to speak to all the ways theatre represented issues of the day; I 
intend only to represent the relationship between experimental philosophy and its staged 
presence. It is useful, therefore, to think about Restoration theatre’s public presence in the 
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same way we would think of the public presence of the Royal Society. Because theatre is 
public art available to those who can pay, it concerns itself with events that would have 
been in the forefront of the audience’s mind. In that way, theater can respond to the 
controversies of the day while reflecting the concerns, anxieties, and interests of the 
audience (Silvette 2). Most of the plays that speculate on the role of the experimental 
philosopher are comedies, but even within comedy, themes of civil and national identity 
are present. Many comedies focus on London life, but “even in the most metropolitan of 
comedies […] the definition of national as well as class-based manners is at stake” (Orr 
4).12  
The particular plays I examine in this chapter are farce (a kind of comedy), which 
is a noteworthy genre considering that Restoration dramatists were often averse to 
labeling their own work as a farce. Dramatists who resisted the label of farce worried that 
farce was unpopular and that it had little aesthetic significance. Characters in Restoration 
farces are often flat and stereotypical, and their actions and behaviors become the focus 
instead of their emotions. Playwrights distanced themselves from the term because they 
did not want to be associated with “the triviality that they too assumed to be inherent in 
the form” (Holland 107).13 Taken together, each of the above criticisms of farce assume 
																																																								
12 Orr lists George Etherege’s The Man of Mode as representative of a city comedy concerned with national 
identity. Topics of emigration can be found in Nahum Tate’s Cuckolds-Haven and Edmund Goldsmid and 
Thomas D’Urfey’s A Commonwealth of Women, and William Wycherley’s The Plain Dealer also 
investigates city manners (4).  
13 For more on farce see J.L. Styan who argues that while there are elements of farce in all comedies, farce 
is closer to fantasy than reality (212). He also argues that the main goal of farce is ridicule, a type of 
ridicule that avoids “moralizing” (243). According to Leo Hughes, “The chief, even the exclusive, business 
of farce is to stimulate the risibilities of the audience. The distinction between farce and other kinds of 
comic drama must then rest upon the nature of the laughter elicited by each. The laugh, the smile, the smirk 
with which an audience receives high comedy […] differs appreciably from the nonreflective guffaw with 
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that farce does not focus on the same subjects that Restoration comedy does, so we 
cannot, according to Peter Holland, find or expect in farce the same kind of realistic 
social activity that we can find in comedy. Holland argues that farce does “not deal 
directly with the ambiguities of desire, the social problems of relationships, the tense 
difficulties of status and power which characterize Restoration comic drama” (107-108). 
When considering the speculative plays that focus on the experimental philosopher, those 
themes, I argue, are in fact present, and my investigation into these plays emphasizes 
aspects of these works that writers would have rejected as sheer absurdity. Speculative 
farce should not be dismissed as trivial or having little value, for it is through the 
stereotypical characters and their actions that we find investigations into the desires, 
relationships, and power that could affect the experimental philosopher, his family, and 
society in damaging ways. Because the playwrights strip away the nuance of character, 
the audience is better able to criticize the methods of experimental philosophy and its 
impacts through the exaggerated ways those methods are presented.  
 More importantly, farce is a significant speculative tool because, in ridiculing the 
practitioner as a character, the viewer/reader better understands public reaction to 
experimental philosophy. King discusses the purpose of farce for eighteenth-century 
audiences, arguing that “satirical derision [was] considered to be [a] crucial vehicle for 
the correction of misguided and wrong behavior” (151). Although some of the actions on 
the stage were satirizing actual Royal Society experiments or actual Royal Society 
members, theater “responds less to reality than to perceptions of reality in its audience” 
																																																																																																																																																																					
which the antics of the farceur are received” (19). Hughes argues that farce was “seen as a low form of 
entertainment” (272). 
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(Kavenik 27). This is an important distinction because it is the public response that best 
showcases how experimental philosophy was received by greater society, and it is that 
public reaction that assists us in discovering how emerging epistemologies influenced 
knowledge formation. Theatrical responses to experimental philosophy also showcase 
how theatrical and dramatic public experimentation could be, in that members of the 
Royal Society relied on “securing mass assent” through public displays that were often 
performative.14 The theater, therefore, became an ideal place to capture the “spectacle” of 
the Society and to represent and critique the practitioner (Coppola 3). The practitioner 
was often represented on stage as performing experiments that had basis in real 
experiments in the Royal Society, but members of the Society, which includes virtuosos, 
were often ridiculed for these experiments. On the Restoration stage, experimental 
philosophy is frequently portrayed as unworthy of a gentleman’s attention, and the 
practitioner’s research topics become farcical because of their uselessness and irrelevance 
(Haynes 34).15 The importance of the theatrical experimental philosopher must not be 
overlooked just because he seems to be a fool. In ridiculing the practitioner, theater that 
speculates presents the audience with serious resistance to the place of experimental 
philosophy in society. The staged experimental philosopher, therefore, symbolizes 
various supposed problems with the practice of experimental philosophy and reinforces 
																																																								
14 For more about experimental philosophy as spectacle, see Al Coppola’s The Theater of Experiment: 
Staging Natural Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain. Coppola focuses on the “affective spectacle” 
that occurred when experiments were performed by learned participants in front of a mixed audience - 
specialists, amateurs, gentlemen, tradesmen, etc. (4). 
15  Haynes also connects the Restoration virtuoso with earlier iterations of the same type of character, 
lumping the virtuoso in with other alchemists, charlatans, gullible fools, and more “serious seekers” of 
knowledge (39). The virtuoso, therefore, could be seen as a successor to characters such as Faustus, in 
addition to a thematic connection to plays like Ben Jonson’s The Alchemist and William Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest.  
 
 199 
the idea that both the methods and practitioners cannot exist outside of society or without 
their ideological biases. Comic and “satirical attitudes in literary portrayals of scientific 
curiosity” reflected, according to King, “the popular discomfort with the uncertain 
consequences of new discoveries and technological advancements” (151). Some of the  
most biting critiques can be found in speculative writing that makes the experimental 
philosopher its main focus, present in Restoration plays such as The Virtuoso and The 
Emperor and the Moon. 
 
The Virtuoso  
 Thomas Shadwell’s farce The Virtuoso opened in May 1676 to great acclaim. In 
attendance that month was King Charles II.16 The plot of The Virtuoso centers on Bruce 
and Longvil, two lovers intent on winning the hands of Clarinda and Miranda, both 
nieces of the experimental philosopher Sir Nicholas Gimcrack. Gimcrack, cuckolded by 
his wife, Lady Gimcrack, has rejected many of his nieces’ marriage proposals so that he 
can benefit financially from his nieces’ dowries. In order to gain access to Gimcrack, his 
home, and his nieces, Bruce and Longvil feign interest in experimental philosophy and 
attempt to defend themselves against Lady Gimcrack’s many advances. The play ends 
with matches made between the suitors and nieces, but only after Gimcrack loses 
everything: his estates are seized to pay off debts owed on equipment he purchased for 
 
																																																								
16 See Marjorie Hope Nicolson and David Stuart Rode’s introduction to the Regents Restoration Drama 
edition of The Virtuoso. The play was occasionally performed over the next couple decades, with the last 
known performance in the eighteenth century taking place in March of 1705 (xii-xiii). All quotations from 
the play are taken from this edition.  
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experiments, his wife leaves him for another and takes her money with her, and the 
nieces transfer their guardianship to Bruce and Longvil.  
 The love plot that leaves Gimcrack alone and destitute is a crucial part of the 
Shadwell’s criticism and ridicule of experimental philosophy, and much of the 
scholarship on Shadwell’s play investigates these various critiques. Gimcrack, after all, is 
an experimental philosopher, whose activities were modeled on practices within the 
Royal Society and on actual members.17 Haynes argues that Sir Nicholas is the “first fully 
developed satirical portrait of the new scientist” and that he definitely was the most 
significant (45). As such, scholars over the past decade have shown interest in Shadwell’s 
character of the experimental philosopher. Christa Knellwolf King sees Shadwell’s play 
as an indictment of a type of experimental philosophy that participates in “untruths” 
when it does not actively seek to undermine false or erroneous conclusions. King believes 
that The Virtuoso’s satire focuses mainly, therefore, on challenging the idea that 
knowledge can be objective. Tita Chico, on the other hand, encourages readers to 
consider Shadwell’s play beyond “the legacy of satire,” noting that many of his plays 
																																																								
17 Nicolson and Rode note that Gimcrack shares vocabulary with Hooke’s Micrographia, Glanvill’s Scepsis 
Scientifica, and Formal (the rhetorician in the play) has similarities with the rhetoric found in Sprat’s 
History and the Philosophical Transactions. Furthermore, Shadwell represents real and failed experiments 
of the Royal Society. See Nicholson and Rode’s “Introduction” for some of the passages and references. 
Black also notes that Gimcrack represents an exaggeration of Royal Society methods (11). Chico says this 
of Hooke: “Due to the nature of his publications and his roles within the organization, Hooke was in many 
ways the public face of experimentalism. After Hooke attended a performance of The Virtuoso on June 2, 
1676, at Dorset Garden, he complained in his diary that the audience knew the characterization of “Sir 
Nicholas Gimcrack, F. R. S.” was a satire of him: ‘Damned dogs. Vindica me Deus. People almost 
pointed’” (31). Haynes disagrees with critics who see connections between Gimcrack and the Royal 
Society, claiming Gimcrack is not meant to be a stand in for actual practitioners within the Royal Society. 
Because Gimcrack was denied membership into the Society, Haynes argues that Shadwell is not “mocking 
the practices of the Royal Society,” and instead, “Shadwell actually uses them as the yardstick with which 
to beat Gimcrack” (45). Haynes also does not see Gimcrack as symbolic of the Royal Society because he 
does not see any of his experiments through to their end results; he experiments only for the sake of 
curiosity (47).  
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focus on female sexuality and desire. Chico sees this play as no different and associates 
the desire for experimentalism as tied to sexual desire and wealth. John Shanahan 
discusses how it might be easy to see clichéd satires of sexuality in The Virtuoso as 
weaknesses within the play, but instead critics should focus more on Shadwell’s most 
“stinging critique” of locating the laboratory within the domestic space (“Theatrical” 
557). Shanahan combines this history of science with the history of theater in his essay 
“Theatrical Space and Scientific Space in Thomas Shadwell’s Virtuoso” to highlight the 
Royal Society’s anxieties about the public and theatrical nature of experimentation. 
Shadwell, he claims, intervenes in this anxiety by staging it and bringing the public 
versus private debate to the forefront because Gimcrack’s home is also his laboratory. I 
agree with Shanahan’s argument that locating the laboratory within the home focuses the 
audience’s attention more on the domestic space, but I contend that this attention on the 
domestic space highlights the negative consequences the experimental philosopher can 
have on his family and within the order of his household. By briefly exploring the kind of 
experimental philosopher Gimcrack is and focusing on his isolation, we will see that 
Shadwell speculates on the dangers this type of experimental philosophy can bring to the 
individual and his family.  
 Many of the characters in Shadwell’s play present the audience with their 
opinions on Gimcrack before we ever meet him, essentially telling the audience exactly 
how we should view Gimcrack’s character. The audience is not given the opportunity to 
formulate their own conclusions; instead Gimcrack’s persona and his experiments have 
already been colored for us. Sir Formal is Gimcrack’s personal rhetorician, and he tells 
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the audience that Gimcrack is the “finest speculative gentleman in the whole world,” and 
that he is the most “curious and inquisitive philosopher breathing” (18). Since Sir Formal 
is Gimcrack’s mouthpiece, his assessment is not to be taken seriously. Everyone else who 
knows Gimcrack agrees on one thing – he is not a respectable character. Bruce refers to 
him as “dull,” “mad,” a “fanatic,” and a “fool.” (21, 113). His nieces, Miranda and 
Clarinda, claim he is “foolish,” a “sot,” a “jealous man,” and that he “never cares for 
understanding mankind” (22). His uncle Snarl calls him a “coxcomb,” while Lady 
Gimcrack says he concerns himself with “fruitless speculations” (31, 42), so much so that 
the Royal Society refused him admission (43).18 Much of the opinions presented are 
grounded in Gimcrack’s research and experimental methods. He has spent 2,000 pounds 
on microscopes and has devoted twenty years of his life to maggots, spiders, and lice, in 
addition to writing a geography of the world on the moon. Gimcrack admits that it is 
below him to “trouble himself with men and manners” (71). While the focus of 
Gimcrack’s research is presented on stage as trivial and unworthy of study, Gimcrack’s 
own admissions downplay the importance of practical application in experimental 
philosophy. Famously, the audience first sees Gimcrack learning how to swim while 
perched upon a table and watching a nearby frog. When asked if he will ever try his hand 
at swimming in water, he replies, “I content myself with the speculative part of 
swimming; I care not for the practice. I seldom bring anything to use; ‘tis not my way. 
Knowledge is my ultimate end” (47). Knowledge for knowledge’s sake is not in line with 
the Society’s purported practical uses for experimental philosophy; however, in calling 
																																																								
18 Lady Gimcrack claims he was denied admission because the members of the Royal Society “envied” him 
(43). 
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attention to Gimcrack’s lack of utility, the play critiques experimental philosophy for its 
lack of practicality, while remaining careful to accuse practitioners not following the 
Royal Society’s standards. Passages such as the one above are meant to make fun of 
experimental philosophy when it “fails to examine the meanings and consequences of its 
discoveries” (King 162). Although none of the representations of Gimcrack are positive, 
these attributes make him more comical than dangerous. However, Shadwell does draw 
our attention to some flaws in the experimental philosopher’s character that may not be as 
laughable.  
 Shadwell’s depiction of the experimental philosopher as isolated is a detail we 
should be more concerned with because isolation prohibits collective efforts designed to 
curtail error, but isolation also reveals Gimcrack’s obsessive practice. Early on in the play 
his wife describes him as a “solitary, philosophical person” (42). We later learn that he 
does not travel and that he has isolated himself so extremely that he will not venture into 
the countryside. Instead, he has country air bottled and shipped to him, which he keeps 
stored in his laboratory. Attentive readers/viewers may also notice how little they see of 
Gimcrack on stage. We hear about his character and his pursuits quite often, but we 
rarely see or hear directly from him. In fact, over the course of the play, Gimcrack only 
speaks 13% of the play’s lines, yet the play is named for him. His minimal presence on 
the stage only highlights even more how he has secluded himself from society and his 
family due to his practices in experimental philosophy. Shadwell, therefore, implicates 
isolation as an important factor in Gimcrack’s deficiencies and his broken relationships. 
Shannahan refers to Gimcrack’s antisocial life as both “ungentlemanly and intellectually 
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unstable,” noting that he has traded relationships with humans for relationships with 
“objects and vermin,” and that he has had to hire someone to have sex with him instead 
of having sex with his wife (561). His isolation, consequently, leads to a disordered 
household in which he is the least of his family’s concerns and instead only becomes a 
subject of their gossip and the butt of their jokes and ruses. 
As we have seen Gimcrack is not the best experimental philosopher, and his 
neglect as the head of his household leads to his own severed familial relationships. 
Shadwell, therefore, offers a critique of the way that experimental philosophy disorders 
domestic relationships (Coppola 42). His nieces trick him into allowing their suitors into 
his home, and Lady Gimcrack, according to Miranda, “cuckolds him abundantly” (22). In 
Restoration theatre, various aspects such as their age or class often distinguished male 
characters, but in comedy, in particular, they were defined most explicitly through their 
sexuality (Rosenthal 92).19 Furthermore, their masculinity often was defined through the 
control of female sexuality (Foyster 55).20 The married man, in theory, was meant to have 
command over all who resided in his home, and men were given authority over their 
wives, so “if a wife committed adultery, contemporaries believed that this provided a 
clear sign that a man had failed in his duty to maintain household control” (Foyster 65-
66). Being a cuckold, therefore, came with dishonor and shame, not because it 
undermined the husband’s position within the household but also because it impacted his 
																																																								
19 Rosenthal lists Aphra Behn, The Rover and The Lucky Chance; George Farquhar, Love and a Bottle; 
William Congreve, Way of the World; William Wycherley, The Country Wife; Mr. Sandford, The Female 
Fop; and George Etherege, The Man of Mode as examples of comedies that define masculinity based on 
sexuality.  
20 Foyster contends that manhood was never completely secure, so it had to be “continually proved and 
asserted.” One of those insecurities was grounded in the fact that female sexuality was an “unstable 
foundation” upon which to define masculinity (55). 
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“standing in the wider community” (Foyster 66). Shadwell’s play, consequently, 
represents Gimcrack’s missteps within his own home as representative of a reputation 
that extends outside the walls of his home. In Act IV, Gimcrack pronounces that he is 
“doubly a cuckold” (89) when he discovers that Mrs. Flirt, his whore, has not been 
faithful. To be doubly cuckolded brings double the shame because cuckoldry was 
assumed to be the man’s fault for his inability to maintain sexual control (Foyster 72). 
Shadwell’s speculations about an experimental philosopher whose house falls into 
disorder send a clear message to viewers of why we should be wary of the isolation that 
results from obsessive devotion to experimental philosophy. Accordingly, Gimcrack is 
representative of the “strong link between science and morality,” determining that the 
“moral decay of a weak-headed society” is caused by “preoccupations” with 
experimental philosophy (King 158-9). 
 A man’s reputation was based on more than just sexual factors, and as the play 
closes the audience is presented with a cuckolded Gimcrack who has lost his economic 
standing as well. Economic misfortune damaged a man’s honor and was devastating to 
the family’s standing in the community (Foyster 66). Hence, all Gimcrack’s female 
relatives abandon him as they each scramble to attach themselves to other men with more 
intact economic status and a secure masculinity. Miranda remarks, for instance, that 
Bruce is better able to protect her fortune, and Gimcrack’s mistress remarks that women 
“love men but as far as their money goes” (138-39). When Gimcrack realizes how 
emasculated and alone he is, he announces, “I would I had studied mankind instead of 
spiders” (139). In the next breath, he declares he will abandon experimental philosophy 
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and will instead search for the philosopher’s stone. Both Andrew Black and Chico 
present this final scene as a move in the right direction in restoring Gimcrack’s 
denigrated reputation. Black contends, “Gimcrack’s remorse is instructive to the 
contemporary experimental community for whom he acts as satirical stand-in” (13). 
Similarly, Chico marks this moment as a modest reformation for Gimcrack: “Sir Nicolas 
vows that now he must devote himself to practical study—that experimental philosophy 
must be for utility, rather than merely for speculation and its associated pleasures” (37). 
Although Chico raises doubts about how likely it is that Gimcrack can recover from his 
financial loss and abandonment, she sees his new focus on practicality as a lesson learned 
(37). When I read these last lines of Gimcrack, I do not see a reformed character since his 
new focus also lacks utility; a plan to locate the philosopher’s stone is anything but 
practical. In terms of progression, it takes Gimcrack a step away from the advancements 
of experimental philosophy, as the methods associated with experimental philosophy 
were rhetorically positioned as conflicting with alchemy and magic. Gimcrack has only 
shifted his methods from emerging methods to more outdated ones, perhaps indicating 
that reform is not possible for this kind of disorder. He does not appear to have learned 
from his mistakes, and in the end, he is even more isolated and turns to a practice that 
will only bring him even more dishonor. Gimcrack’s excessive behavior may have 
shifted away from experimental philosophy, but his home, family, and finances lay in 
shambles with no real prospects for recovery. The kind of disorder in the domestic, 
private space that Shadwell envisions with Gimcack is also present in Aphra Behn’s 
exploration of Baliardo, the experimental philosopher who experiments in his own home 
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to his family’s possible detriment.21 In Baliardo, we see a look into a type of 
experimental philosopher who mixed emerging methods with speculative methods, 
resulting in practices that are absurd and unbalanced. Consequently, his masculinity and 
household are threatened by such absurdities because his actions are deemed effeminate. 
 
The Emperor of the Moon  
Aphra Behn began working on the farce The Emperor of the Moon in 1685 before 
the death of Charles II.22 She returned to the play during the “troubled reign” of James II, 
adding a prologue and epilogue (Todd 154). The play was most likely first performed in 
March of 1687, and it was printed in the same year. As with Shadwell’s play, Behn’s 
farce on experimental philosophy was quite popular; the only other play she wrote that 
received more acclaim was The Rover.23 Behn’s script centers on Doctor Baliardo, an 
experimental philosopher, who believes that he has spotted an entire nation living in the 
moon. He is so convinced by what he believes he sees in the telescope, that he becomes 
obsessed with peering through it constantly and spying on the world he sees there. While 
																																																								
21 Behn’s play is more implicit in its criticism of the Royal Society. Other scholars, however, have marked 
her play as an explicit critique of the Society. Coppola, for instance, argues that Behn enters into discourse 
with the Royal Society (66). Barbara Benedict also sees Behn’s play as a satire of and reaction against the 
Royal Society (60). Within the play, Behn uses the term “natural philosophy,” but one of the texts that the 
main character, Baliardo, reads is by John Wilkins, who was one of the founders of the Royal Society. 
Baliardo speaks many lines that correspond with Sprat’s rhetoric about moderation and a lack of sin being 
key to experimental philosophy pursuits. It also seems that Behn had connections to the Royal Society, 
specifically being acquainted with Sprat, who may have allowed her burial in Westminster Abbey (Todd 
435).  
22 According to the introductory matter by Janet Todd in The Works of Aphra Behn: Volume 7, The Plays 
1682-1696, Charles the II enjoyed Italian farce, and commedia dell’arte became associated with Charles’s 
court (154). All references to Behn’s play are taken from this edition.  
23 Todd notes that The Emperor of the Moon remained well known throughout the beginning of the 
eighteenth century and refers to an actor’s notes on having performed in the play in 1711. Derek Hughes 
marks this play as Behn’s most successful and notes that it was frequently performed until 1750.  
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Baliardo is consumed with the moon, the Vice-Roy’s nephews Don Cinthio and Don 
Charmante court his daughter Elaria and his niece Bellemonte. With the help of 
Scaramouch (Baliardo’s man), Cinthio and Charmante stage a spectacle designed to trick 
the doctor into believing that the Emperor of the Moon and his brother, the Prince of 
Thunderland (both played by Cinthio and Charmante), want to marry his kin.  
Behn’s play has not received a lot of scholarly attention, perhaps because the play 
is labeled as a farce, and farces are meant to only entertain. Derek Hughes in The Theatre 
of Aphra Behn actually cautions readers to not over interpret the play (171); however, 
Behn herself makes it clear that she is using farce with a didactic purpose in her 
dedication to the Lord Marquess of Worcester.24 Critics who have examined The 
Emperor of the Moon have focused on Baliardo’s obsession with the moon, the fiction of 
the theater, and the political dangers of an experimental philosopher who observes too 
much. Judy Hayden argues that Behn purposely uses farce as a way to ridicule the belief 
in a plurality of worlds. It is not, therefore, meant to be a disapproval of the Royal 
Society but instead a disapproval of the absurd belief that there is life on the moon. 
Katherine Mannheimer reads Behn’s play as an examination of “theatrical and print-
based fictions,” arguing that Behn regenders these two modes of representation (39). 
Coppola explores the spectacle of The Emperor of the Moon through Behn’s Tory 
political beliefs and presents Baliardo’s spying on the Moon’s king as symbolic of the 
																																																								
24 Behn writes, “I am sensible, my Lord, how far the Word Farce might have offended some […] and who, 
without considering the Intent, Character, or Nature of the thing, wou’d have cry’d out upon the Language, 
and have damn’d it […] as too debas’d and vulgar to entertain a Man of Quality; but I am secure from this 
Censure, when your Lordship shall be its Judge, whose refin’d Sence, and Delicacy of Judgment, will, thro’ 
all the humble Actions and trivialness of Business, find Nature there, and that Diversion which was not 
meant for the Numbers, who comprehend nothing beyond the Show and Buffoonry” (156-57). 
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political instability under James’s reign.25 Coppola goes so far as to say that Baliardo’s 
interest in the moon is political and not at all “scientific” (493). Even if that were the 
case, Baliardo uses his skills in experimental philosophy, as well as an object of 
observation (the telescope), to gain political information about what would be (if it 
existed) a foreign entity, and that is partly what makes Behn’s play speculative. Behn 
attempts to forecast the political dangers associated with men who use experimental 
philosophy as a means to make political gains. I, however, would like to turn my focus, 
as I did with Sir Gimcrack, to the character himself. In this case, Baliardo participates in 
a kind of philosophy that is partly influenced by experimental philosophy because he 
relies on technologies, such as the telescope; however, his practice is also immoderate 
and heavily tied to his reading and, therefore, to speculative, not experimental, 
philosophy. One could argue that Baliardo’s crimes, because they are more speculative, 
do not suggest a critique of the Royal Society, for it rhetorically positioned itself as 
opposed to the speculative. However, no matter how much the Royal Society claimed to 
reject speculative methods, those outside of the Society did not see the Society’s methods 
as distinct from speculation. For these reasons, Baliardo’s methods can be seen as 
representative of the mixed and emerging methods associated with the Royal Society at 
the time, and his actions represent a speculative danger to his family and, therefore, the 
nation as well.  
Baliardo’s pursuit of experimental philosophy seems destined to fail because of 
deficiencies in his character. Throughout the play he is prone to excitability, and over the 
																																																								
25 Coppola argues that Baliardo is a “caricature of a Whig conspiracy-monger,” and that his actions of 
spying are treasonous (493).  
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course of the drama, he is reminded by several characters to be moderate. He is also 
easily tricked by most of the characters in the play, failing to show any careful judgment 
and instead jumping to irrational conclusions. When Charmante puts images in front on 
the telescope’s glass, the doctor has no qualms in assuming that what he sees actually 
exists, and he exclaims, “I am all Rapture, Sir, at this rare Vision” (167). His daughter 
and niece quite easily trick him into believing that they are sleeping while standing up, by 
“sleep-talking” about the Emperor in the Moon: He says, “The Moon, the Moon she 
means. I am Transported, Over-joy’d, and Ecstacy’d” (183). Baliardo is easily distracted 
and easily convinced of everyone’s deceits as long as they begin talking about the subject 
that he is obsessed with. When he is told the Emperor will be descending that very night 
he remarks, “I am – undone with Joy! ruin'd with Transport” (187); and in the last scene 
of the play, when he thinks the Emperor is before him, he says, “the Splendor of his 
Majesty confounds me” (203). The doctor repeatedly has trouble being moderate in his 
responses, letting his desires for discovery and power obscure his vision and heighten his 
emotions; yet, he seems to have enough clarity to understand that such over-the-top 
reactions are not acceptable. In the final act and scene of the play, he is captivated by the 
elaborately staged spectacle and reminds himself in an aside, “I am amaz’d, but must 
conceal my Wonder ---that Joy of Fools ---and appear wise in Gravity” (200). His 
statement shows an awareness that his immoderate emotions make him appear foolish; 
however, he does not speak of those emotions as something he needs to tame or remedy, 
but instead as something to hide from everyone else, lest they assume he is unwise. 
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Behn’s conjectures on the human qualities within the practitioner highlight how easily 
one’s own emotions and flaws can color conclusions. In the case of Baliardo, Behn draws  
our attention not just to the moral inadequacies of the experimental philosopher, but also 
to how his research interests, when paired with intemperance become even more flawed 
and even more ridiculous.   
One of the lowest “scientific” pursuits or interests, as seen in Butler’s 
aforementioned poem, is looking for life on the moon, a subject matter that Behn uses as 
a way to mock Baliardo’s methods as disordered. Stimson argues that the telescope was 
widely used and a well-known form of observation. However, “the enthusiasm of some 
of the amateurs and their excited imaginations had carried them into some surprising 
flights of fancy about possible voyages to the moon” (90). Herein lie Baliardo’s methods 
– he relies on a technological tool to observe the sky, something that would have been 
part of experimental philosophy’s methods; however, he does not moderate and weigh his 
conclusions. He jumps to speculative conjectures about what he thinks he sees, similar to 
the experimental philosophers in Butler’s poem. To satirists, what came across as the 
most bizarre was the use of “elaborate, complex, and expensive apparatus – telescopes, 
microscopes, airpumps – to demonstrate” the obvious, the implausible, or the 
insignificant (Hall 162). These kinds of practices are a combination of experimental and 
speculative methods gone wrong, which makes both methods seem absurd. Henry Stubbe 
pointed out how men of “true learning” laughed at the “proposals some made of flying to 
the world in the moon,” claiming that these men of real intellect viewed such ideas as  
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“superlatively ridiculous.”26 Looking for life on the moon underscores the debate about 
the proper focus of experimental philosophy and what conclusions one can arrive at when 
speculating. 
While Baliardo’s methods are clearly mocked in the play, his disordered mind is 
really what is being satirized. In the opening of the play, one of the first things the 
audience finds out about Baliardo is that his man and his daughter question his mental  
stability. In Act I, scene i, Scaramouch speaks to Elaria about her father: 
 
 
Scaramouch: You must know, Madam, your Father, (my Master, the Doctor) is a 
little Whimsical, Romantick, or Don Quick-sottish, or so. –   
Elaria: Or rather mad. (163) 
 
 
With Elaria’s support, Scaramouch then believes he can disregard his own civility and 
pronounces that the doctor is a “lunatic” because “he is always traveling to the Moon” 
(163). This madness is referred to as an infection, a sickness he has “caught” from 
reading too many narratives about moon travel, one of which is Francis Godwin’s The 
Man in the Moone.27 Though Godwin’s narrative is clearly fictional, the Doctor seems to 
view the story as factual. This kind of reading, according to Mannheimer, is a type of 
infection because Baliardo subscribes “to a mode of reading in which the reader’s sense 
of reality is invaded and replaced by a new, alternative reality and the reader’s sense of 
self is overrun and occupied by other, vicarious selves” (Mannheimer 41-2). Sprat and 
Cowley both refer to this type of reading as a hindrance to experimental philosophy, 
																																																								
26 From A Specimen of Some Animadversions upon a book entitled, Plus ultra, or, Modern impovements of 
useful knowledge printed in 1670 (42). Henry Stubbe consistently attacked the Royal Society in his work.  
27 The Man in the Moone was published posthumously in 1638 (shortly after John Wilkin’s narrative The 
Discovery of a World in the Moone). In the narrative, Gonsales travels to the utopian moon world on a 
machine powered by birds.  
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which I discussed in the third chapter. None of the books the doctor reads are what would 
be classified as works of experimental philosophy; they are works of speculative 
philosophy and speculative fiction.28 Even John Wilkins’s narrative The Discovery of a 
World in the Moone, which Elaria lists as one of her father’s “foolish books,” would not 
be considered an empirical treatise because of Wilkins’s reliance on speculation.29 
Wilkins’s treatise opens with a clear message to readers in which he instructs them that 
they “shouldst not here looke to find any exact, accurate,” truth and that they must 
“remember that I promise onely probable arguments for the proofe of this opinion.” His 
sixth proposition, however, states “That there is a world in the Moone,” and his thirteenth 
proposition asserts that “tis probably there may be inhabitants in this other World,” 
propositions that Baliardo clearly takes literally despite Wilkins’s warning that he is 
offering speculations, not fact.30 The stories the Doctor believes about the nation in the 
moon are deemed “Fantoms of mad Brains to puzzle Fools withal – the wise laugh at 
’em” (205).  
Essentially, the Doctor is viewed in a derogatory way because his instruments 
have proven to be a source of illusion while his reading has led him into speculative 
thought, which puts him into a position of inferiority due to his lack of judgment and 
																																																								
28 Other than The Man in the Moon and A Discourse of the World in the Moon, Elaria mentions Lucian’s 
Dialogue of the Lofty Traveller as one of her father’s books, in addition to “a thousand other ridiculous 
Volumes too hard to name” (163). 
29 John Wilkins was a member of the Royal Society and its first secretary. Wilkins’s treatise, printed in 
1638, blends natural philosophy with speculations on the moon, predicting what kind of life could be 
present on the moon. Marjorie Hope Nicolson marks it as an important work of popular “science” in her 
book Voyages to the Moon (1948). Quotations from Wilkins’s book are taken from the facsimile found at 
Early English Books Online.  
30 Wilkins admits at the end of this thirteenth treatise that there is no way to test any of his “conjecture[s], 
since there can bee no sailing to the Moone.” 
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practices deemed feminine. The irony, of course, is that he is presented as the fool, while 
the non-practitioners in the play are presented as wise. In fact, Scaramouch, who is the 
doctor’s servant, speaks of “Deceptio visus, or the Error of the Eyes” (176). In this case, 
an unlearned man seems better able to speak to the dangers of experimental philosophy 
than the man who has devoted his life to learning. When Scaramouch comments that the 
doctor’s “reading of Books is a pernicious thing,” he is presenting a view of a certain 
type of reading, which can have a harmful influence on the mind (163). Mannheimer 
notes that Baliardo’s giddy and “credulous” reading positions him as a “prototypical 
consumer of prose fiction: a figure already recognizable in the late seventeenth century, 
and already identified as female” (Mannheimer 42). Thus, the doctor’s reading is not only 
problematic because his practice of experimental philosophy remains influenced by it, but 
because it undermines his masculinity. In the anonymously published conduct book 
Advice of a Father, or Counsel to a Child (1664), the author councils that men should not 
be “effeminate” in their recreations, and that gentlemen readers must be careful to not 
become “‘so Bookish, as to neglect thy estate’” (16).31 Jacqueline Pearson discusses 
reading and gender on the Restoration stage and notes that in seventeenth-century 
writing, “the real man” or the “man of sense, is constructed not by books but by 
knowledge of the world” (46). As was established in chapter three, Sprat and Cowley 
both rhetorically positioned experimental philosophy as a masculine pursuit, with Cowley 
lamenting the way experimental philosophy had been feminized and had languished over 
the years.  
																																																								
31 Cent I, Section XXXII. 
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The doctor’s reading habits, therefore, might lead audience members to question 
his masculinity, a query further reinforced by the disordered household that Baliardo 
heads. Baliardo’s masculinity seems continually ridiculed throughout the play, as his 
household and estate are in a state of neglect. The internal operations of households were 
of genuine public concern because the patriarchal family was believed to be the “bedrock 
of social order” (Flather 42). The patriarchal household did not just consist of keeping 
family members under control, but also keeping other live-in subordinates in line, and 
restricting access to the household by outsiders. Baliardo, however, becomes so absorbed 
in his studies that he is oblivious to the insubordination of others in the house, 
particularly with Scaramouch, whom Baliardo refers to as a “false Steward of thy Masters 
Treasure” (140-41). Servants were supposed to have very limited power within the 
household, so when Scaramouch seems to be in charge of who has access to the house, 
there is unquestionably a problem with the household’s order. After Baliardo tells 
Scaramouch to go back to bed and exits the stage, Scaramouch is left alone on stage and  
says: 
 
 
No, Sir, ’tis Morning now – and I’m up for all day. 
This Madness is a pretty sort of a pleasant Disease, when it tickles but in 
one Vein – Why here’s my Master now, as great a Scholar, as grave and 
wise a Man, in all Argument and Discourse, as can be met with, yet name 
but the Moon, and he runs to Ridicule, and grows as mad as the Wind.  
Well Doctor, if thou can’st be madder yet,  
  We’ll find a Medicine that shall cure your Fit.  
  ---Better than all Gallanicus. (182)  
 
 
Scaramouch’s response reveals much about the disordered state of Baliardo’s home. Not 
only does he defy his master’s direct orders to go to bed, but he then also takes on a 
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powerful position by constructing the home’s reality when he claims it is morning instead 
of night. This home is now in his control and he will be the one dictating what next 
happens in the doctor’s home. Because the household was regarded as a microcosm of 
society, “the most fundamental duty for its head was that he should ensure that order was 
maintained,” and if “relationships broke accepted or conventional bounds, then the 
spotlight of responsibility would fall on the male head of household” (Foyster 66). 
However, this male head of household has been presented as both a lunatic and 
effeminate, so Scaramouch is able to take advantage of the disorder. Scaramouch puts 
himself into a position of power, not only in the household, but also over Baliardo’s mind 
when he claims he is going to “find a cure” for the doctor’s madness (251). This 
madness, of course, is grounded in his obsession with life on the moon, an obsession that 
distracts him from caring for the life within his home. For instance, he does not attend to 
the courtship of his daughter and niece, and instead of arranging their matches he keeps 
them in captivity, not allowing his daughter to go farther than his garden (198). When his 
daughter and niece get married without his consent, literally right before his eyes and in 
his own home, the trickery highlights his inability to keep control of his household, and 
since “the home was a ‘little Commonwealth,’” this also proves his inability to rule 
(Foyster 87).  
 When the trickery is revealed to Baliardo in the final scene of the play, the true 
stakes associated with his disordered household take center stage. Keplair, a philosopher 
who took part in the deceit, instructs Baliardo to “Be patient, Sir, and call up all your 
Vertue, You’re only cur’d, Sir, of a Disease That long has raign’d over your Nobler 
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Faculties” (205). He goes on to point out that they have cured Baliardo from “an Error 
that unman’d” him (205). When Keplair asserts that Baliardo imbalanced faculties have 
caused him to become “unman’d,” these associations make the text speculative of 
gendered norms. Behn’s play presents conjecture and emotions as inferior because of 
their relation to the feminine, an association that Sprat and Cowley attempted to distance 
the Royal Society from. As Foyster argues, “The ideology of patriarchy thus led to the 
construction of a system of morality which rewarded and chastised those who succeeded 
or failed to live up to its requirements” (5). The ridicule, therefore, of Baliardo’s 
effeminate reading practices, his emotions, and his inability to lead his household, plays 
into this system of morality Foyster discusses. The members of Baliardo’s household are 
able to justify their trickery by claiming they are protecting his honor, but honor and 
reputation could only be earned by exemplifying the “male qualities of reason and 
strength in an approved way;” that approval was only granted if a man displayed control 
over his self and control over his inferiors (Foyster 32). Consequently, Baliarado has 
already been stripped of his honor, yet Charmante claims to care for the doctor’s honor 
when he explains that the elaborate ruse was all done to protect the doctor’s reputation: 
“If we’d not lov’d you, you’d been still impos’d on; We had brought a Scandal on your 
Learned Name, And all succeeding Ages had despis’d it” (205). Charmante, we must 
remember, has ulterior motives that supersede a selfless care over the doctor’s reputation. 
He has, after all, just married the doctor’s niece, so his own honor and reputation are now 
tied to Baliardo’s household. With that accounted for, Charmante’s reasoning recognizes 
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that a man’s behavior was often closely watched by his neighbors and that his reputation 
did depend on what others thought about him (Foyster 55, 58).  
 When presented with the errors of his beliefs and the impact they could have on 
his reputation, Baliardo has trouble coming to terms with what the staged spectacle 
means for his research into life on the moon. Even after the truth comes out, the Doctor 
seems unwilling to let go of his fantasy when he says to Cinthio and Charmante who have 
taken on the personas of the moon men, “Are you not then the Emperor of the Moon? 
And you the Prince of Thunderland” (205)? It is difficult for him to reconcile the 
elaborate and fictional narrative he has crafted in his head and the very real and 
observable truth in front of him. It is a moment in which the audience almost feels pity 
for him as he bawls onstage while they watch his work and theories crumble before him. 
When Cinthio reminds him that a civilization never existed on the moon, his reply is one 
of shock: “No Emperor of the Moon, --- and no Moon World” (205)! However, when 
Charmante reminds him that his behavior is blighting his reputation, it is then that he has 
an awakening of sorts and decides to cleanse his home in a moment reminiscent of 
Faustus and Prospero: “Burn all my Books, and let my Study Blaze, Burn all to Ashes, 
and be sure the Wind Scatter the vile Contagious Monstrous Lies” (205).32 These books 
he refers to do contain fictions and speculations, but when Baliardo equates them with 
lies, he deflects attention away from his own mistakes. None of the titles Elaria 
mentioned earlier in the play lay any claim to any kind of soundness in experimental 
																																																								
32 In Act V, Scene ii of Doctor Faustus, the titular character cries out, just before being dragged to hell by 
demons, “I’ll burn my books” (116). Prospero in The Tempest says at the end of the play, “I’ll break my 
staff, / Bury it certain fathoms in the earth, / And deeper than did ever plummet sound / I’ll drown my 
book” (V, i, 54-57).  
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methods or any kind of truth in their conclusions. By deflecting attention from his beliefs 
and blaming his books, Baliardo may reveal that his mind has not been cleansed, for he 
does not seem to realize the errors in his own thinking at this point. He orders that his 
books be destroyed, but he has said nothing of his instruments and telescopes.  
Perhaps he will destroy the speculative texts and keep his experimental tools; 
however, we have no assurances that he will only pursue experimental procedures with 
them or that any of his methods have been rectified. Telescopes do assist experimental 
philosophers in their practice; however, a telescope can still be used for only 
observational purposes, leaving the door open for Baliardo to continue to concoct 
speculative narratives about what he supposes to have seen. One has to wonder just how 
sincere he is in saying that he will destroy his books, especially in light of words that are 
so similar to those spoken by Faustus and Prospero. Faustus only offers up the 
destruction of his materials in a final attempt to save his soul, and Prospero only says he 
will drown his books, but the audience never sees him do that. Perhaps Baliardo will 
actually keep all of his books, and everything he has just said was done to placate the 
crowd of people in his home and to uphold a semblance of his reputation. The final lines 
of the play also imply that Baliardo’s great realizations might not be that sound. As the  
play comes to an end, Baliardo says the following lines “gravely” to himself: 
 
 
I see there’s nothing in Philosophy --- 
Of all that writ, he was the wisest Bard, who spoke this mighty Truth. --- 
      “He that knew all that ever Learning writ, 
       Knew only this --- that he knew nothing yet.” (206)33 
 
																																																								
33 According to the notes in Todd’s edition of Behn’s play, Socrates supposedly said these words.  
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Baliardo seems to have missed the point when he concludes that there is nothing to be 
gained from experimental philosophy. Instead, it would be more helpful for him to 
understand that there is there nothing to be gained from the methods he employs. One 
also has to wonder if Behn’s play offers up a critique of the Royal Society because of the 
gap between its rhetoric and the methods practitioners were actually engaging in within 
their own homes. Baliardo’s methods, like Gimcrack’s, are immoderate and obsessive, 
while also being decidedly individual efforts bereft of the collective’s purifying purpose; 
yet, Butler’s poem implies that even a collaborative effort cannot save experimental 
philosophy from the flaws and ambitions of immoderate men. If Baliardo does, in fact, 
believe that there is nothing to be gained from experimental philosophy, then maybe he 
has learned something. Nevertheless, if we read the final lines ironically, perhaps there is 
an underlying message from Baliardo actually indicating that he is not going to abandon 
his ways. Maybe he is saying that all he has really discovered is that he has not 
discovered anything yet.  
 
The Afterlives of Gimcrack and Baliardo 
 Speculative characters such as Baliardo and Gimcrack warn Restoration 
audiences about a type of experimental philosophy in conjunction with speculative 
methods that are self-absorbed and lead to the downfall of the family, the mind, and may 
have negative consequences for society. Both experimental philosophers have become so 
engrossed in what they suppose is experimental philosophy that they lose sight of what is 
really happening in the world around them and instead see only what they want to see, an 
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act reminiscent of Butler’s experimental philosophers who look through the telescope 
itself but concoct their own version of reality. As writers, Shadwell and Behn participate 
in a type of speculation themselves, drawing conclusions based on what they believe 
could be happening within the Royal Society and with its practitioners. Extending their 
observations to predicted consequences establishes the experimental philosopher as a 
comic figure but also as figure we should be wary of because he mismanages his home 
and family. These fictional experimental philosophers are not just characters to laugh at 
because their ridiculous pursuits can lead to ruin on many levels. Coppola argues that we 
should not look at characters such as Gimcrack and attempt to trace the “morphology” of 
the “scientist” as a character type (42). Although I can understand why Coppola might 
see such attempts as reductive, it is important to trace the development of these characters 
when considering how other texts participate in the speculative mode. When other writers 
are directly influenced by the characters of Gimcrack and Baliardo and create their own 
versions of these characters, these character types become even more pertinent. The 
speculative practitioner becomes a way for writers – and their readers or audiences – to 
mediate and manage their anxieties associated with experimental philosophy. In laughing 
at these characters, audiences can think through their concerns, and in satirizing the 
experimental philosopher, speculative writers can influence and contribute to the 
discourse surrounding the role of the practitioner in society. 
I turn now to two characters inspired by Behn and Shadwell’s virtuosos, not with 
the goal of providing fully-fledged investigations of either, but only to draw attention to 
the development of the character type and the public’s continued fascination with works 
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that speculate about the individual practitioner. Thomas D’Urfey also presents the 
experimental philosopher as someone worthy of ridicule in his play, Wonders in the Sun 
(1706),34 which he based on Behn’s drama. D’Urfey’s satire, however, differs from 
Behn’s in that the experimental philosopher in Wonders in the Sun is actually on the 
moon, not just observing the moon from Earth. In the play’s list of characters, Domingo 
Gonzales, the protagonist and experimental philosopher, is described as “Over Curious in 
Natural Productions and Secrets in Astronomy” (13). His curiosity, in this case, is 
presented as an extreme. In the context of the play, Gonzales is accused of having “vain 
Curiosity,” in that he only pretends “to Sciences and Knowledge” (13). Similar to Doctor 
Baliardo, Gonzales is considered ridiculous because he claims knowledge when he 
actually lacks it. Philosophers, according to D’Urfey’s drama, eat “steams, luscious 
Fumes, rich edifying Smoak” (13). Figuratively, such a description associates 
experimental philosophers with feeding on that which is unsubstantial or imaginary, and 
Gonzales’s focus is on that which has no real value or substance. Consequently, though 
Gonzales may believe he is striving for experimental knowledge, that very endeavor 
clouds and obscures his reason. Like Doctor Baliardo, he is merely a fool, and his role as 
a comic figure is further enhanced by the wisdom of his servant Diego who pronounces, 
“Ah Plague on your Philosophy” (10). Diego reinforces the ridiculousness of the scientist 
when he says, “Philosophy, Philosophy, a new Maggot, his head’s full of 'em” (12). 
Associating maggots with experimental philosophy emphasizes the threatening aspects of 
																																																								
34 Wonders in the Sun was first performed in April of 1706, and it was performed five or six times and then 
withdrawn for “not having paid half the expense of its production” according to Robert Stanley Forsythe 
(150). In addition to drawing inspiration from Behn, it is also thought to be influenced by Godwin’s The 
Man in the Moone.  
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the new methods. Maggots, of course, are associated with decay, and Diego views 
Gonzales’s head as full of these dangerous and destructive influences. Furthermore, in the 
eighteenth-century, maggots were representative of strange or perverse notions and 
ideas.35 
Though one could conclude that audiences were more accepting of experimental 
philosophers by the time D’Urfey’s play premiered and that is why his play was not as 
successful as Behn’s, that does not necessarily seem the case, at least when briefly 
exploring the records associated with works about the Royal Society. Behn’s play, for 
example, was performed throughout the first part of the eighteenth century. On the other 
hand, Sprat’s initial History was not reprinted in the seventeenth century; its first reprint 
was in 1702 and then again in 1722 and 1734. Perhaps this printing history represents a 
larger shift in public attitudes, and that certain intellectual positions that seemed 
controversial in the 1660s were becoming more common and more accepted (Hunter 66). 
However, Butler’s poem was reprinted in 1759, highlighting that the public still either 
found the experimental philosopher ridiculous or at least still enjoyed poking fun at him. 
The reprinting of both Sprat’s History and Butler’s poem, in addition to the fact that 
Behn’s play was regularly performed, implies that there was still a public desire for 
works that speculated about experimental philosophers. 
Further supporting this hypothesis is the fact that D’Urfey dedicated his play to 
the Kit-Cat Club, of which both Joseph Addison and Sir Richard Steele were members. 
Addison and Steele in The Tatler and The Spectator made fun of the Royal Society 
																																																								
35 “Maggot, n.” OED. 
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Fellows repetitively and continued to ridicule their undertakings.36 In Addison’s view, 
“Certainly the mind of man, that is capable of so much higher contemplations, should not 
be altogether fixed upon such mean and disproportionate objects. Observations of this 
kind are apt to alienate us too much from the knowledge of the world, and to make us 
serious upon trifles.”37 He also argues that “Whatever looks trivial or obscene in the 
common notions of the world, looks grave and philosophical in the eye of the virtuoso.” 
In Addison’s arguments, we see reverberations of criticisms that had been lodged at the 
Royal Society thirty or forty years prior in Cavendish, Butler, Shadwell, and Behn’s 
writings: namely, that experimental philosophers concern themselves with 
inconsequential matters. Addison also highlights the difference between the common 
man and the experimental philosopher, implying that the common man concerns himself 
																																																								
36 Addison and Steele published these periodical papers that were meant to be both educational and 
entertaining between 1709 and 1714. According to Erin Mackie, The Tatler and The Spectator “addressed a 
broad variety of topics of concern to their contemporaries” and sought to “reform polite society” (ix). Both 
publications were not just commentary on culture but were “agents” in forming culture (x). Their goal was 
to “enter into the daily lives of their readers and reshape them” (2). Donald F. Bond, who edited The Tatler, 
describes it as a “miscellany of news, instruction, and entertainment” (x).  
37 The Tatler, No. 216 (1710). This entry contains the will of a virtuoso. Bond’s notation on the use of the 
name Gimcrack attributes Addison’s usage to the main character in Shadwell’s play. He writes that 
Gimcrack satirizes “experiments by members of the Royal Society” (133). There are other direct mentions 
of the Royal Society in No. 7, No. 119, and No. 236, in addition to No. 221, which I discuss in this chapter. 
No. 7, which appeared in April 1709, contains Bickerstaff’s will and testament in which he says, “I bestow 
my Learning upon the Honourary Members of the Royal Society.” Bond’s note on this argues that 
“References in the Tatler to the Royal Society are generally uncomplimentary” (65). In No. 119, Addison 
writes of the “curious Discoveries that have been made by the Help of Microscopes,” and the Royal Society 
is mentioned in a list of experiments (205, 208). Bond’s note on No. 119 explains, “Addison and Steele 
generally ridiculed the work of the Royal Society and the efforts of the virtuosi as centering upon trivial 
and unworthy objects of investigation” (206). Bond marks entry 236 as a satire of the “ingenious virtuoso 
whose scheme for importing frogs from Ireland exemplifies the dull pedantry of the virtuosi of the Royal 
Society” (220). Within the entry, Addison says that the Royal Society seems “to be in a Confederacy 
against Men of polite Genius, noble Thought, and diffusive Learning; and chuse into their Assemblies such 
as have no Pretence to Wisdom, but Want of Wit; or to natural Knowledge, but Ignorance of every Thing 
else. I have made Observations in this Matter so long, that when I meet a young Fellow that is an humble 
Admirer of the Sciences, but more dull than the rest of the Company, I conclude him to be a Fellow of the 
Royal Society” (219-20).  
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with issues that matter, while the experimental philosopher becomes consumed with 
trivialities to the point of alienation from his community.  
Addison’s Tatler #221, printed in 1710 emphasizes the idea that absorption in 
experimental philosophy leads to domestic disorder, a theme undertaken earlier by 
Shadwell and Behn. In Shadwell’s drama, for instance, the Virtuoso is cuckolded and has 
his estate removed from right under his nose, while in Behn’s play, the Doctor’s incessant 
observation of the moon leads him to neglect his daughter, establishing his home as a 
source of chaos. The experimental philosopher in D’Urfey’s play has left his wife and 
children behind so he can explore the world in the moon. In Addison’s “Letter from the 
Virtuoso’s Widow,” the widow Gimcrack writes a letter about her husband the 
experimental philosopher, who has recently passed away. Her letter is a cry for help, 
since her husband’s obsessions with experimental philosophy have left her destitute. 
Addison’s work adds another dimension to the public discourse surrounding the Royal 
Society because his criticisms, unlike those in the theatre, brought experimental 
philosophy into the coffeehouse and the readers’ home.38 
 In Mrs. Gimcrack’s letter, she indirectly criticizes her husband’s trivial studies of 
experimental philosophy by detailing the many consequences she has suffered under his 
pursuits. His decisions consisted of having her fire the gardener, for example, since Mr. 
Gimcrack believed there was no such thing as weeds. He also took to rambling through 
																																																								
38 The Tatler would have been read in the privacy of one’s own home but was also read and discussed in 
coffeehouses. Steele addresses this in the first printing in The Tatler. Although we cannot know for sure 
how popular it was or what kind of circulation it saw, Bond argues that “there can be no question as to the 
paper’s success. The steadily increasing number of advertisements, the many references to Steele and the 
Tatler by contemporaries, and the host of imitators, both friendly and hostile – all indicate that the Tatler 
was widely read and discussed” (Bond xix-xx). He details the increase of advertisements from forty-two in 
May 1709 to a monthly average of over 150 by 1710 (xx). 
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the country, returning home with his pockets full of “moss and pebbles” (154). There is a 
kind of idleness associated with Mr. Gimcrack, and Addison’s satire is amusing. In this 
case, however, the experimental philosopher’s focus on the trivial is presented as 
something larger than a source of mockery. His attentions are portrayed as unnecessary 
and as damaging to his both his life and to his wife. Mr. Gimcrack, in fact, dies because 
he chased a “very odd-coloured butterfly” over the course of five miles and half of a day, 
resulting in a fever that killed him (154-55).39 Despite immoderate pursuits that led him 
to his death bed, Gimcrack’s dying request was for his wife to “bring him a flea which he 
had kept for several months in a chain,” so that he could release the flea from its captivity 
(155). His deathbed instructions further underscore his misplaced focus, which should be 
on his wife and family, but are still concerned with inconsequential experiments.  
 The criticisms of male experimental philosophers, who are also husbands and 
fathers, reflect a larger issue connected to British concerns. As patriarchal figures, the 
families mentioned in each of the aforementioned texts could be read as microcosms of 
the nation and its vulnerabilities. As stated previously, the Royal Society regarded itself 
as an institution that might be able to heal the nation after the strife associated with the 
civil wars and Interregnum. Sprat, in fact, saw the Baconian method as something that 
could rebuild English nationhood (Lynch 32). The Restoration itself resulted in a “flurry 
of examination,” focused precisely on what united the English together as a nation 
(Lynch 159). What tended to emerge, especially in opposition to what was viewed as the 
																																																								
39 Gimcrack’s death serves as an interesting parallel to Bacon’s death. According to Rose-Mary Sargent, it 
was Bacon’s interests in investigating nature that “hastened his death.” She notes that Bacon died in 1626 
from a respiratory illness that was “apparently aggravated by a chill he had received while gathering snow 
for an experiment designed to test the ability of cold to preserve the flesh of fowl” (x).  
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frenzied enthusiasm prior to the Restoration, was a focus on moderation. In Sprat’s 
History, he attempts to align the experimental philosopher with English moderation, and 
he establishes the practitioner as a model citizen. One could argue that the real problem 
associated with speculative writers’ representations of experimental philosophers, is at 
least partly, a lack of moderation. The rhetoric of moderation in the Restoration had a 
couple of goals, according to John Montano. First, the rhetoric attempted to end the 
division in the “body politic,” and second, it sought to emphasize moderation as one basis 
for “restoring national unity” (Montano 53). Montano asserts that any time ambition or 
selfishness overtook one’s public duties, then “disorder invariably follows” (99). The 
behavior of any of the aforementioned experimental philosophers and virtuosos could 
easily be interpreted as extreme, and English audiences and readers might perceive this 
quality as a threat to the order of the period. The fact that Mr. Gimcrack’s obsession with 
experimental philosophy kills him is not something to take lightly, especially if we read 
him as a metaphor for England as a nation.  
While the death of Mr. Gimcrack is certainly problematic, the state in which he 
leaves his family is also of public concern. His wife recounts that when she first met him, 
he had a very “handsome estate”; however, after buying a set of microscopes, he was 
selected as a Fellow in the Royal Society (153). It is at this point that Mr. Gimcrack 
seems to lose all touch with reality, even speaking in a manner that his family cannot 
comprehend. She says that after he joined the Society he no longer spoke “as other 
People did,” and that none of his family could understand him (153-54). In Addison’s 
text, we are presented with the picture of a man (or nation) both before and after his 
 
 228 
dabbling in experimental philosophy. Before, his family is comfortable, well taken care 
of, and respected. After becoming a member of the Royal Society, however, he sacrifices 
the well-being of his family in order to finance his scientific whims and experiments.40 
Her husband’s behavior often gave Mrs. Gimcrack a “heavy heart,” especially as he 
began to sell off his estate in order to purchase “strange baubles,” items she later recounts 
as a “parcel of dried spiders,” “cockle-shells,” and “beetles” (154). These items are all 
she has left, and the purpose of her letter is to ask for assistance in how to sell them in the 
best, most efficient manner so as not to be destitute. 
When considering the speculative writing in this chapter as a whole, the concerns 
and anxieties within each work often overlap with one another. As touted by the Royal 
Society, the methods represented a radical break in worldview, and speculative writing 
responds anxiously to this new epistemology. Each text reinforces the dangers of relying 
on experimental philosophy for valid avenues to truth, thereby setting up the 
experimental philosopher as an object of ridicule. Each piece forwards the idea that 
experimental philosophers are not just comic figures; they are figures of which to beware, 
for they have the potential to wreak both domestic and national havoc. As such, each of 
the pieces of literature examined within this chapter offer moral warnings to their readers. 
When the doctor in Behn’s play refers to his books as “vile Contagious Lies” (205), we 
are presented with an interesting insight into the dangers of the experimental philosophy; 
it is contagious. It is morally despicable, and it has the power to spread. In light of the 
																																																								
40 Though the Royal Society received a Royal sanction, it did not receive government funding. Each 
member of the Society was required to pay an initial fee to gain membership, in addition to monthly dues. 
Experimental philosophers had to finance their own experiments, as well.  
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criticisms employed in these texts, being an experimental philosopher seems to be one of 
the lowest forms of work a man can pursue. In The Virtuoso Bruce remarks that “one 
bricklayer is worth forty philosophers” (IV, iii, 219-20). In D’Urfey’s drama, Diego 
laments working for Gonzales and not keeping his first job at the plough. In his view 
even working for a “Dagling Lawyer, or a Stockjobbing Citt, or a wholesale Horridan” 
would be better than working for a “Philosopher, one that is climbing the Devil knows 
where, into the Sun; one that studies the Nature of Magots and Humble bees” (44). Diego 
further aligns the pursuit of experimental philosophy with the trivial, but more 
importantly with immoral and unworthy work. It seems that no matter which 
interpretation a reader or viewer was exposed to, the experimental philosopher was 
viewed with “every variety of Restoration anxiety” (Parkin 120). It is no wonder that 
Sprat and the Royal Society felt such a need to defend themselves, but it is also 
understandable why British citizens might be concerned about the implications the new 
experimental philosophy could have for their country.  
Speculative writing in the Restoration and the eighteenth century, then, becomes a 
unique mode through which a reader can investigate these new forms of knowledge 
formation, in light of how they interact with and conflict with established truths of the 
day and how they speak back to epistemological shifts. Speculative writing directed 
specifically at the Royal Society does much more than merely critique the Society’s 
work; it also speculates about the role art and the imagination can have in knowledge 
formation, as I will allude to in my final chapter. Astell’s “The Character of the 
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 Vertuoso” emphasizes another Restoration anxiety associated with experimental  
philosophy – its lack of utility: 
 
 
To what purpose is it, that these Gentlemen ransack all Parts both of Earth and 
Sea to procure these Triffles? . . . I know that the desire of knowledge, and the 
discovery of things yet unknown is the Pretence; but what Knowledge is it? What 
Discoveries do we owe to their Labours? It is only the Discovery of some few 
unheeded Varieties of Plants, Shells, or Insects, unheeded only because useless; 
and the Knowledge, they boast so much of, is no more than a Register of their 
Names, and Marks of Distinction only. (102-103) 
 
 
Astell speaks to one of the main ways people worried about experimental philosophy: 
what exactly is the point of it? Astell is right in considering the motives behind these 
discoveries, and when she asks if the point is to boast and get recognition of some kind, 
her question underscores a common concern associated with experimental philosophers – 
their hubris, an element common to this character type in many later writings that fall 
under the label of science fiction. Consequently, works such as those considered in this 
chapter contribute to the development of the genre of science fiction and to the 
development of scientists as characters in literature. Margaret Atwood, in her essay “Of 
the Madness of Mad Scientists: Jonathan Swift’s Grand Academy,” posits the following 
questions: “Where did the mad scientist stock figure come from? How did the scientist – 
the imagined kind – become so very deluded and/or demented” (39)? She offers Jonathan 
Swift as the missing link and associates his representation of experimental philosophers 
in Gulliver’s Travels as connected directly to the Royal Society. Atwood goes on to claim 
that without the Royal Society, there could never have been Gulliver’s Travels, and that 
without Swift’s text, there would be no mad scientists in books or film, thereafter. 
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Atwood is certainly correct to see a correlation between the Royal Society and Swift’s 
novel, but authors like Butler, Shadwell, Behn, D’Urfey, and Addison were promoting 
this image of the deluded scientist years, and sometimes decades, before Swift introduced 
readers to experimental philosophers who attempt to extract sunbeams from cucumbers.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION: “TWO WORLDS AT THE END OF THEIR POLES”:  
THE NEED FOR “SCIENCE” AND ART 
 
 
The man of science observes his own and the reports of other people’s more 
public experiences; conceptualizes them in terms of some language, verbal or 
mathematical, common to the members of his cultural group; correlates these 
concepts in a logically coherent system; then looks for “operational definitions” 
of his concepts in the world of nature, and tries to prove, by observation and 
experiment, that his logical conclusions correspond to certain aspects of events 
taking place “out there.” In his own way, the man of letters is also an observer, 
organizer and communicator of his own and other people’s more public 
experiences of events taking place in the world of nature, culture and language. 
Viewed in a certain way, such experiences constitute the raw material of many 
branches of science. They are also the raw material of much poetry, many dramas, 
novels, and essays. 
           Aldous Huxley, Literature and Science1 
 
 
 Huxley is perhaps best known for his novel Brave New World, a work that blends 
science with speculation by forecasting the capabilities of reproductive technology and its 
possible impacts on society.2 In the above excerpt, taken from his treatise entitled 
Literature and Science, Huxley argues for the similarities between scientists and writers, 
both of whom observe the world and communicate their findings to the public. Each of 
them, in Huxley’s view, look “out there” and seek to make meaning of what they see, the 
scientist through conception, systemization, experimentation, and observation, and the 
																																																								
1 pg. 5-6. 
2 Huxley’s family had strong ties to science. His brothers Sir Julian Sorell Huxley and Sir Andrew Fielding 
Huxley were both scientists. The former was an evolutionary biologist and eugenicist, and the latter was a 
physiologist and biophysicist who won the Nobel Prize in 1963. Huxley was also the grandson of Thomas 
Henry Huxley, a zoologist often referred to as “Darwin’s Bulldog.” 
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man of letters through organization and communication, in addition to observation. What 
Huxley recognizes is the deep connection between scientific and literary pursuits, in that 
the source of each is the same. Both the scientist and the writer draw from their own 
experience and the experiences of others to make sense of the world. They both 
investigate nature, culture, and language – each of these serves as the “raw material” for 
their initial observations and eventual conclusions. In understanding the similarities of 
both endeavors, Huxley bridges two pursuits that are often viewed as divergent ones. In 
investigating the cultural products of the Restoration and early eighteenth century, I hope 
I have also exemplified how similar experimental philosophy and speculative writing 
were in terms of their influence on culture and knowledge production.  
In both the study of science and the study of literature, it has become 
commonplace among scholars to debate and determine the point of origin for things such 
as empiricism or science fiction. But looking for the definitive beginning of something 
seems bound to fail because change never happens instantaneously. In investigating 
multiple cultural documents that range from dictionaries to philosophical treatises to what 
we today consider “literature,” we can better understand how many genres of writing 
assist in the production of knowledge. Epistemological shifts, therefore, are not just 
represented in the work of experimental philosophers such as Robert Boyle or Robert 
Hooke, and the formation of the Royal Society did not happen outside of culture. In 
looking at dictionary definitions, speculative prose, and speculative drama, we receive a 
new and more nuanced understanding of how knowledge forms. Through the exploration 
of these varied kinds of writing, we can also explore how science emerged and changed 
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culture. Experimental and speculative philosophy, therefore, does not just happen in 
specialized and localized places, such as the laboratory. Experimental philosophy also 
happens and becomes part of culture when people read about it in coffeehouses, enact it 
on the stage, and imagine other systems in other worlds through speculative prose and 
poetry.  
 In thinking about the shifts in natural philosophy or how experimental philosophy 
attempted to break away from speculative philosophy, I chose to focus on a narrow 
segment of time, in which the experimental agenda was institutionalized and sanctioned 
by the king. The formation of the Royal Society in 1660 represents one way in which 
epistemology shifted through the establishment of an institution, and it is an important 
moment to consider because of the public nature of its experimental program and its 
public defense in 1667. Likewise, in this study the public responses to the Royal Society 
and its activities, evaluated in examples of speculative writing, represent a narrow span of 
time – just a few decades after the Restoration. The limited number of speculative 
writings I have explored cannot represent the range of responses to the rise of 
experimental philosophy, including the concerns that these kinds of writings articulated. 
There is much that remains to be explored. I could have studied speculative writings that 
praise the Royal Society, or investigated how experimental philosophy shifted notions of 
the self and subjectivity, or examined how genre and form developed in certain directions 
because of this major shift in knowledge formation. There is also room to point toward 
some patterns regarding representations of technology in speculative writing – Bacon’s 
predictions of the posthuman or Cavendish’s use of technology as instruments of war, for 
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example. Because the scope has been limited, I was able to investigate a specific kind of 
response toward the early Royal Society, one filled with an anxious undertone about the 
best ways to produce knowledge, whether through experimental or speculative methods. 
In contemplating experimental philosophy, speculative writers bring to light a concern 
about the Royal Society that focuses on its impracticality, the dangers of immoderate 
obsession, its potential effects on destabilizing gender norms, and the downfall that 
comes with a disordered household. Just under the surface, these anxieties are connected 
to larger political and societal ones, for if Britain’s greatest minds cannot temper their 
own egos and find useful ways to benefit the kingdom there lurks a threat to the nation at 
large. 
These concerns do not vanish once the period known as the Restoration ends and 
the eighteenth century begins, which is evident in speculative texts that continue to 
speculate on experimental philosophy. A particular text of note is Book III of Jonathan 
Swift’s 1726 satire Gulliver’s Travels, another example of speculative writing that 
focuses specifically on the Royal Society. In looking at Gulliver’s Travels, it is not my 
intent to perform a detailed reading of the text or to draw out larger implications related 
to its critique of the Royal Society, for in leaping forward in time by several decades, the 
cultural and political world has shifted and the Royal Society itself has changed. Instead, 
I look to Swift’s speculative text to connect some common themes to those discussed in 
the preceding chapters and to make a case for how speculation continued to inform 
literary writing in the eighteenth century. A text such as Swift’s also highlights the 
prominent, public position that the Royal Society still maintained within culture.  
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Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels was popular, and at the same time, the Royal Society 
also continued to capture the public’s imagination. According to J. Paul Hunter, the first 
printing of Gulliver’s Travels “sold out in a matter of days, and within five weeks two 
more printings were issued […]; the book’s fame spread quickly throughout both 
England and Ireland” [and], “it quickly became a conversation piece” (216). Book III 
focuses on the fictional island of Laputa, an island that floats above the earth using the 
technology of a magnetic “loadstone,” and the capital city of Lagado, where the Grand 
Academy of projectors is located. This Grand Academy is a direct critique of the Royal 
Society, and its projectors stand in for the Society’s Fellows.3 Scholars such as Frederik 
Smith have established that the Society’s Philosophical Transactions inspired Book III. 
These Transactions contained the “latest news” on experimental philosophy, and they 
“were widely read, and not only by scientists […] but by well-read laymen generally” 
(139). Because both the experimental and speculative texts –Transactions and Gulliver’s 
Travels, respectively – proved so popular, we can infer that elements of each captured the 
public’s enthusiasm and imagination. In writing a satire that enters into a discourse with 
the Transactions, Swift combines the experimental with the speculative. 
 
																																																								
3 For scholarship that claims Swift rejects natural philosophy altogether see Richard Foster Jones, “The 
Background of the Attack on Science” (1949); John Sutherland, “A Reconsideration of Gulliver’s Third 
Voyage” (1957); John Hill, “Corpuscular Fundament: Swift and the Mechanical Philosophy” (1975); 
Richard G. Olson, “Tory-High Church Opposition to Science and Scientism in the 18c: The Works of John 
Arbuthnot, Jonathan Swift, and Samuel Johnson” (1983); and Dennis Todd, “Laputa, the Whore of 
Babylon, and the Idols of Science” (1978). S. H. Gould, “Gulliver and the Moons of Mars” (1945), and 
Colin Kiernan, “Swift and Science” (1971), contend that Swift was a supporter of natural philosophy. For 
more of a middle ground, where Swift is presented as both critical and enthusiastic of natural philosophy, 
see George Reuben Potter, “Swift and Natural Science” (1941); Frederick N. Smith, “Science, Imagination, 
and Swift’s Brobdingnagians” (1990); and Douglas Lane Patey, “Swift’s Satire on ‘Science’ and the 
Structure of Gulliver’s Travels” (1991).  
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Swift’s response to the Royal Society is filled with ridicule. Similar to Margaret 
Cavendish’s critiques in Blazing World, one of Swift’s criticisms centers on the 
denigration of the imagination by the Royal Society. While on Laputa, Gulliver observes 
his surroundings and the behaviors of mathematicians there and comes to the conclusion 
that “they are very bad Reasoners […]. Imagination, Fancy, and Invention, they are 
wholly strangers to” (Swift 234-35).4 Their lack of imagination results in clothing that is 
“ill made” and uncomfortable and houses that are “ill built” and defective (232, 34). Not 
only do they construct materials in error and disregard those errors, but they also are 
unable to conceive of other subjects; they are utterly perplexed by anything outside their 
area of study (235). Gulliver’s critique draws attention to the ridiculousness of a practice 
that exists without fancy. Without fancy, the projectors can only calculate and produce 
based upon their calculations, exemplifying that experimental philosophy also lacks 
practicality when it is bereft of fancy. Gulliver’s description implies that the multiple 
errors result because there is a lack of creative foresight, or the ability to suppose and 
think through the possible ramifications of the formulas they employ. Without the 
imaginative faculty, their methods are more prone to error. They also lack the curiosity  
needed to look outside their disciplines for other types of solutions and other ways of 
knowing.  
As we have seen in the speculative writing discussed in chapters four and five, 
excessive and obsessive behavior, especially when focused on impracticality, raises 
																																																								
4 It is important to note that Gulliver is not always the most reliable narrator. His descriptions are very 
exact; however, he is sometimes a naïve observer, in that he does not seem to acknowledge the limitations 
of his own viewpoint. In Part III, though, not much happens to Gulliver, and much of his narration details 
what he observes.  
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concerns about moderation and pragmatism within the practice of experimental 
philosophy. When Gulliver takes a tour of the Grand Academy, he details the absurdity of 
the projectors’ experiments, a critique reminiscent of the behaviors seen in characters 
such as Gimcrack and Baliardo. Gulliver is introduced to a projector who has spent eight 
years “upon a Project for extracting Sun-Beams out of Cucumbers” (260). Although he 
has thus far been unsuccessful, the projector believes that in eight more years he will 
probably have a breakthrough. Another projector focuses on “reducing human Excrement 
to its original Food,” while another tries to burn “Ice into Gun-Powder,” and someone 
else hopes to turn cobwebs into silk (260, 61). Still another’s experimentation on a dog 
results in the dog’s death, after having bellows placed in his anus (264). These 
experiments represent a small sampling of the ones Gulliver observes, but each of them is 
connected by its lack of usefulness. Some of them, such as trying to turn marble into a 
pillow, seem completely unnecessary, as well. These practitioners do not just focus their 
energies on nonsense, however; their obsessive pursuit of knowledge also leads to 
weakness in their physical bodies. Gulliver comments on one projector’s “meager 
Aspect” and his beard that has become “ragged and singed” (259). In another chamber 
Gulliver is “overcome with a horrible stink” (260), and he describes a different projector 
by observing that “His Hands and Cloths [were] dawbed over with Filth” (260). The 
experimental philosophers have let their work overtake them to a degree that it affects 
their appearance and their cleanliness.  
As was established in discussions of the speculative works by Cavendish, 
Shadwell, and Behn, this excessive behavior wreaks havoc beyond the individual 
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practitioner. Gulliver mentions husbands who do not notice their wives’ infidelities, 
despite the fact that those indiscretions are occurring right in front of their faces (237), 
indicating an imbalance within the domestic space. Of even more concern, however, is 
the great danger that the Grand Academy represents for the city of Lagado. The city, as a 
whole, seems to lie in ruins and at the root of their troubles is the formation of the 
Academy, which occurred forty years prior, after a group of citizens visited Laputa for 
five months. Upon their return, they “began to dislike the Management of every thing 
below, and fell into Schemes of putting all Arts, Sciences, Languages, and Mechanicks 
upon a new Foot” (255). Their desire for change results in a system that has not yet been 
“brought to Perfection, and in the mean time the whole Country lies miserable in wast” 
(256). In attempting to gain knowledge about the natural world, their own world has 
fallen apart. After spending time observing Lagado, Gulliver remarks, “I did not discover 
any good Effects they produced; on the contrary, I never knew a Soil so unhappily 
cultivated, Houses so ill contrived and so ruinous, or a People whose Countenances and 
Habit expressed so much Misery and Want” (251-52). In the span of just a few decades, 
the Grand Academy’s pursuits and experimentations have destroyed their society. It is 
not just that people are poor and hungry, but Lagado’s citizens are unhappy, as well. 
Their quality of life has suffered and their needs have increased. One might think that 
such drastic and negative consequences might deter the projectors from their selfish 
ambitions. Quite the contrary, however: instead of being discouraged, they are “fifty 
times more violently bent upon prosecuting their Schemes, driven equally on by Hope 
and Despair” (257).  
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 Despite the popularity of Gulliver’s Travels and the fact that Swift enters the 
discourse surrounding the Royal Society, critics have often disregarded and sometimes 
denigrated Book III. According to Hunter, even Swift’s contemporaries were hesitant 
about parts of Book III (217). Unlike the other three books, Swift is often faulted for 
Book III, and it is frequently dismissed as a complete failure. As such, it is a text that has 
not received a lot of scholarly attention. Robert Phiddian notes that Book III is the “least 
popular and least studied part of Gulliver’s Travels,” and that no matter which scholars 
attempt to come to the book’s defense, none has been able to dispel the belief that “it is a 
rather messy, miscellaneous, and even fragmented section” (50). Other critiques of Book 
III center on its incoherence, its dullness, its lack of literary value, and its focus on 
allusions that are too contemporary.5  
 Of Restoration and eighteenth-century examples of speculative writing, Swift’s 
Book III is not alone in being derided or neglected by critics. Although Cavendish’s 
																																																								
5 Bruce Olsen sees coherence and a “conscious arrangement of ideas” among Books I, II, and IV (11). Paul 
Alkon remarks that Swift’s rhetorical stance is too negative, which makes Book III seem “the weakest” 
(13). William Eddy issues one of the most scathing critiques of Book III: “The third part of Gulliver’s 
Travels is at once the longest and the worst. It is a miscellany of unrelated situations that are, with one 
exception, Struldbruggland, uninspired and dull. There is here no attempt to create an agreeable world of 
the imagination.” Because of these faults, he says, “it would be the apotheosis of pedantry for me to attempt 
to enlist interest where Swift himself failed” (157). Bonamy Dobrée argues, “this voyage has never been 
popular […] it seems at first sight too much of a rag-bag of all the left-overs in Swift’s satirical armoury; 
both the scientific references and the political ones are at once too contemporary and too recondite” (329). 
Marjorie Nicolson and Nora M. Mohler’s article “The Scientific Background of Swift’s Voyage to Laputa” 
is the first to offer a sustained investigation into the connections between Swift’s ideas and the 
Philosophical Transactions and the Royal Society. Even they remark, “There is a general agreement that in 
interest and literary merit it falls short of the first two voyages […] it lacks philosophic intuition. Any 
reader sensitive to literary values must so far agree with the critics who disparage the tale” (110). For other 
scholarship on Book III’s value see: Clive T. Probyn, “Swift and Linguistics: The Context behind Lagado 
and around the Fourth Voyage” (1974); Jenny Mezciems, “The Unity of Swift’s ‘Voyage to Laputa’: 
Structure as Meaning in Utopian Fiction” (1977); Dennis Todd, “Laputa, the Whore of Babylon, and the 
Idols of Science” (1978); James A. Swearingen, “Time and Technique in Gulliver’s Third Voyage” (1982); 
Michael DePorte, “Teaching the Third Voyage” (1988); Douglas Lane Patey, “Swift’s Satire on ‘Science’ 
and the Structure of Gulliver’s Travels” (1991); and Walter Freedman, “Swift’s Struldbruggs, Progress, and 
the Analogy of History” (1995). 
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works have received more scholarly consideration in recent decades, her work is still 
often discussed in similar terms to Swift’s Book III. Blazing World is said to have little 
narrative coherence and readers are advised to not expect her writing to make sense. As I 
discussed in the last chapter, Aphra Behn’s play The Emperor of the Moon was the 
second-most (if not the most) popular of all her plays; yet, there has been very little 
scholarship on it.6 Samuel Butler’s poem “The Elephant and the Moon” has not received 
the attention it deserves, despite it being his most ambitious work after Hudibras. There 
seems to be a difference between these texts that had cultural relevance at the time and 
those we now deem as worthy of study. Perhaps that difference arises due to subject 
matter and the fact that some of these writings have been relegated to works of science 
fiction.  
 Scholars who study science fiction tend to label texts such as Blazing World and 
Book III of Gulliver’s Travels as science fiction or as precursors to science fiction. In 
some cases, Book III is seen as the very archetype of science fiction (Alkon 164).7 
Anachronistically labeling Swift’s work as science fiction marks his writing as something 
unique or isolated in its time. Milton Millhauser contends that Swift’s views about 
																																																								
6 As I mentioned in chapter 4, Derek Hughes cautions readers to not over interpret the play in The Theatre 
of Aprha Behn (171). 
7 Alkon makes it clear that Book I and II are only “adventure-fantasy, no matter how much they may be 
inspired by the microscope and telescope.” Part IV, he says is a “variety of utopia,” but Gulliver’s third 
voyage is science fiction but “only while he is on the Flying Island, in Lagado, and among the 
Struldbruggs” (13). For other scholarship on Book III as science fiction see Samuel Holt Monk who claims 
that Gulliver’s Travels “is at once science fiction and a witty parody of science fiction” (48). Robert M. 
Philmus analyzed Lagado and Laputa to show that “although Gulliver’s Travels is not science fiction, 
strictly defined, in […] episodes like these a technique of presenting science as fiction can be perceived 
which anticipates the science fiction of later writers” (12). Darko Suvin argues that “Swift created the great 
model for all subsequent SF [science fiction]” (113), and Neil Barron contends, “Of its seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century contemporaries, Gulliver’s Travels probably remains the most important to 
contemporary science fiction from Wells onward because of the bitterly critical tone it takes toward 
humanity” (80).  
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experimental philosophy are “exceptional” for the period and that his is the only work of 
fiction from this time period that retains “any currency and that include[s] any significant 
treatment of science and scientists” (290, 287). Clearly, as my study has shown, there are 
other authors who take on experimental philosophy and its practitioners as one of their 
main themes, so Swift’s critiques are not all that exceptional; however, as with trying to 
determine a starting point for science, it is also problematic to attempt to label a work as 
the originator of the science fiction genre. The writings I have studied are fictional in that 
they create a space of imagined realities and fictitious characters, but they are not 
necessarily prose fiction. More important than conventions of genre, however, is the 
reduction that occurs when we label early modern texts as science fiction. Doing so 
causes a loss in our appreciation of the cultural moment. When speculative writing is 
classified as science fiction, that writing is simplified because we lose sight of the 
cultural discourse that was happening at the time over whether the speculative or the 
experimental was more valuable. Disregarding that conversation inhibits us from 
understanding why the turn to speculative writing was so important, in that it arose at a 
moment in which the speculative was being denigrated.  
 Studying speculative writing in tandem with experimental philosophy also 
reminds us of the beginnings of the separation between art and what we now know as 
science. The Royal Society positioned their experimental method as the new and modern 
approach to knowledge and aligned the speculative with ancient philosophy. It is within 
this context of the “quarrel between Ancients and Moderns” that we see the beginnings of 
“science” as a distinct and progressive form and one that eventually is positioned in 
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opposition to art and the humanities (Patey 810). Swift represents the division between 
these modes of learning by having the Academy’s various buildings be divided into 
different schools, based on that which they see as practical (or experimental philosophy) 
and those who are the “Advancers of speculative Learning” (265). Today we understand 
the division between art and science, but we do not always acknowledge or understand 
the interplay between the two, and this interplay is culturally important. There was a need 
for art and the imagination at this particular historical moment for understanding 
experimental philosophy better, and there remains a need for both today for the same 
reasons. The speculative serves as a bridge between literature and science, and yet we are 
not paying it the attention it deserves – either in studying literature or in studying science.  
 Speculative writing allows for ambiguity, and although it does not provide readers 
with the definitive “matters of fact” that experimental philosophy claims to provide, it 
leads us to a more complex understanding of knowledge formation. Speculative writing 
interprets cultural events and in doing so, it helps “to define a new national tradition of 
identity, ideas, values, and literature” (Hunter 220). Texts such as Thomas Sprat’s The 
History of the Royal Society and writings such as Blazing World raise similar questions: 
how does one find truth? On what do we base that truth? What is the relationship between 
truth and fact? Between truth and imagination? Speculative writing, I believe, also 
undermines the stability of truth. As Smith notes, a text such as Gulliver’s Travels allows 
for readers to “consider some important questions regarding the assumptions” of both 
kinds of discourse – “scientific” discourse and the discourse that is speculative writing 
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(157). Huxley’s text on science and literature implies that these assumptions will only   
lead us to incomplete truth: 
 
 
Thought is crude, matter unimaginably subtle. Words are few and can only be 
arranged in certain conventionally fixed ways; the counterpoint of unique events 
is infinitely wide and their succession indefinitely long. That the purified 
language of science, or even the richer purified language of literature should ever 
be adequate to the givenness of the world and of our experience is, in the very 
nature of things, impossible. Cheerfully accepting the fact, let us advance 
together, men of letters and men of science, further and further into the ever-
expanding regions of the unknown. (118) 
 
 
It is in the in-between, according to Huxley, that we can truly advance toward 
knowledge. By acknowledging the limitations of both science and art and their inability 
to ever completely represent the range of experience or the vastness of nature, we can 
look to both science and art to equip us to better understand that which can seem 
unfathomable. Speculative writing combines logic and fancy, and it is in that combination 
where we can find more nuanced understanding. Cavendish describes how she wants her 
reader to view her Observations and Blazing World, two seemingly different texts. She 
says that she joined these two pieces of writing together “as two Worlds at the ends of 
their Poles” (153). In other words, the philosophical treatise and the speculative prose are 
joined together along the same continuum. Cavendish’s description is how I propose we 
view the speculative writing and experimental philosophy of this time, as part of the same 
structure. We must move between the two ends of the poles and find truth within the 
interplay.    
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